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ABSTRACT
UNLEASHING THE LEVIATHAN
: Against Common Interpretations and a Contemporary Decision-Theoretic
Reconstruction of Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy
Hun Chung, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2012
My dissertation consists of two parts. Part I “Unleashing the Leviathan” attempts to
free Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy from three commonly held interpretations. In
chapter 1, I free Hobbes from the preference-satisfaction theory of the good. The preference-
satisfaction theory of the good claims that what is good for each individual is simply to
satisfy his or her current preferences or desires. I show that this is not the case for Hobbes,
since the entire system of Hobbes entirely rests on the assumption that self-preservation is
objectively each and every individual’s greatest good. In chapter 2, I free Hobbes from
the Humean conception of instrumental rationality. This purely instrumental conception of
rationality assumes that no preferences or desires can properly be said to be irrational in
themselves, and that the role of reason or rationality can only be confined to: (a) informing
the agent with true beliefs about the world, and (b) revealing the most effective means that
could satisfy the current ends (whatever they are) that the agent happens to have. I show
that this is not the case for Hobbes, since, for Hobbes, self-preservation is the very aim of
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rationality. In chapter 3, I free Hobbes from psychological egoism. Psychological egoism is
a theory of human psychology that claims that all human beings are motivated solely by their
own self-interest. I argue that not only was Hobbes not committed to psychological egoism
in any of its plausible formulations, I also argue that, unlike what people commonly think,
psychological egoism is not even needed for Hobbes’s political philosophy.
In Part II “Reinvigorating the Leviathan”, I provide a contemporary reconstruction of
Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy in the lights of formal decision theory and modern
game theory. In chapter 4, I reinterpret Hobbes’s theory of the good as a version of what
is, now, known as an ideal-advisor theory of the good. An ideal-advisor theory of the good
maintains that what is really good for a given individual is to satisfy the type of preferences
that his/her fully-rational self would form on behalf of his/her actual self. In chapter 5, I pro-
vide a formal representation of Hobbes’s theory of the good in terms of contemporary utility
theory. In Chapter 6, I analyze Hobbes’s state of nature. There, I argue against conventional
attempts to understand Hobbes’s state of nature as a game of Prisoner’s Dilemma. As an
alternative, I provide three game-theoretic models that utilize the tools of modern Bayesian
game-theory. Not only do these three Bayesian game-theoretic models respect what is actu-
ally written in Hobbes’s original text, but they also show how universal conflict can inevitably
emerge as a stable equilibrium due to uncertainty, without assuming psychological egoism.
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Part I
UNLEASHING THE LEVIATHAN
7
General Introduction for Part I
This dissertation consists in two large parts. In Part I, “Unleashing the Leviathan”, I attempt
to free Hobbes’ moral and political philosophy from a number of commonly held interpre-
tations for his views. In Part II, “Reinvigorating the Leviathan”, I attempt to reconstruct
Hobbes’s theory of the good as well as his description of the state of nature in the lights of
contemporary decision theory and game theory. Part I consists in three chapters, which are
all designed to free Hobbes from a certain kind of interpretation that is commonly given to
his views (usually by people who are generally known as the Hobbesian contractarianists.1)
My arguments as well as my interpretive reconstruction of Hobbes’ theory of human
psychology and his theory of good will be based primarily on textual evidence that can be
found from Leviathan2, De Homine.3, and On the Citizen4, which are all regarded as the
representative works of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy. There are basically three
commonly held interpretations that are attributed to Hobbes’s views.
The first common understanding of Hobbes is that Hobbes has proposed the simplest
form of what is known as “the preference-satisfaction theory of good”. The preference-
satisfaction theory of good claims that what is good for each individual at any given time is
simply to satisfy his or her current preferences or desires. The preference-satisfaction theory
1See Gauthier 1969, 1984, Hampton 1986, Kavka 1986
2Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668), (edited, with introduc-
tion, by Edwin Curley), Hackett (1994). All citations from Leviathan are made from this text.
3Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive), (edited by Bernard Gert), Hackett (1991).
All citations from De Homine are made from this text.
4Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen (edited by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne), Cambridge (1997).
All citations from On the Citizen are made from this text.
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of good is quite problematic, especially because it seems that people occasionally do prefer
things that are not actually good for them. For example, I might prefer to play video games
rather than to study for an important exam that is scheduled the very next day. However, it
seems hardly true that playing video games would really be good for me or would be in my
best interest simply because I had preferred so. However, many people commonly think that
Hobbes was committed to such view in its most simplistic form.5
The second common understanding of Hobbes is that Hobbes was a precursor and an
advocate of what is now known as “the Humean theory of instrumental rationality”. The
Humean theory of instrumental rationality is a view that is often attributed to David Hume
on the basis of what he wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature. The view claims that no
preferences or desires can properly be said to be irrational in themselves, and that the role
of reason or rationality can only be confined to: (a) informing the agent with true beliefs
about the world, and (b) revealing the most effective means that could satisfy the current
ends (whatever they are) that the agent happens to have. It is controversial whether Hume
actually held this view. However, it is very common to think that Hobbes was committed to
such view of rationality and reason.6
The third common understanding of Hobbes is that Hobbes was a “psychological ego-
ist”.7 Psychological egoism is a theory of human psychology that claims that all human
5See [Gauthier, 1984, Hampton, 1986, Railton, 1986b] I will quote the specific passages where these au-
thors attribute the preference-satisfaction theory of good to Hobbes later on. There are certain versions of the
preference-satisfaction theory of good that claims that what is good for an individual is to satisfy his or her
idealized preferences. I have put “in its most simplistic form” to indicate that I am not referring to such an
idealized preference-satisfaction theory of the good.
6See [Gauthier, 1969, Hampton, 1986] Again, I will quote the specific passages where these authors attribute
the Humean conception of instrumental rationality to Hobbes later on.
7See [Butler, 1983, Hume, 1975, Broad, 1950]. [Kavka, 1986] thinks that some textual evidence does
suggests that Hobbes was a psychological egoist, but thinks that only a weakened version of psychological
egoism, which he calls “Predominant Egoism” is needed for Hobbes’s political philosophy to work. [McNeilly,
1966] thinks that Hobbes was at least committed to psychological egoism in his earlier works. [Hampton, 1986,
pp. 20-24] interprets Hobbes as a psychological egoist who maintains that all of our desires are caused by a
“self-interested” bodily mechanism, and opposes the idea of interpreting Hobbes as a psychological egoist who
claims that all of our desires have self-regarding content. In other words, according to Hampton, Hobbes does
allow people to have certain kinds of other-regarding desires. However, according to Hampton, these other-
regarding desires play absolutely no role in Hobbes’s political argument that it is not entirely unreasonable to
regard Hobbes as a psychological egoist when one is trying to understand his political philosophy. Gert [1967,
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actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest or self-love alone. Not only do many people
think Hobbes was a psychological egoist, but they also think that psychological egoism is
essential to his political philosophy. That is, many people think that Hobbes cannot properly
explain why it is the case, according to his view, that the state of nature would dissolve into
a state of war of all against all without relying on psychological egoism. In other words,
psychological egoism, according to the conventional interpretation, is absolutely necessary
for Hobbes’s entire political philosophy to work.
The main purpose of Part I is to argue that none of these three interpretations is, strictly
speaking, true (or at least that there are reasonable interpretations of Hobbes that free him
from such accusations). The first chapter is intended to free Hobbes from the preference-
satisfaction theory of the good. The second chapter is intended to free Hobbes from the
Humean conception of instrumental rationality. The third chapter is intended to free Hobbes
from psychological egoism.
1991, "Introduction" in Man and Citizen]denies that Hobbes was a psychological egoist and claims that he can,
at best, seen as merely, what he calls, a “tautological egoist.”
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Chapter 1
Freeing Hobbes From the
Preference-Satisfaction Theory of the
Good
It has been commonly thought that Hobbes had held the preference-satisfaction theory of
the good. The preference-satisfaction theory of the good maintains that what is good for an
individual at any given time is to satisfy his or her current preferences whatever they happen
to be. Coupled with this interpretation is the interpretation that Hobbes was committed to a
purely instrumental conception of practical rationality that foreshadows that of David Hume.
One can quite easily see that the two doctrines make a very natural combination. If one
thinks that the satisfaction of just any kind of preferences is good for the individual, then
it seems pretty natural to think that the only role that reason and rationality can play is to
inform the individual with the best available means to satisfy the type of preferences that
he/she happens to have at the current moment; reason and rationality do not tell what the
individual should rightly prefer, and are only, as Hume puts it, “slave of the passions.” The
whole purpose of this chapter and the next chapter is to show that, despite the common trend
to interpret Hobbes in these two ways, Hobbes was committed to neither of these doctrines.
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1.1 The Preference-Satisfaction Theory of the Good
As I have explained, the preference-satisfaction theory of the good maintains that what is
good for a given individual at a given time is the satisfaction of the individual’s current
desires and preferences whatever they are. The preference-satisfaction theory of the good
is also (perhaps better) known in philosophy as “the desire-satisfaction theory of the good”
or “subjectivist theory of value”. Economists generally favor the term “preference” while it
seems that philosophers tend to use the term “desire”.
The major difference between the two terms is that, unlike “desire”, “preference” has a
comparative notion built-into its very meaning. At first, such a difference might not seem to
be that significant, but it actually has a very important practical implication. For instance,
suppose that there are three objects, x, y, and z that one desires; here, suppose that one prefers
x to y to z. If so, then the desire-satisfaction theory of the good will claim that it would be
good for one to obtain any of the three objects. However, the desire-satisfaction theory of
the good would be silent on the issue of which object would be better for one to obtain if one
wasn’t able to obtain all three. By contrast, the preference-satisfaction theory of the good
would claim that it would be best for one to obtain x if one had a choice among x, y and
z, and that it would be better for one to obtain y if one had to choose between y and z. In
short, it might be argued that preference is a more useful concept than desire in the sense
that it informs us with a ranking of the various objects under consideration. I will use the
name “preference-satisfaction theory of the good” to denote the stance that is usually known
as “desire-satisfaction theory of the good” to philosophers.1
As I have mentioned, the preference-satisfaction theory of the good claims that it is
generally better for people to get what they prefer. Note that it does not say anything about
what people should prefer. If John prefers chocolate ice cream to vanilla ice cream and Jane
prefers vanilla ice cream to chocolate ice cream, then the preference-satisfaction theory of
1For a further discussion concerning the distinction between the two terms, “desire” and “preference”, see,
Broome, “Introduction: ethics out of economics” in [Broome, 1999, section 1.5]
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good claims that it is better for John to have chocolate ice cream and that it is better for Jane
to have vanilla ice cream.
Here, we can see that the preference-satisfaction theory of the good is committed to a
certain form of relativism; that is, it claims that anything that is good (or better) is good (or
better) for a specific individual, not something that is just simply good (or better) in itself.
Then, the theory supplements this relativistic notion of the good by providing an account
of how the relative good of a given individual is determined; according to the theory, an
individual’s relative goodness is determined by the individual’s current preferences. In other
words, according to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, a person’s preferences
work something very similar to a magic wand; the very fact that one prefers something
automatically makes that thing good for the person who prefers it.
So, we can say the preference-satisfaction theory of good is a conjunction of the follow-
ing two claims:
[PREFERENCE-SATISFACTION THEORY OF THE GOOD]:
1. (Relativism): what is good is good for a specific individual, not what is simply good
in itself.
2. (Subjectivism): the good of a given individual at any given time is determined by his
or her current preferences (or desires).
Most commentators think that Hobbes had adopted the preference-satisfaction theory of the
good in this particular formulation. Consider how Peter Railton characterizes Hobbes’s the-
ory of good:
Perhaps the simplest relational theory of goodness is that of Hobbes, who held
that to call something good is always to speak of someone’s good, and that the
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only sense in which something can be good for someone is that he desires it.
[Railton 1986b, contained in (2003), p.49]
Similarly, consider how David Gauthier characterizes Hobbes’ theory of good:
Perhaps the classic philosophic formulation of a conception of value both sub-
jective and relative was offered in the seventeenth century by Thomas Hobbes.
. . . Hobbes links subjectivism with relativism – the view that value is dependent
on appetite or preference with the view that value is relative to each individual.
[Gauthier 1984, p. 51]
Jean Hampton also writes:
. . . Hobbes is clearly defining ‘good’ as “what we desire”, and ‘bad’ as “what
we are averse to.” . . . What is good is simply what we desire, and what we
hate simply what is bad. That this is a baldly subjectivist ethical understanding
of ‘good’ is something Hobbes seems to not only admit but also welcome. . . .
Hobbes is saying that, strictly speaking, when we use the word ‘good’ we must
use it relative to an individual or set of individuals at a particular time. [Hampton
1986, p. 29 emphasis added]
However common it is to attribute the preference-satisfaction theory of good to Hobbes,
attributing the preference-satisfaction theory of good to Hobbes has two major problems.
First of all, the preference-satisfaction theory of good is independently a very implausible
theory. People very often prefer to do things that are not actually good for them; a drug addict
has a very strong preference to take drugs, but it would be quite absurd to claim that giving
drugs to this drug addict would really be good for him/her. 2 Therefore, the fact that Hobbes
2From this, it has also been argued that the preference-satisfaction theory of good cannot be a basis for
social goodness or social welfare which is the prime objective that welfare economics aims to achieve.See
Broome, “Introduction: ethics out of economics” contained in [Broome, 1999, pp. 3-8], where Broome gives a
short but a very convincing argument on why the preference-satisfaction theory of the good is false.
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was committed to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, which is independently
implausible, undermines the plausibility of Hobbes’s moral philosophy.
Second, regardless of whether or not the preference-satisfaction theory of the good is
independently plausible, there are numerous pieces of textual evidence that suggest that
Hobbes did not actually adopt the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, as I will ar-
gue. The main purpose of this chapter is to show that Hobbes did not actually adopt the
preference-satisfaction theory of the good as we normally understand it.
1.2 The Key Text
Writers usually attribute the preference-satisfaction theory of the good to Hobbes on the
basis of the following passage:
But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire that is it which
he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and
of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and
contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there
being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the
man . . . [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 7] 3
The passage is generally interpreted as supporting both relativism and subjectivism which we
have seen in the previous section, which are the two major components of the preference-
satisfaction theory of the good.
3There is also another passage that people often cite to support their attribution of the preference-satisfaction
theory of good to Hobbes.
Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to
say, continual prospering, is that men call FEILICITY; [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI,
Paragraph 58]
Here, we can see that Hobbes is identifying the continuous satisfaction of a person’s own desires with the
person’s continual prospering - which is another way to say that the person is achieving his or her own good -
the result of which is normally considered to be felicity (or happiness).
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I do not intend to question whether or not Hobbes had held a relativistic view concerning
people’s good. I do think that the above passage supports such interpretation.4This means
that Hobbes’ theory of the good meets at least one part of the two constitutive claims of the
preference-satisfaction theory of the good. So, in order to show that Hobbes was not commit-
ted to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, we would have to show that Hobbes’s
theory of the good was not subjectivist (albeit being relativistic) as defined in section 1. In
other words, we would have to show that Hobbes did not think that the satisfaction of just
any kind of preferences or desires is really good for a given individual. Can this be done?
Right now, the odds are against us. In the above passage, Hobbes claims that whatever is
the object of a person’s desire is, for his or her part, called good. Here, Hobbes seems to be
claiming that it is better for one to get what one prefers regardless of what that happens to
be. That is, Hobbes seems to be saying that what is good for a given individual is determined
by the individual’s current preferences. This is subjectivism. And if so, it makes Hobbes
committed to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good.
1.3 Our Strategy: Two Ways to Show that Hobbes was
not Committed to the Preference-Satisfaction Theory
of the Good
Then, how are we to show that Hobbes was not committed to subjectivism, and was, thereby,
not committed to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good? There are two basic ways
4For, in the passage, Hobbes states that there cannot be anything that is simply and absolutely good in itself,
and that whatever is good is good in relation to a particular person and the person’s particular circumstances.
Such relativistic view is quite prevalent in Hobbes’ works. Consider,
. . . therefore one cannot speak of something as being simply good; since whatsoever is good, is
good for someone or other. . . . Therefore good is said to be relative to person, place, and time.
[Hobbes 1991: De Homine: Chapter XI, Section 3]
So, I think that it is safe to say that the theory of good that Hobbes adopts is at least relativistic.
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to do this:
1. Show that there is something that Hobbes thought to be objectively good for a given
individual regardless of whether or not he/she prefers or desires it.
2. Show that there are certain things that Hobbes thought to be objectively bad for a given
individual even when he/she prefers or desires it.
1.3.1 First Strategy: Self-Preservation as Objectively One’s Greatest Good
We start out with the first strategy: to show that there is something that Hobbes thought to
be objectively good for a given individual independent of the individual’s actual preferences
or desires. If one reads Hobbes carefully, it is not hard to discover that the major assumption
that permeates Hobbes’s entire moral and political philosophy is that self-preservation is
each and every individual’s greatest good.
Moreover, the greatest of goods for each is his own preservation. For nature
is so arranged that all desire good for themselves. Insofar as it is within their
capacities, it is necessary to desire life, health, and further, insofar as it can be
done, security of future time. [Hobbes 1991: De Homine, Chapter XI, Section
6, emphasis added]
Here, we can see what Hobbes deems to be the three major components that constitute one’s
self-preservation: it is one’s life, health, and security. Hobbes claims that whenever it is
within one’s capacities, it is necessary to desire one’s self-preservation.
The passage clearly shows that Hobbes thought that self-preservation is each and every
individual’s greatest good. What the passage does not show is that Hobbes thought that self-
preservation is objectively each and every individual’s greatest good. That is, it might be
the case that the reason why Hobbes thought that self-preservation is every human being’s
greatest good is because every human being simply desires his/her self-preservation more
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than anything else. If so, the fact that Hobbes thought that self-preservation is each and every
individual’s greatest good does not show that Hobbes was not committed to subjectivism. It
might have very well been true that Hobbes thought that what makes self-preservation the
greatest good for everybody is the fact that everybody desires it.
However, I claim that this is not the case for Hobbes. That is, I claim that, for Hobbes,
self-preservation is objectively each and every individual’s greatest good. In order to show
that, for Hobbes, the greatest goodness of self-preservation is objectively, and not subjec-
tively, determined, it is sufficient to show that Hobbes did not think that everybody, as a
matter of fact, prefers securing his/her self-preservation more than anything else, and that
Hobbes thought that self-preservation is the greatest good for even these types of people who
do not desire their self-preservation very strongly.
First of all, it is quite clear that Hobbes thought that there exist people who do not prefer
securing their self-preservation more than anything else. The most noticeable example is
what Hobbes refers to as vain-glorious men.
Also, because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security re-
quires, [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Section 4]
Vain-glorious men ... are inclined to rash engaging... [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan,
Chapter XI, Paragraph 12]
For Hobbes, glory is defined as the pleasure that one feels by self-recognizing that one has
superior power over other people.5 Vain-glorious men are of a type of people who are ob-
sessed with glory, which makes them pursue power and superiority over others much more
than what their self-preservation requires. Simply put, vain-glorious people are of a type
who desire glory much more than their self-preservation.
One should note that Hobbes did not think that everybody is vain-glorious in this way.
5“Joy arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is
called GLORYING...” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Section 39]
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In the state of nature there is in all men a will to do harm, but not for the same
reason or with equal culpability. One man practices the equality of nature (. . . )
this is the mark of modest man (. . . ) Another, supposing himself superior to
other, wants to be allowed everything (. . . ) that is the sign of an aggressive
character. In his case, the will to do harm derives from vainglory. [Hobbes
1997: On the Citizen, Chapter 1, Section 4 emphasis added]
In other words, according to Hobbes, only some people are vain-glorious; that is, only some
people prefer glory much more than their self-preservation. However, as we have just seen
above, Hobbes claims that self-preservation is the greatest good for everybody. This means
that, for Hobbes, self-preservation is the greatest good for even the vain-glorious people, who
do not desire their self-preservation more than anything else. This suggests that, for Hobbes,
the greatest goodness of self-preservation does not really depend on its being desired or
preferred by anybody.
If Hobbes was truly a subjectivist, and was, thereby, committed to the preference-satisfaction
theory of the good, he would have claimed that glory is the greatest good for the vain-glorious
people, who desire, more than anything else, their glory. It can be quite easily shown that
Hobbes did not think this way. The fact that, for Hobbes, self-preservation is objectively each
and every individual’s greatest good can be further confirmed by Hobbes’s attitude towards
those who do not desire their own self-preservation strongly enough.
The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is either great vain-
glory, which is commonly called pride and self-conceit, or great dejection of
mind. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VIII, Paraphraph 18, emphasis on
"madness" is mine]
Here, Hobbes lists what he thinks as the two major passions that cause people to act in
ways that are detrimental to their own self-preservation; according to Hobbes, the two major
passions are either vain-glory or great dejection. Please note what Hobbes says about the
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people who are being influenced by any of these two passions; Hobbes thinks that people
who are being influenced either by vain-glory or great dejection are sufferring madness.
I believe that this is a point that many scholars of Hobbes have either completely ignored
of have not taken very seriously. According to Hobbes,
... all passions that produce strange and unusual behavior are called by the gen-
eral name of madness. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan: Chapter VIII, Paragraph 20]
Hobbes is saying here that anybody who displays strange and unusual behaviors indicate
that he/she is suffering madness. In order to understand what Hobbes meant by “strange
and unusual behaviors”, we should first understand what Hobbes considers to be normal
behavior. As we have seen above, Hobbes thinks that it is necessary6 for human beings to
desire their own self-preservation more than anything else. So, for Hobbes, normal behavior
consists in behaving in ways that are consistent with the achievement of one’s long-term
self-preservation. This means that anybody who is behaving in ways that show that he/she
is not giving utmost priority to securing his/her long-term self-preservation, and is actually
acting in ways that are inconsistent with its very achievement, is, for Hobbes, a person who
is displaying strange and unusual behavior, and, is, therefore, a person who is suffering
madness.
In other words, for Hobbes, even if somebody happens to value glory more than his/her
self-preservation, this fact does not automatically make the achievement of glory really better
for him/her than the achievement of his/her long-term self-preservation. Rather, the fact that
the person values glory more than his/her self-preservation only signifies that the person is
irrational or mad7: that he/she is desiring the wrong thing.
6Again, “Moreover, the greatest of goods for each is his own preservation. For nature is so arranged that
all desire good for themselves. Insofar as it is within their capacities, it is necessary to desire life, health, and
further, insofar as it can be done, security of future time.” [Hobbes 1991: De Homine, Chapter XI, Section 6,
emphasis added]
7Somebody might point out that there is a difference between being irrational and being mad; a person
might behave in irrational ways, now and then, without being clinically diagnosed to be mad. However, for
Hobbes, there is no significant difference between being in the two states.
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This shows that, for Hobbes, the fact that self-preservation is the greatest good for ev-
erybody does not really depend on its being desired or preferred more than anything else
by everybody. Within Hobbes’s moral system, self-preservation is already assumed to be
objectively the greatest good for each and every individual. This completely defies the main
spirit of subjectivism - which claims that a person’s good is completely determined by what
the person actually desires or prefers. In short, Hobbes was not committed to the preference-
satisfaction theory of the good.
1.3.2 Second Strategy: It is Bad to Satisfy the Fool’s Preferences
In the previous section, I have shown that Hobbes was not committed to the preference-
satisfaction theory of the good by showing that there is something the value of which Hobbes
did not think to depend on its being desired or preferred by anyone; namely, self-preservation,
which Hobbes deems to be objectively the greatest good for each and every individual. In
this secion, I will show that Hobbes was not committed to the preference-satisfaction theory
of the good by showing that Hobbes did not think that the sheer fact of desiring or preferring
something automatically makes that something good for the individual.
Actually, I have already shown two examples of this in the previous section. The vain-
glorious person and the person who is subjected to great dejection - the two types of peo-
ple that Hobbes thinks to be suffering madness. The former prefers glory to his/her self-
preservation, and the latter prefers self-destruction to self-preservation. The fact that Hobbes
thought that the preferences of these two types of people are mad clearly indicates that
Hobbes did not think that something is good (or better) for a given individual simply be-
cause he/she desired (or preferred) it.
However, there is another famous example that shows that Hobbes did not think that the
sheer fact of desiring or preferring something automatically makes that something good for
the individual. The example is what is famously known as Hobbes’s fool.
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In Leviathan, the fool is an imaginary opponent of Hobbes who questions the rational-
ity of performing one’s own part of a mutual agreement, when the other party has already
performed his/her part.
The fool hath said in his heart: “there is no such thing as justice”; and sometimes
also with his tongue, seriously alleging that: “every man’s conservation and
contentment being committed to his own care, there could be no reaon why
every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto, and therefore also
to make or not make, keep or not keep, covenants was not against reaon, when
it conduced to one’s benefit.” He does not therein deny that there be covenants,
and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept, and that such breach of
them may be called injustice; but he questioneth whether injustice, taking away
the fear of God (for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God), may not
sometimes stand with that of reason which dictateth to every man his own good.
... you may call it injustice, ..., yet it can never be against reason... [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter XV, Section 4]
What the fool is arguing in this passage is roughly this: If one expects to gain at the other’s
expense by not performing one’s own part of a covenant, and if one can also expect that
one can do this without ever being punished for performing such actions, then such actions
cannot be properly called irrational (even if we may conventionally call such action to be
unjust). According to Hobbes, “This specious8 reasoning is nevertheless false. [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter XV, Section 4]”.
Hobbes provides two main reasons why he thinks preferring to perform such actions,
which ostensibly seem to be in one’s own best self-interest, is, nonetheless, not really good
8The term “specious” has changed its meaning in the last several centuries. Although Edwin Curley thinks
that the term “specious” is used pejoratively in this context, such pejorative connotation was not always asso-
ciated with the term in its historical usage. (For example, the term is not used pejoratively by David Hume. I
thank Nick Sturgeon for pointing this out for me.) In the glossary of Hobbes [1994], the term “specious” is
defined as “plausible, apparently sounding convincing, but in reality sophistical or fallacious; fair, attractive
but lacking genuineness.”
22
for oneself:
first, that when a man doth a thing which, notwithstanding anything can be fore-
seen and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction (howsoever some accident
which he could not expect, arriving, may turn it to his benefit), yet such events
do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, ..., He, therefore, that
breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with
reason do so, cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace
and defence but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received,
be retained in it without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man can
cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and therefore, if
he be left or cast out of society, he perisheth; and if he live in society, it is by
the errors of other men, which he could not foresee nor reckon upon; and con-
sequently [he has acted] against the reason of his preservation... [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter XV, Section 5]
The wording is slightly convoluted. But, here is the main point. According to Hobbes, any-
one would realize that not doing one’s part of a mutual agreement, when one already knows
that the other party has performed his or her own part, is irrational, if he or she properly takes
into account the long-term effects that one’s actions would bring. This is because one cannot
reasonably expect that one would be able to conceal one’s actions forever; sooner or later
other people will find out that one has cheated, and by knowing that one has cheated in the
past, other rational people would be quite unlikely to cooperate with one or let one participate
in some cooperative venture in the future. Since one cannot properly continue to live without
engaging in at least some cooperative activities with other people, being excluded from most
cooperative activities in this way would very likely undermine one’s own self-preservation,
which, according to Hobbes, is objectively the greatest good of all mankind.
Of course, there might be some exceptional cases where one could completely get away
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with one’s cheating-behaviors, and there might also be some exceptional cases where other
people, who already know that one is a cheater, would, nontheless, let one participate in
their cooperative activities. However, according to Hobbes, such exceptional cases cannot
be a proper basis to ground one’s decisions for action. 9
Anyway, if one were to decide to cheat based on such exceptional cases, then this means
that one thinks that such exceptional cases provide reasons for one to assume that people
in general cannot detect others’ cheating-behaviors in a reliable way, or that, even if people
generally are reliable cheater-detectors, they are usually stupid or irrational enough to give
additional chances to pre-identified past-cheaters and would prefer to bear themselves the
risk of getting cheated once again. This is totally unreasonable.
Therefore, if one had decided to cheat rather than to keep one’s part of the covenant,
then one’s decisions were irrational, even if, by some accidental fluke, one were to get away
with one’s cheating-behaviors without punishment. In short, what Hobbes is claiming in the
passage above is that it is actually bad for the person (in the long-run) to cheat and take
advantage of other people’s initial cooperation even when the person strongly prefers to do
so. This is the reason why Hobbes calls such person a “fool.”10
In this section, we have seen that Hobbes thought that there are certain things that are
objectively bad for a given individual even if the individual strongly prefers or desires it.
This again completely defies the main spirit of subjectivism - which claims that anything
that is the object of one’s current preferences or desires are good for one. Again, Hobbes
was not committed to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good.
9We can say that, here, Hobbes is assuming that nobody has the Gyges’ ring introduced in Plato’s Republic
Book II (SeeCooper [1997, p. 1000]), and is being very optimistic about people’s ability to detect as well as
their willingness to punish cheaters. I thank Nick Sturgeon for pointing this out to me.
10According to Curley, the position that Hobbes ascribes to the “foole” is very close to the one Grotius
ascribes to Carneades in De jure belli ac pacis (On the Law of War and Peace.) [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, p.
90, footnotes 2 and 3]
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1.4 Interpretation of the Key Text: The Distinction between
Real Good and Apparent Good
In the previous sections, we have seen two reasons to think that Hobbes did not hold the
preference-satisfaction theory of the good. For one thing, there is something that Hobbes
thought to be objectively the greatest good for each and every individual - namely, his/her
self-preservation - regardless of whether or not the person desires or prefers his/her self-
preservation more than anything else. Secondly, there are some things that Hobbes thought
to be objectively bad for a given individual even when the individual strongly desires or
prefers it; namely, satisfying the preferences of the fool as well as the preferences of the
people who are overwhelmed by a passion for glory or dejection.
What all this shows is that Hobbes did not hold the preference-satisfaction theory of the
good as it is commonly perceived. But, then, how does all of this fit with the key text that
have made so many people attribute the preference-satisfaction theory of the good to Hobbes.
Let’s go back to key text that we have seen in section 2.
But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire that is it which
he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and
of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and
contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there
being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the
man . . . [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 7]
In the passage, Hobbes claims that whatever is the object of a person’s desires or preferences
is, for his/her part, called good. The passage can be interpreted in any of the following three
ways:
Interpretation 1. We might think of Hobbes as defining what goodness is. Such interpre-
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tation implies that Hobbes was committed to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good.
It is evident that people who think that Hobbes held the preference-satisfaction theory of the
good adopts this interpretation. However, doing so contradicts with what we have estab-
lished in the previous sections; namely, that Hobbes did not hold the preference-satisfaction
theory of the good. So, if one adopts this interpretation, one has no choice but to claim that
Hobbes was inconsistent in his views about value. This may be true. But, I believe that
saying that some philosopher’s view is inconsistent should be left as a last resort after one
has successfully eliminated all other alternate interpretations.
Interpretation 2. We might think that what Hobbes is advancing in the above passage
is not a normative ethical theory that tries to provide a substantial theory of what goodness
(for a particular person) consists in, but rather a meta-ethical theory that intends to explain
what is going on when we are using ethical terms and, thereby, call something “good” or
“evil”. According to this interpretation, what Hobbes is saying in the above passage is this:
when somebody calls an object X good, what he/she is doing is simply expressing his/her
positive attitudes (namely, his/her desires) towards X, and is not asserting anything. This
would imply that Hobbes was an expressivist or a non-cognitivist about value. There are
some people who have persuasively advanced such interpretation.11However, such an inter-
pretation implies that Hobbes thought that sentences such as “X is good for Y” lacks any
definite truth-value. This conflicts with many parts of Hobbes’s original text which jointly
suggest that, for Hobbes, the sentence, “self-preservation is the greatest good for individual
Y”, is not simply truth-valueless, but, objectively true.
Interpretation 3. Lastly, we might interpret the passage this way. When somebody de-
sires or prefers something and, thereby, calls that thing “good”, this indicates that the object
seems or appears to be good to him/her. However, this leaves open the possibility that the
person might be mistaken about the goodness of the object.
11See Darwall [2000]. Gregory Kavka also calls such interpretation “the straightforward interpretation” and
considers it as a possibility, but later discards it in favor of what he calls “the subtle interpretation”. See Kavka
[1986, pp. 292-297]
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For instance, suppose that somebody took some kind of herbal medicine whenever he
had a flu believing that the herbal medicine would invigorate his body and give him strength
to overcome the disease. However, suppose that medical researchers have later confirmed
that the herbal medicine is strongly carcinogenic. In this situation, we can say that when the
person called the herbal medicine good and desired to take it whenever he caught a flu, the
herbal medicine appeared good to him; but, as a matter of fact, the herbal medicine was not
really good for him.
This kind of interpretation invokes a distinction between what is really good and what is
merely apparently good for a given individual. And it is not hard to verify that the distinction
between real good and apparent good is a distinction that Hobbes explicitly makes in several
places in his works.
. . . good (like evil) is divided into real and apparent. [Hobbes 1991: De
Homine, Chapter XI, Section 5]
Whence it happens that inexperienced men that do not look closely enough at the
long-term consequences of things, accept what appears to be good, not seeing
the evil annexed to it; afterwards they experience damage. And this is what is
meant by those who distinguish good and evil as real and apparent. [Hobbes
1991: De Homine, Chapter XI, Section 5]
By using Hobbes’s own distinction between real good and apparent good, we might interpret
the key passage, which many scholars have hitherto interpreted as implying Hobbes had
held the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, as defining a person’s apparent good as
opposed to a person’s real good.
That is, according to this interpretation, what Hobbes is saying in the key passage is that
whatever is the object of a person’s desires or preferences is the person’s apparent good;
however, whether that object is really good for the person is still left as an open question.
If obtaining the object is consistent with securing the person’s long-term self-preservation,
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which Hobbes deems to be objectively the greatest good for everybody, then the satisfaction
of such desire would be really good for the person. However, if the obtaining of the object
puts the person’s long-term self-preservation at significant risk, then the satisfaction of such
desire would only be apparently, but not really, good for the person.
This third interpretation has several advantages over the other two interpretations. First
of all, none of the other two interpretations (i.e. interpretation 1 and interpretation 2) can
make sense of Hobbes’s explicit distinction between real good and apparent good.
Interpretation 1 commits Hobbes to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, which
implies that Hobbes thought that it is really good to satisfy just any kind of desire or pref-
erences that a person happens to have. If this is so, it is unclear why Hobbes had explicitly
distinguished between what is really good and what is merely apparently good for a given
individual, and claimed that there are occasions where the two do not coincide.
Interpretation 2 makes Hobbes an expressivist or a non-cognitivist for value-terms such
as “good.” If interpretation 2 is true, then Hobbes would have to think that such sentences
as, “X is apparently good for individual Y, but X is not really good for individual Y.”, lacks
any objective truth-value. However, for Hobbes, such sentence does have an objective truth-
value; if Y happens to prefer X, but if obtaining X is inconsistent with achieving Y’s long-
term self-preservation, then the sentence would be objectively true; if Y happens to prefer
X, and if obtaining X is consistent with achieving Y’s long-term self-preservation, then the
sentence would be objectively false. Interpretation 2 would not be able to accommodate such
objective truth-conditions of statements concerning an individual’s good. On the other hand,
interpretation 3, which interprets the key text as defining Hobbes’s notion of apparent good,
encounters none of these problems.
Second, interpretation 3 shows us a way to make Hobbes’s views about value and good-
ness consistent. We have seen in the previous section that there is much textual evidence that
jointly suggest that Hobbes did not hold the preference-satisfaction theory of the good as he
is commonly assumed to hold. By interpreting the key passage as Hobbes’s attempt to define
28
“apparent good” (not “real good”), we are able to make the key passage consistent with these
other parts of Hobbes’s original text which conflict with the view that Hobbes had held the
preference-satisfaction theory of the good.
More specifically, according to interpretation 3, what Hobbes was saying in the key pas-
sage was simply that whatever is the object of one’s current desires or preferences is ap-
parently good. This means that whether such object is really good for the individual is yet
undetermined. In order to see whether such object is really good for the individual, we would
need to see how the object relates to the individual’s long-term self-preservation.
So, if a person happens to prefer glory even at the very expense of his/her long-term self-
preservation, satisfying his/her preferences would, for Hobbes, still be good (and thereby
called “good”) albeit apparently. However, this does not mean that satisfying the person’s
preferences would be really good for him/her, and the fact that the person did not prefer
his/her self-preservation strongly enough does not undermine the fact that his/her long-term
self-preservation is objectively the greatest good for him/her. In short, another advantage of
interpretation 3 is that we do not have to accuse Hobbes of holding inconsistent doctrines at
the same time.
1.5 Taking Care of One Last Worry
Before I conclusively claim that Hobbes did not hold the preference-satisfaction theory of
the good, I would like to take care of one last qualm that is left. Let’s go back to the last part
of the key passage:
For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to
the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor
any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects
themselves, but from the person of the man... [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter
VI, Paragraph 7]
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One might think that Hobbes is, here, advocating the preference-satisfaction theory of good
by concentrating on the part where Hobbes claims that “there is no common rule of good
and evil (..) but from the person of the man.” Hobbes can be seen here as relying on the
individual’s current preferences to determine what is good for him or her.
But note that Hobbes is not merely claiming that “there is no common rule of good and
evil” but that “there is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of
the objects themselves.” In other words, what Hobbes is denying here is merely that the
objective properties of external objects, taken by themselves, can constitute what is good for
somebody without their being related to that person in some relevant way. However, the
relevant relation in question need not be the satisfaction of one’s current preferences.
Here is an example. Suppose that I have diabetes and you don’t. Then a specific food
that would be objectively good for your health might actually be very bad for mine. We can
see here that the specific food is not good or bad in itself : rather, the food is objectively good
for you and objectively bad for me in relation to our health. This is relativism.
And as I have already explained, relativism does not imply the preference satisfaction
theory of the good. This is because relativism does not imply subjectivism. In other words,
the fact that a specific food is good for you and bad for me could have nothing to do with
satisfying our current preferences whatsoever; I, who have diabetes, might strongly prefer
to eat that specific food which would be objectively bad for me, and you, who do not have
diabetes, might strongly prefer to not eat that specific food even when it is quite obvious that
it would be objectively good for you. However, the fact that we respectively have these types
of preferences does not change the fact that the specific food is objectively bad for me while
it is objectively good for you.
This is what I believe is behind Hobbes’s distinction between real good and apparent
good. That is, there might be things that are really good for somebody despite the fact
that they are apparently bad (i.e. the person does not prefer such things), and there might
be things that are really bad for somebody despite the fact that they are apparently good
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(i.e. the person does prefer such things.) What the last part of the key passage is saying is
that what kind of things are really good for somebody might differ from person to person
(i.e. relativism.) However, this does not mean that whether something is good or bad for a
given person is determined by the person’s current preferences. I claim that Hobbes did not
advocate a preference-satisfaction theory of good.
1.6 Did Hobbes Hold an Idealized Preference-Satisfaction
Theory of the Good?
I believe that many readers would now have been persuaded that Hobbes did not hold the
preference-satisfaction theory of the good as it was introduced in section 1. However, I ex-
pect that many people would still be quite reluctant to accept that Hobbes had thought that
one’s long-term self-preservation is objectively one’s greatest good. This is because the fact
that Hobbes had thought that there is something that is objectively each and every individ-
ual’s greatest good seems to completely defy the main spirit of Hobbes’s entire project.
1.6.1 The Motivation
As it is well-known, one of the primary aims of Hobbes was to present an alternative system
of moral and political philosophy that was completely purged of any vestiges of Aristotelean
metaphysics - which assumes there to be objectively the highest good for all human beings
which everybody should rightly pursue as their final end. Instead, Hobbes intended to present
a system of ethics and political philosophy where all normative conclusions can be properly
derived and reduced to facts about human psychology and physical motions. The basic
intent was to align moral and political philosophy with the then burgeoning natural sciences
in Hobbes’s own time.
So, it is not a surprise that many people would be shocked by my claim that the primary
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assumption of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy is that self-preservation is objec-
tively each and everybody’s greatest good; this seems to make Hobbes’s moral and political
philosophy very close to that of Aristotle’s.
Of course, people will not want to deny that self-preservation is each and every indi-
vidual’s greatest good in Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy as securing one’s self-
preservation is the central notion that permeates through out all of Hobbes’s works. What
they would want to deny is that, for Hobbes, the greatest goodness of self-preservation is ob-
jectively determined. That is, if one were to preserve Hobbes’s general intention to provide
a reductive analysis of normative concepts that was purely based on facts about human psy-
chology and natural physics, it would be nice if we could find a way to say that, for Hobbes,
the greatest goodness of self-preservation is somehow determined by what everybody, as a
matter of fact, desires or prefers.
This would require two things: (i) showing that Hobbes was committed to the preference-
satisfaction theory of the good, and (ii) showing that Hobbes thought that everybody as a
matter of fact desires or prefers his/her self-preservation more than anything else. However,
we have seen that Hobbes clearly thought that there are people who do not desire or prefer
their long-term self-preservation as much as they rightly should (e.g. the madman and the
fool); Hobbes clearly thought that satisfying the preferences of these people would not be
really good for them. In short, I have shown that Hobbes did not endorse any of these two
requirements.
To this, somebody who wants to retain the general spirit of Hobbes’s reductive analysis
might claim that it is, strictly speaking, not the satisfaction of people’s actual or current
preferences which Hobbes thought to be really good for people, but rather, what Hobbes
thought to be really good was the satisfaction of people’s rational or idealized preferences
- that is, the type of preferences which people would form if they were perfectly informed
about the relevant facts and were free from any psychological distractions. And it might
also be argued that Hobbes thought that everybody would prefer to secure their own long-
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term self-preservation more than anything else when people are perfectly informed about the
relevant fact and are free from any psychological distractions in this way.
In short, one might try to argue that Hobbes was committed to an idealized preference-
satisfaction theory of the good, and that the reason why Hobbes thought that self-preservation
is each and every individual’s greatest good is because he thought that everybody would
prefer their own self-preservation more than anything else if they were ideally rational.
Of course, this would make Hobbes’s theory of the good undoubtedly normative; so it
does not completely preserve Hobbes’s intention to reduce normative concepts to factual
ones. However, it still retains a certain form of subjectivism by saying that whatever is good
for a given person is good by the very fact that the person would desire or prefer it in certain
idealized circumstances. Such interpretation, on the surface, seems to be in better accordance
with Hobbes’s general spirit of providing a reductive analysis for value terms than simply
assuming that self-preservation is objectively the greatest good for everybody.
1.6.2 Grounds to Think that Hobbes had held an Idealized Preference-
Satisfaction Theory of the Good
It should be noted that there are actually textual grounds to interpret Hobbes as proposing an
idealized preference-satisfaction theory of the good. Consider:
And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of
the good and evil consequences and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate,
the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of
consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. . . . so
that he who hath by experience or reason the greatest and surest prospect of
consequences deliberates best himself, and is able, when he will, to give the
best counsel unto others. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 57
emphasis added]
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Here, we can see that Hobbes is saying that people who have the greatest and surest prospects
of consequences are generally the best deliberators. And, we can see that Hobbes thinks that
one acquires such information concerning the nature as well as the likelihoods of various
consequences that occurs by performing a given course of action by one’s past experiences
and reasoning powers. If we combine this with Hobbes’s distinction between real good
and apparent good that we have seen previously, we can see that there is room for us to
interpret Hobbes as saying that what is truly (or really) good for a given individual is what
that individual would desire or prefer if he/she were fully informed about the relevant facts,
which may be acquired by his/her past experiences and reasoning capabilities.
Note that, here, what is really good for a given individual is not fixed or predetermined
independent of the individual’s desires or preferences; what is really good for a given individ-
ual is what he/she would happen to prefer or desire provided that he/she has full information
about the relevant facts. From this, we can explain why Hobbes deems self-preservation to be
each and every individual’s greatest good as follows. According to Hobbes, self-preservation
is each and every individual’s greatest good because everybody would prefer his/her long-
term self-preservation more than anything else once he/she becomes fully aware of the rele-
vant facts. In short, we might interpret Hobbes as being committed to what might be called
as a full-information account of the good12, which is one particular version of an “idealized
preference-satisfaction theory of the good.”
12Noticeable people who have proposed theories that are quite similar in their general spirit in recent times
are: [Railton, 1986a,b, Smith et al., 1989, Firth, 1952, 1955, Brandt, 1955, 1998]What all of these theories have
in common is that they interpret value – whether it is individual goodness or moral rightness – as a dispositional
property that invokes a certain kind of positive psychological reaction to ideally suitable subjects. The theories
differ in what sort of evaluative properties that their theories are trying to propose a dispositional analysis of – is
the property moral rightness? [Firth, 1952, 1955, Brandt, 1955, 1998]; or is the property individual goodness?
[Railton, 1986a,b, Brandt, 1998]; or is the property simply what people generally value? [Smith et al., 1989] –
as well as in what they consider to be “ideally suitable subjects” whose psychological reactions determine the
truth or falsity of the type of evaluative statements in question – is it one’s own psychological reaction when one
is in idealized circumstances that matters?; or is it only some outsider who could provide professional advise
that counts?; does the ideally suitable subject have to have full-information or would it be sufficient (or even
preferable) to have more limited information?; what other traits (such as the level of imaginative capacities,
perceptual awareness, impartiality, etc.) do the theories require ideally suitable subjects possess? and so on.
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1.6.3 Hobbes’s Conception of Practical Rationality and the Reason Why
Hobbes did Not Hold an Idealized Preference-Satisfaction Theory
of the Good.
The problem with this strategy is that there is really no way to make such interpretation non-
circular in a non-question-begging way. This is because, within Hobbes’s entire system,
reason and rationality are defined in a way to have self-preservation as its very aim, and
relevant facts which Hobbes advises one to incorporate in one’s deliberation process include
certain type of moral facts which already assumes that self-preservation is every human
being’s greatest good. This needs some explanation.
Within Hobbes’s system, the two major components of one’s rationality are prudence
and reasoning. Whereas prudence is one’s ability to project roughly reliable predictions
about future consequences based on one’s past experiences alone, reasoning is one’s ability
to generalize these past experiences into conditional statements (e.g. “if one eats ice cream,
then one will later get fat.”) and to use these conditional statements as basic premises in
one’s deliberation and syllogistic thinking (e.g. P1: I do not want to get fat. P2: If one eats
ice cream, then one will later get fat. C: Therefore, I should not eat ice cream now.”) . When
this process of reasoning is performed in a systematic way by starting out with correctly
defined concepts, the whole process results in what Hobbes calls “scientific knowledge.”
By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us, nor
gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by industry, first in apt
imposing of names, and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in pro-
ceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion
of one of them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of
one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences
of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it men call SCIENCE.
[Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter V, Section 17 emphasis added]
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In short, for Hobbes, the very culmination of one’s successful use of prudence and reasoning
capabilities is scientific knowledge. Hobbes basically repeats the same characterization of
science in the following:
When the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words,
and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these
again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the
thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge
of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter VII, Section 4, emphasis added]
After one has arrived at scientific knowledge in a specific area, one can then re-use this
scientific knowledge again as basic premises in one’s deliberation and syllogistic thinking.
So, when Hobbes advises one to base one’s desires and preferences on full information (that
is, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences), what he is advising one to do is to base
one’s desires and preferences on various fields of scientific knowledge.
Among the several specific fields of scientific knowledge, there is a field, according to
Hobbes, that specifically concerns how to achieve what is good for individuals and societies
in general. Hobbes calls such scientific field “moral science” or “moral philosophy” the
major contents of which are “the laws of nature.”
A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis) is a precept or general rule, found out by
reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life
or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which
he thinketh it may be best preserved. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIV,
Section 3]
And the science of them [the laws of nature] is the true and only moral phi-
losophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good
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and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan,
Chapter XV, Section 40 emphasis added]
So, when Hobbes recommends one to form desires and preferences on the basis of full infor-
mation (i.e. the greatest and surest prospects of consequences), what is included in the list of
full information are the laws of nature which, according to Hobbes, are the major contents
of moral science and moral philosophy.
However, as we can see in the quoted passage right above, the laws of nature are none
other than a list of general rules or precepts that are designed to help one secure one’s long-
term self-preservation. This means that when Hobbes claims that what is (not just apparently
good, but) really good for somebody is to satisfy the type of desires and preferences which
he/she would form after he/she has fully incorporated moral science and the laws of nature
into his/her deliberation process, we can see that Hobbes is already assuming that securing
one’s long-term self preservation is each and everybody’s greatest good.
That is, since moral science is a field of scientific knowledge which concerns what is
really good for people, and since, the contents of moral science, which are the laws of nature,
are a set of prescriptions that are specifically designed to tell people what the most effective
means to secure their own self-preservation are, we can see that saying that one should form
one’s preferences on the basis of moral science and the laws of nature already assumes that
securing one’s long-term self preservation is each and everybody’s greatest good.
Furthermore, the fact that moral science and the laws of nature, which specifically aim
for the achievement of long-term self-preservation for individuals and society, are the final
culmination of one’s combined rational faculties indicate that, for Hobbes, self-preservation
is the very goal of rationality itself. We can even go further and say that, within Hobbes’s
system, the very concept of practical rationality itself is defined in terms of self-preservation,
which Hobbes deems to be each and everybody’s greatest good. That is, we can say that, for
Hobbes, practical reason and practical rationality is none other than one’s ability to recognize
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that long-term self-preservation is one’s greatest good as well as one’s ability to correctly
choose the right kind of means to best achieve it.
The fact that this is, indeed, Hobbes’s working notion of practical rationality can be
(indirectly) confirmed by looking at what kind of preferences Hobbes deems to be irrational.
As we have seen, for Hobbes, one’s preferences are irrational whenever, for whatever reason,
one does not prefer to act in ways that best secures one’s long-term self-preservation. For
Hobbes, there are two ways for a person to form irrational preferences.
One way is for one to rightly desire one’s long-term self-preservation more than any-
thing else, but to either be insufficiently informed or misinformed about the best available
means to achieve it. An example of this would be the case of the fool which we have dis-
cussed previously. We can say that Hobbes’s fool does desire his/her self-preservation; this is
why he/she enters into a mutual covenant that aims to provide mutual protection. However,
Hobbes’s fool is either misinformed or insufficiently informed in the sense that he/she does
not properly realize that failing to reciprocate towards his/her partner’s cooperation in a mu-
tual covenant would very likely jeopardize his/her chances to secure his/her self-preservation
in the long-run despite its short-term gain. Let us call a set of preferences that are irrational
in this way - that is, by being based on insufficient (or mis-) information, “unconsidered.”
Another way for one to form irrational preferences, according to Hobbes, is for one to
be swayed by the wrong kind of passions themselves, (such as vain-glory or self-dejection),
which prevent one from desiring one’s long-term self-preservation strongly enough. Hobbes
calls any desire or passion, which momentarily directs one’s attention away from strongly
desiring one’s long-term self-preservation, “perturbations.”
Emotions or perturbations of the mind are species of appetite and aversion (. . . )
They are called perturbations because they frequently obstruct right reasoning.
They obstruct right reasoning in this, that they militate against the real good and
in favor of the apparent and most immediate good, which turns out frequently
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to be evil when everything associated with it hath been considered. (. . . ) There-
fore, although the real good must be sought in the long term, which is the job
of reason, appetite seizeth upon a present good without foreseeing the greater
evils that necessarily attach to it. Therefore appetite perturbs and impedes the
operation of reason; whence it is rightly called a perturbation. [Hobbes 1991:
De Homine, Chapter XII, Section 1 emphasis added]
However, when the influence of these wrong passions go over the limits of local-level per-
turbations and one starts to become completely overwhelmed by their overarching influence,
this is the point where one is, now, suffering what Hobbes calls “madness.” When one is
suffering madness, the irrationality of one’s preferences consists in one’s desiring the wrong
thing - that is, desiring something (such as glory) at the very expense of one’s long-term
self-preservation. Let us call a set of preferences that are irrational in this way - that, by
being based on the wrong kind of basic passion, “unbalanced.”
So, within Hobbes’s system, one’s preferences are irrational whenever one prefers to take
a course of action that does not best achieve one’s long-term self-preservation, and one’s
actual preferences can be irrational either because they are unconsidered or unbalanced.
From this, we can say that, for Hobbes, one’s preferences are rational whenever they are
well-considered and well-balanced, and this is so whenever (a) one has correctly identified
what course of action best achieves one’s long-term self-preservation (which makes one’s
preferences well-considered) and (b) one has properly directed one’s motivational states to
perform the course of action that has been so identified (which makes one’s preferences
well-balanced.)
So, it is true that Hobbes thinks that people would necessarily desire or prefer their own
long-term self-preservation more than anything else when they are fully rational and are
fully informed about the relevant facts; but this is so because what Hobbes considers to be
“the relevant facts” already include the moral fact that self-preservation is each and every
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individual’s greatest good, and also because Hobbes’s working notion of practical rationality
defines rationality as the ability to understand that long-term self-preservation is one’s great-
est good as well as the ability to be properly motivated to do what has been identified as the
best means to achieve it.
This contradicts the main spirit of an idealized preference-satisfaction theory of the good.
For if Hobbes really intended to propose an idealized preference-satisfaction theory of the
good, he would have had to claim that obtaining glory would be actually better for anybody
who preferred glory over his/her self-preservation given that he/she were fully rational and
were fully informed about the relevant facts. Rather, as it is clearly shown in his discussion
of madness, for Hobbes, the fact that somebody prefers glory over his/her self-preservation
simply shows that that the person is irrational. I believe that this shows that Hobbes did not
hold an idealized-preference satisfaction theory of the good, at least, in its pure descriptive
form; within Hobbes’s system, self-preservation is objectively the greatest good for every-
body.
40
Chapter 2
Freeing Hobbes from the Humean
Conception of Instrumental Rationality
Until now, we have freed Hobbes from one conventional interpretation of his moral and po-
litical philosophy; namely, that Hobbes was a defender of the preference-satisfaction theory
of the good. In the previous chapter, we have seen that Hobbes was not committed to the
preference-satisfaction theory of the good in any of its variations. However, there is an-
other common interpretation of Hobbes that is coupled with seeing him as an advocate of
the preference-satisfaction theory of the good; namely, that Hobbes’s conception of ratio-
nality was purely instrumental which foreshadows that of David Hume’s. This is another
conventional interpretation that I would like to free Hobbes from.
2.1 David Hume’s Conception of Instrumental Rationality
As I have just mentioned, many commentators interpret Hobbes as being committed to an
instrumental view of rationality which foreshadows that of David Hume. It is quite contro-
versial whether Hume had actually adopted such view of rationality.1 However, it is quite
1Nick Sturgeon’s unpublished manuscript, “Hume on Reason and Passion”, deals with this issue with care-
ful detail in depth.
41
common to attribute such instrumental conception of rationality to Hume, and, regardless of
whether Hume had actually held this view or not, I would like to show that at least Hobbes
wasn’t committed to such view.
It is best to understand what is known as the “Humean conception of practical ratio-
nality (i.e. instrumental rationality)” by looking at the passages that Hume wrote himself.
According to Hume,
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion
and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can
never pretend to any other office than the serve and obey them. [Hume 1984: A
Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III: p. 462]2
‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the
scratching of my finger. ‘Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total
ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to
me. ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledge’d lesser
good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the
latter. [Hume 1984: A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III:
p. 463]
The thesis that Hume is interpreted as advancing in the first quoted passage is, what is gen-
erally known as, the “No-Combat Thesis”; namely, the thesis that there is no way for one’s
desires or preferences to contradict the dictates of reason and rationality. In other words,
according to Hume, it is not the role of reason or one’s other rational faculties to evaluate
and oversee whether one’s desires or preferences are rational or reasonable. One’s desires
and preferences are simply things that the individual just happens to have whose contents
which the individual’s reason or rationality has no control over.
2The page numbers refer to the Penguin (1984) edition.
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The result of this, according to Hume, is that there cannot be any preferences or desires
that can properly be called irrational, and, thereby, be seen as in conflict with one’s ratio-
nality. According to Hume, no preferences are irrational – it is not irrational to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger; it is not irrational to prefer my
total ruin to the least amount of uneasiness that a totally unrelated foreigner might feel; and
it is not even irrational to prefer what I believe to be worse for me to what I believe to be
better for me – and it is not the job of one’s reason and rational faculties to encourage one
to form rational preferences – because, strictly speaking, preferences can neither be rational
nor irrational.
Then, according to Hume, what are the roles of reason and rationality in the process of
deriving one’s preferences? According to Hume, there are two major roles that reason and
rationality play in this area: one is to help the agent form true beliefs about the world, and
the other is to help the agent choose the most effective means to satisfy the agent’s current
preferences or desires (whatever they happen to be) in the light of these true beliefs.
This means that there are two basic ways that one’s preferences or desires might be
(rather imprecisely) called irrational or unreasonable. One way is for one’s preferences to
be based on a false belief; such as when one prefers not to go to the bathroom at the middle
of the night because one falsely believes that there is a scary monster living in the bathroom
that only shows up at night. Another way is for one to prefer to use a specific means for a
given end which is highly ineffective in accomplishing the end that one has in mind; such as
when one prefers to use a toothbrush to open a bottle of beer.
‘tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call’d unreasonable. First, When
a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on
the supposition or the existence of objects which really do not exist. Secondly,
When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the de-
sign’d end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. [Hume
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1984: A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III, p. 463]
However, even though we commonly call these two types of preferences as instances of
irrational or unreasonable preferences in our ordinary life, according to Hume, it is not,
strictly speaking, the preferences themselves that are irrational or unreasonable, but only the
accompanying beliefs that are so.
In short, a passion must be accompany’d with some false judgment, in order to
its being unreasonable; and even then ‘tis not the passion, properly speaking,
which is unreasonable, but the judgment. [Hume 1984: A Treatise of Human
Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III, p. 463]
So, according to the Humean conception of practical rationality, it might be irrational for Jill,
who is currently living a moderately decent life, to prefer to commit suicide by swallowing a
chewing gum. But, the reason why we can (rather imprecisely) call such preference irrational
is not because preferring to commit suicide when one is living a moderately decent life is
itself irrational, but rather because Jill has not chosen an effective means to achieve her
given end, which is to kill herself. If Jill had preferred to kill herself and end her life by
using a very effective means (e.g. jump off a 40-story building), then Hume would say that
there is nothing irrational about her preferences. In other words, according to the Humean
conception of practical rationality, no preferences (not even a preference to kill one’s life
without having any good reason to do so) can, strictly speaking, be irrational or unreasonable
in itself.
Let’s summarize the Humean conception of practical rationality into the following for-
mula.
[HUMEAN CONCEPTION OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY (I.E. INSTRUMENTAL RA-
TIONALITY)]
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: The Humean conception of practical rationality (i.e. the purely instrumental view of
rationality) is the conjunction of the following two claims:
(a) No preferences or desires, by themselves, are irrational or rational.
(b) (The Role of Reason and other Rational Faculties)
: the basic role of reason and other rational faculties are confined
to the following two roles;
(i) To inform the agent with true beliefs (about the world), and
(ii)To inform the agent with the most effective means to achieve
a given end in the light of these true beliefs (about the world).
* That is, reason and rationality say nothing about the agent’s
ends themselves.
2.2 Was Hobbes Committed to the Humean Conception of
Instrumental Rationality?
Now, the question is: “Did Hobbes endorse the Humean conception of instrumental ratio-
nality as formulated above?” Many people think that he did. Consider Jean Hampton’s early
interpretation:
So, for Hobbes, (. . . ) Rationality would therefore regarded by him as having
instrumental value; a rational man would be one whose reason would serve his
desires well by determining correctly how those desires could be satisfied. (. . . )
Moreover, (. . . ), Hobbes makes his instrumentalist notion of reason crystal clear
(. . . ) [Hampton 1986, p. 35]
David Gauthier’s interpretation of Hobbes is similar.
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If we accept also Hobbes’ contention that ‘those actions are most reasonable,
that conduce most to their ends’ (E.W. iii, p. 133), we can then derive from
‘a man must do X to secure what he wants’, the further conclusion ‘a man,
if rational, will do X.’ (. . . ) In the state of nature reason is the slave of the
passions; hence to refer to a right to do what one naturally endeavours to do is
otiose. [Gauthier 1969, p. 21, 35, emphasis added]
Hobbes certainly did not deny that one’s reason and rational faculties can play such instru-
mental role in one’s deliberation process. In fact, one of the major reasons why Hobbes
advises one to bring one’s prudence, reasoning, and scientific knowledge to bear on one’s
deliberation process is, as we have seen, to enable the agent to determine his/her final prefer-
ences on the basis of “the greatest and surest prospects of consequences.”And, here, we might
say that the reason why Hobbes advises one to combine “the greatest and surest prospects
of consequences” with one’s deliberation process is because, having such information will,
generally, reduce the chances of one’s final preferences to be based on false beliefs, and such
information will also, very likely, reveal what the most effective means or what the most ef-
fective course of action could be to achieve the end that one has in mind. In other words,
Hobbes does think that one’s reason and rational faculties can perform the specific roles that
are described in clause (b) of the formula of “the Humean conception of practical rationality”
stated above.
2.2.1 Hobbes Did Not Endorse Clause (b)
However, as we have already seen, for Hobbes, the roles that reason and rationality play are
not confined to the two activities of preventing the formation of false beliefs and revealing
the most effective means to a given end. In the previous sections, I have already shown
that Hobbes thought that any preferences the satisfaction of which are inconsistent with the
achievement of one’s long-term self-preservation are irrational. (As we have seen, this gen-
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erally happens when the agent is either (1) insufficiently (or mis-) informed or (2) perturbed
by the wrong kind of basic passions.)
On the face of it, this already seems to contradict clause (a) of the above formula – which
states that no preferences or desires, by themselves, are irrational. However, we would
need to verify that when Hobbes talks about irrational preferences or instances of madness,
he is not merely talking about preferences that are based either on false beliefs about the
world or on false beliefs about the effective means for a given end, but is also talking about
preferences, which, he thinks, are irrational in themselves.
But, before we deal with clause (a), let’s first start with clause (b). According to clause
(b), the role of rationality and reason is confined to providing the agent with true beliefs and
revealing what is the best means to achieve whatever end that the agent just happens to have.
To put it in another way, clause (b) claims that the role of reason and rationality does not
extend to directing one’s desires and preferences towards a specific direction; that is, reason
and rationality say nothing about the agent’s ends themselves.
However, we can see that Hobbes did not endorse clause (b) by reminding ourselves
of what Hobbes said about moral science and the laws of nature. According to Hobbes,
the final culmination of one’s reasoning abilities is scientific knowledge. When the matter is
about what is good for individuals and societies in general, the scientific field which provides
answers to these questions is what Hobbes calls moral science or moral philosophy. In short,
moral science, which is the final culmination of one’s practical rationality, informs one about
what is good for individuals and societies.
And, since the laws of nature, which constitute the major contents of moral science, are
none other than a list of general rules or precepts that are specifically designed to teach
the best ways to secure one’s long-term self-preservation, we can clearly see that Hobbes
actually thought that reason and rationality should properly direct the agent to aim for his/her
long-term self-preservation.
This shows that Hobbes did not accept clause (b) of the formula of the Humean concep-
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tion of instrumental rationality – which, in effect, claims that reason and rationality can say
nothing about the agent’s ends themselves. According to Hobbes, reason or rationality does
say what one’s basic end should be; and that is to achieve one’s long-term self-preservation.
2.2.2 Hobbes Did Not Endorse Clause (a)
To this, one might object that the fact that the laws of nature aim for self-preservation and
that these laws are discovered by right reason does not, strictly speaking, imply that it is the
proper role of reason and rationality to direct one’s ends. Rather, “the laws of nature” is a
perfect example that shows how the basic role of reason and rationality is confined to the
instrumental role described in clause (b). That is, according to this interpretation, the laws
of nature, which are discovered by right reason, merely tell people the most effective means
to achieve what they most basically want: namely, their own self-preservation.
To take this approach, one has to assume that Hobbes thinks that it is a matter of fact
that everybody has a basic desire for self-preservation which is stronger than any other desire
they happen to have and that the sole job of reason is to choose the most effective means to
achieve this end which is already given. This seems to be the view adopted by those who
attribute the Humean instrumentalist conception of rationality to Hobbes.
If we accept Hobbes’s view that man is a self-maintaining engine then . . . Men
want, and necessarily want, to preserve themselves. Therefore, whatever can
be shown to be a condition of human preservation, is thereby shown to be a
means to man’s end. From premises of the form ‘X is a necessary means to self-
preservation’, Hobbes can derive conclusions of the form ‘a man must do X to
secure what he want’. . . . we can then derive from ‘a man must do X to secure
what he wants’, the further conclusion ‘a man, if rational, will do X’. [Gauthier
1969, p. 21]
Here, we could specify the variable X by “the laws of nature”. According to Gauthier’s inter-
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pretation, Hobbes thinks that we are “self-maintaining engines” who just cannot help but to
desire our own self-preservation, and the main role of reason and rationality is to identify the
most effective means – which is to follow the prescriptions of the laws of nature – to secure
this already given end. So, when Hobbes seems to be advancing a normative claim that “one
should follow the prescriptions of the laws of nature”, he is, strictly speaking, not recom-
mending one to desire self-preservation as a specific end, but rather is only recommending
one to choose the necessary means to secure what one already wants the most.
If this is the case, then, what’s so wrong with people who seek glory at the expense
of their own self-preservation, who, according to Hobbes, are irrational and mad? Isn’t
Hobbes, here, criticizing the specific ends to which glory-seeking people are committed?
According to Hampton, what Hobbes thinks is wrong with glory-seeking people is not that
they are pursuing the wrong end, but rather that they are seeking their own self-preservation
badly.
So how can Hobbes have an instrumentalist conception of rationality when he
is prepared to label as irrational those people who don’t act to pursue their self-
preservation? He can have such a conception if that label’s meaning is roughly
equivalent to ‘imprudent,’ that is, if the label is critical of such people not be-
cause they are pursuing an object rather than self-preservation but because they
are perceived to be pursuing self-preservation badly. (. . . ) Hobbes’s condemna-
tion would thus convict them of an error in their [instrumental] reasoning, not
an error in what they were desiring. [Hampton 1986, p. 36]
This is incorrect. In order for Hampton’s interpretation to be correct, she would have to
show that Hobbes thinks that it is perfectly rational to seek glory (given that it is pursued
effectively) if one truly desires glory and that it is OK to commit suicide (again, given that
it is performed effectively) if one truly desires to conclude one’s life. However, as we have
seen, when Hobbes characterizes certain people as being mad or irrational, he is specifically
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criticizing the abnormal passions and desires that underlie their extreme behaviors. Recall
how Hobbes defines “madness”:
In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behavior are called by the
general name of madness. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VIII, Paraphraph
20 emphasis added]
Again, that madness is nothing else but too much appearing passion . . . [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter VIII, Paragraph 23 emphasis added]
Here, it is apparent that what is Hobbes criticizing here are the passions themselves. And
it seems that it would be too much of a stretch to think of what Hobbes calls “madmen”
as being merely imprudent in our ordinary sense of the term as Hampton suggests. As we
have already seen previously, somebody might happen to have an extremely strong desire
for glory, and this person might very intelligently choose the most effective means to satisfy
this basic desire. This person is certainly not imprudent in the sense suggested by Hampton;
nonetheless, the person will still count as mad by Hobbes’s own standards, as we have quite
clearly seen in the previous chapter.
So, when Hobbes is labeling glory-seekers as “mad” or “irrational”, what he is really
criticizing is not merely that these people are choosing ineffective means to secure their own
self-preservation, but also that these people are being overwhelmed by the wrong kind of
desires – namely, the desire for (vain) glory – and, thereby, not desiring their own self-
preservation strongly enough.
This shows that Hobbes did not endorse clause (a) of the above formula of the Humean
conception of practical rationality – which claims that no desire or preferences are, by them-
selves, irrational. What Hobbes is criticizing about glory-seekers is their ends themselves,
not just the means.
Moreover, since it is clear that Hobbes acknowledges the existence of mad people who
do not desire their own self-preservation strongly enough, it is not entirely correct to interpret
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Hobbes as regarding human beings as what Gauthier calls “self-maintaining engines”, since
this implies that everybody, as a matter of fact, has a basic desire for self-preservation which
is stronger than any other desire they have or would have.
Not only does Hobbes think that it is possible for somebody to prefer glory over self-
preservation, he also thinks that there is a certain portion of the human population who actu-
ally do prefer glory over self-preservation in the state of nature where government authority
is absent.3
So, it seems that Bernard Gert’s interpretation of Hobbes’ theory of reason was generally
going in the right direction when he claimed:
For Hobbes, reason provides a genuine guide to conduct, one applicable to all
rational men; it is not merely a method whereby each man attempts to harmonize
or maximize his particular passions. That is, for Hobbes reason is not, or at least
should not be, the slave of the passions, rather the passions are to be controlled
by reason. This is not to deny that “every man by reasoning, seeks out the means
to the end which he propounds to himself”’ but reason does more than this, it has
an end of its own, avoidance of violent death. [Gert, “Introduction” in Hobbes
1991: Man and Citizen, p. 13 emphasis added]
The more surprising fact is that, in a later article, even Jean Hampton retracts her early inter-
pretation of Hobbes and concedes that Hobbes did think that certain desires or preferences
are irrational in themselves.
Elsewhere I argued that there was no inconsistency between these passages [i.e.
passages where Hobbes apparently criticizes the preferences of glory-seeking
people] and that theory of value [i.e. the desire(preference)-satisfaction theory
of good]. But now I have second thoughts. [Hampton 1992, p. 340 emphasis
3As I will argue in a later chapter, Hobbes thinks that it is precisely this fact that makes it inevitable for the
state of nature to dissolve into a state of war of all against all.
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added]
. . . Hobbes does appear to criticize certain basic desires themselves, and not
merely action from them, as irrational [Hampton 1992, p. 342]
In sum, based on numerous pieces of textual evidence as well as the reasons provided above,
we can see that Hobbes did not endorse any one of the two clauses (a) and (b) in the for-
mula of the Humean conception of practical rationality. That is, Hobbes did think that there
are certain desires or preferences that are irrational in themselves. Moreover, Hobbes also
thought that the role of reason and rationality is not and should not be confined to merely
that of informing true beliefs about the world as well as the most efficient means to achieve
a given end, but also to guide the agent’s end towards the right direction. Therefore, we
can conclude that Hobbes was not committed to the Humean conception of instrumental
rationality.
2.3 Reconciliation with Hobbes’s General Project
Until now, I have tried to free Hobbes from two widely held interpretations; namely, the
preference-satisfaction theory of the good and the Humean conception of instrumental ratio-
nality. In section 1.6, I have explained that one of the major motivations to interpret Hobbes’s
moral and political philosophy in these two ways is in order to respect Hobbes’s general spirit
to provide a reductive analysis of normative concepts, and free moral and political phioloso-
phy from any vestiges of Aristotelian metaphysics.
However, we have seen that, based on numerous pieces of textual evidence, it is plausi-
ble to think that, within Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy, long-term self-preservation
is objectively each and every individual’s greatest good, which one’s reason and rationality
should rightly aim and seek to achieve, and, hence, Hobbes was committed to none of the
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two widely held interpretations. Such interpretation makes much better sense of Hobbes’s
distinction between real good and apparent good, Hobbes’s discussion of madness and ir-
rational preferences, and Hobbes’s notion of reason, scientific knowledge, and the laws of
nature. Such interpretation makes everything coherent except for one thing. Saying that self-
preservation is objectively each and every individual’s greatest good would make Hobbes’s
ethical system normative from its very first premise and would seem to defy Hobbes’s gen-
eral intention to provide an alternate moral and political philosophy to that of Aristotle’s. I
would like to respond to this worry as follows.
First of all, in the history of western philosophy, there are very few philosophers who had
proposed a philosophical system that was completely consistent. And the fact that there are
inconsitencies in some parts of a philosopher’s works doesn’t always damage the greatness of
a philsopher’s thoughts taken as a whole. I believe that Hobbes was no exception. There are
many parts of Hobbes’s writings which apparently contradict one another. The best thing we,
as modern scholars, can do is to make these apparently contradicting elements coherent as
best as we can. If there are any remaining inconsistencies after we go through such process,
we cannot help but to admit the existence of such inconsistencies and make the most out of
a philosopher’s works.
As we have seen, Hobbes was not completely consistent with pursuing his ambitious
project of providing an ethical system that can be completely reduced to non-normative facts.
This doesn’t mean that Hobbes’s works are no longer worth reading. I believe that there are
still many insights that Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy provide that are relevant
even for today; such as his claim that external enforcement of some sort is a necessary evil
to prevent a sub-optimal social state and his justification for the existence of governments
which relies on it. And, in order to make use of these insights and make sense of many other
parts of Hobbes’s original text, I believe that acknowledging that Hobbes did not entirely
pursue his reductive project in a completely consistent manner is a relatively a small price to
pay.
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Second, if we pause and think about it for a moment, we can see that the fact that self-
preservation is assumed to be objectively the greatest good for each and every individual is
not completely devastating for the reductive project which Hobbes had originally intended.
This is because, compared to Aristotle’s notion of the highest good (which assumes the full
realization of people’s rational capabilities), the assumption that self-preservation is objec-
tively the greatest good seems to be very weak.
That is, if one is supposed to enjoy anything that is good in life, it is evident that one must
first have a life in the first place. In this sense, the fact that, within Hobbes’s moral system,
self-preservation is objectively the greatest good for everybody, which does not depend on its
being desired or preferred by anybody, might be interpreted as Hobbes’s attempt to present
a minimum threshold for any desire or preference to count. And, once, this issue is settled,
we might say that, for Hobbes, what is really good for any individual is the satisfaction of
his/her desires or preferences given that it is consistent with the achievement of his/her long-
term self-preservation. If we interpret Hobbes this way, we would be able to retain most of
Hobbes’s original intentions to provide a reductive analysis of normative concepts with only
a slight modification. This is the basic plan that I have in mind for chapters 4 and 5.
Third, as we have seen, I believe that it is, now, quite clear that Hobbes did not think
that the satisfaction of just any kind of desires or preferences is really good for an individual.
So, the simplistic version of the preference-satisfaction theory of the good is not a viable
interpretative option for us to take. The only other options would be to interpret Hobbes
as holding either an idealized preference-satisfaction theory of the good or an expressivist
view about value terms. As we have seen, the first option makes Hobbes’s theory of the
good normative as well. So, it does not have any advantage over our current interpretation
that assumes that, for Hobbes, self-preservation is objectively the greatest good, in terms
of respecting Hobbes’s general intention to provide a fully reductive analysis of normative
concepts. The second option simply ignores Hobbes’s general intention to provide a fully
reductive analysis of normative concepts that would render normative sentences to bear ob-
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jective truth-value.
In other words, none of the other alternate interpretations can fully respect Hobbes’s gen-
eral intention to provide a fully reductive analysis of normative concepts either. If this is the
case, then the fact that our current interpretation conflicts with Hobbes’s general intention
cannot be a reason to deny it, since none of the other viable alternate interpretations respect
Hobbes’s general intention either. And, if one considers how, unlike the other two inter-
pretations, our current interpretation makes many specific elements of Hobbes’s moral and
political philosophy consistent, I believe that our current interpretation, albeit being imper-
fect, is still the best way to see Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy.
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Chapter 3
Freeing Hobbes From Psychological
Egoism
3.1 The Motivation Behind Attributing Psychological Ego-
ism to Hobbes
Many commentators interpret Hobbes as a psychological egoist.1 Psychological egoism is a
view that claims that all human actions are motivated, at bottom, exclusively by self-interest;
it claims that everybody, in the end, are egoists. This is a very strong claim. It does not
merely claim that only some or the majority of human actions come from considerations of
self-interest; but rather that all human actions – including the ones that apparently seem to
be acts of benevolence as well as those acts that seemingly stem from one’s moral conviction
1See Butler [1983], Hume [1975], Broad [1950]. Kavka [1986] thinks that some textual evidence does
suggests that Hobbes was a psychological egoist, but thinks that only a weakened version of psychological
egoism, which he calls “Predominant Egoism” is needed for Hobbes’s political philosophy to work. McNeilly
[1966] thinks that Hobbes was at least committed to psychological egoism in his earlier works. Hampton [1986,
pp. 20-24] interprets Hobbes as a psychological egoist who maintains that all of our desires are caused by a
“self-interested” bodily mechanism, and opposes the idea of interpreting Hobbes as a psychological egoist who
claims that all of our desires have self-regarding content. In other words, according to Hampton, Hobbes does
allow people to have certain kinds of other-regarding desires. However, according to Hampton, these other-
regarding desires play absolutely no role in Hobbes’s political argument that it is not entirely unreasonable to
regard Hobbes as a psychological egoist when one is trying to understand his political philosophy.
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– are ultimately motivated solely by a concern for one’s own exclusive personal good.
The major reason why so many people tend to attribute psychological egoism to Hobbes
comes from the following passages:
...of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself. [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIV, Section 8]
For no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is volun-
tary, and of all voluntary acts the object is to every man his own good... [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter XV, Section 16]
For Hobbes, an act is voluntary if and only if it proceeds from one’s will. Here, “the will” is
simply one’s final intention to perform the most preferred course of action (which is revealed
after deliberation) that is available to that specific individual. So, what the passages above
suggest is that, according to Hobbes, everybody, as a matter of fact, aims for their own
exclusive personal good whenever they perform their most preferred course of action. As we
can see, this sounds pretty close to psychological egoism.
In addition, commentators tend to attribute psychological egoism to Hobbes because they
think that psychological egoism is a necessary foundation for Hobbes’s political philosophy;
they think that we cannot get Hobbes’s political philosophy without psychological egoism.
Hobbes’s justification for the existence of government power relies on Hobbes’s assumption
that, absent government enforcement, the state of nature will result in a state of war of
all against all. Here, one might naturally ask, “Why is it the case that people in the state
of nature, according to Hobbes, cannot live harmoniously and cooperate with one another
without external enforcement?” According to conventional interpretation, Hobbes’s answer
to this question is: “Because all human beings are, by nature, selfish.”
This assumption of universal selfishness is the main ground that Hobbes’s state of nature
has been so commonly modeled as a game of Prisoner’s Dilemma by contemporary Hobbes
scholars who are influenced by modern game theory. What results from people having this
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sort of egoistic psychology in the state of nature is a state of war of all against all – a sub-
optimal state, which everybody finds undesirable and very much prefers to escape. The only
way to escape this dire situation, according to Hobbes, is to establish a sovereign: a political
government with unlimited and absolute power.
So, many people think that, for Hobbes, the justification for political government relies
on the fact that, without it, the state of nature inevitably dissolves into a state of war, and the
main reason why this is so is because people naturally have a strictly egoistic psychology.
In short, psychological egoism is the major cornerstone upon which the entire system of
Hobbes’s political philosophy is erected; for many people, without assuming psychological
egoism, Hobbes’s political philosophy simply does not work.
However, as I have briefly suggested, psychological egoism is a very extreme and con-
testable doctrine. Many people think that it is false, and for good reasons. So, to the very
extent that Hobbes’s political philosophy relies on psychological egoism, we can say that it is
based on a very weak foundation. If there is a way to build up Hobbes’s political philosophy
from a less contestable theory of human psychology without relying on psychological ego-
ism, I believe that this will significantly bolster the general plausibility of Hobbes’s political
philosophy. This is one of my aims.
There are two things that I intend to argue in this chapter: first, I will argue that Hobbes
was not actually a psychological egoist in any plausible interpretation of this doctrine, and
second, I will argue that psychological egoism is not really needed for his political philoso-
phy.
3.2 What is Psychological Egoism? - Some Clarifications
So, what is psychological egoism? Here is psychological egoism stated in its most general
form:
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[PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM]: Everybody is ultimately motivated at bottom only by his/her
own self-interest.
There are some things that we need to get clear about in order to understand psychological
egoism properly.
First, psychological egoism is a doctrine about people’s ultimate or most basic motiva-
tions for action. It intends to provide an answer to the question: “Why did X act in that
way?” According to psychological egoism, there is a unique answer to all such questions:
namely, “In order to promote his/her self-interest.”
Psychological egoism does not deny that people can sometimes act in seemingly benev-
olent ways. It also does not deny that people can point to certain altruistic reasons to explain
their seemingly benevolent actions. What psychological egoism denies is that those altruistic
reasons were what really or ultimately motivated such people. According to psychological
egoism, regardless of whether one is consciously aware of it or not, one’s actions – even
those actions that are seemingly benevolent – are ultimately motivated at bottom by one’s
own self-interest.2 This leads to our next characteristic.
Second, one doesn’t necessarily have to be consciously aware of the fact that one is ul-
timately motivated by one’s self-interest in order for one’s actions to qualify as instances
of psychological egoism. It might be true that everybody is, in fact, ultimately motivated
by self-interest, but such motivation might be so deeply embedded within people’s subcon-
scious states that not everybody is consciously aware that his/her actions are motivated in
this way. Or people might simply be what Gauthier calls “self-maintaining engines”3 who
are just programmed (like machines) to pursue their own self-interests without always be-
2Drawing from contemporary psychological learning theories (such as that of Hull and Skinner), in one of
his earlier papers, Michael Slote suggests that there could be an empirical basis for psychological egoism such
that all higher-order drives and motives (e.g. altruistic and benevolent motives) are functionally dependent on
a certain number of basically “selfish” unlearned primary drives and motives. [See Slote 1964]
3See (Gauthier 1969, p. 21)
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ing consciously aware that they are motivated in this way. Psychological egoism would still
be true if either one of these two doctrines (or a combination of both) are universally true.
This means that psychological egoism has more to do with the underlying psychological
mechanism rather than the motivational contents of one’s desires and actions.
Third, psychological egoism is not a doctrine of achievement. Although it claims that
everybody is ultimately motivated by one’s own exclusive self-interest, it does not claim that
everybody (or even most people) actually succeeds in achieving their own self-interest. This
is something that is not that hard to understand if one thinks about the difference between
attempting to achieve something and actually achieving that thing.
Such failure to achieve one’s self-interest usually occurs when one has one or more false
beliefs For instance, suppose that one is motivated to promote one’s physical health (which is,
intuitively, a major component of one’s self-interest), and, thereby, regularly takes a herbal
medicine, which is scientifically proven to be carcinogenic, by falsely believing that the
herbal medicine possesses some mysterious powers that contributes to longevity. In such
case, one is not really achieving one’s best self-interest; quite the contrary. Nonetheless, this
does not change the fact that one was primarily motivated by one’s self-interest. So, such
example is not a counter example to psychological egoism.
Fourth, psychological egoism is a descriptive theory of human psychology; not a nor-
mative theory of human psychology. It claims that it is a matter of fact that all human
motivations are ultimately based on one’s exclusive self-intest; not that people’s motivations
should be ultimately based on their exclusive self-interest. There is a standard name for the
latter type of doctrine which is strictly normative: ethical egoism. Ethical egoism claims
that, generally speaking, people should promote their own exclusive self-interest more than
anything else.
The purpose of this section is to see whether Hobbes was a psychological egoist, not
whether Hobbes was an ethical egoist. I want to deny that Hobbes was a psychological
egoist, or at least, psychological egoism is not needed for his political philosophy. I take no
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stance on whether Hobbes was an ethical egoist.
3.3 Was Hobbes a Psychological Egoist?
As we have seen, psychological egoism generally claims that all human actions are ultimately
motivated by one’s own self-interest. Different people have different conceptions of what a
person’s self-interest consists in. And this, in turn, results in slightly different versions of
psychological egoism.
3.3.1 Was Hobbes a Psychological Hedonist?
One version of psychological egoism interprets a person’s good in purely hedonistic terms.
This is a version that is usually known as psychological hedonism. Psychological hedonists
define a person’s good as the experience of pleasure and the absence of pain. In fact, they go
slightly further than this; according to psychological hedonism, the experience of pleasure
and the absence of pain exhaust a person’s good or well-being.
So, self-interest, according to psychological hedonism, is none other than the experience
of pleasure and absence of pain. From this, psychological hedonism can be characterized as
follows:
[PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM]: All human actions are motivated ultimately by a basic
desire to experience pleasure and to avoid pain.
There are some people who have understood psychological egoism in this particular way
when they attributed psychological egoism to Hobbes.4 However, as long as one’s theory of
4This seems to be the view of F. S. McNeilly in [McNeilly 1966], where he argues that Hobbes was not a
psychological egoist after he had wrote Leviathan because, unlike Hobbes’s earlier works, pleasure no longer
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the good (or well-being) allows the possibility of things other than the experience of pleasure
and the absence of pain to constitute or contribute to one’s self-interest, one need not be
committed to psychological hedonism in order to be committed to psychological egoism;
one can think that all human actions are ultimately motivated by one’s own self-interest even
if one thinks that not all human actions are motivated by a basic desire to experience pleasure
and avoid pain.
It is not very hard to see that Hobbes was not a psychological hedonist in our current in-
terpretation. We have seen that, within Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy, the achieve-
ment of long-term self-preservation is objectively each and everybody’s greatest good. Note
that actions that best secures one’s prospects of self-preservation need not be pleasurable.
For example, exercising regularly might be a good way to maintain physical health, but ex-
ercise is not always a pleasurable thing to do even when it is obvious that it would make the
person healthier.
Furthermore, it is clear that Hobbes did not think that the fact that somebody is experienc-
ing pleasure, by itself, guarantees that the person is achieving something that is truly good for
him/her. According to Hobbes, there exists people who experience intense pleasure by con-
quering and having superior power over other people; namely, the glory-seekers.5However,
Hobbes emphatically denies that these glory-seekers are people who are seeking what is
truly advantageous for them6; which is their long-term self-preservation. In fact, he calls
these type of people “mad.”7
plays a central role in his philosophy. Jean Hampton also seems to be interpreting Hobbes as a psychological
hedonist when she claims that Hobbes is committed to the view that all of our desires are ultimately produced
by pleasure-producing and pain-avoiding physical mechanisms. Hampton thinks that Hobbes is not committed
to the view that every human desires have self-regarding motivational content. However, her interpretation is
still a version of psychological egoism (more specifically, psychological hedonism) according to our current
framework. See [Hampton 1986, pp. 23-24]
5“Joy arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is
called GLORYING...” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Section 39]
6As we will later see, these people are the main culprits of the state of nature descending into a state of
universal war.
7“The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is ... great vain-glory... [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter VIII, Paraphraph 18, emphasis on "madness" is mine]
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So, not only did Hobbes not think that the experience of pleasure and the absence of pain
exhausts a person’s self-interest, but he also did not think that pursuing pleasure can always
be regarded as a case of pursuing one’s real self-interest. Therefore, we can at the very
least say that Hobbes was not a psychological hedonist. However, this isn’t yet sufficient
to show that Hobbes was not a psychological egoist, since it might still be the case that
Hobbes thought that all human actions are ultimately motivated by a basic desire to promote
one’s own self-interest, (and, thereby, was committed to psychological egoism), even though
he thought that such actions may not always result in pleasurable (as well as less painful)
experiences.
3.3.2 Hobbes’s Dictum and Tautological Egoism
Now, many places within Hobbes’s text seem to suggest that Hobbes was committed to the
following doctrine:
[HOBBES’S DICTUM]: Everybody is motivated by their current desires or preferences -
that is, everybody always aims to satisfy their current desires or preferences
whenever they act.8
The doctrine, as it is stated, is not a version of psychological egoism. It is merely a theory of
motivation. The reason why Hobbes’s Dictum is not yet a version of psychological egoism
is because it is not supplemented by a theory of self-interest or personal good. It claims that
people in general are motivated by their current desires and preferences; however, it is silent
on the issue of whether satisfying these desires and preferences will be actually good for the
people in question.
8“Hobbes’s Dictum” is a name that Nick Sturgeon has suggested for me to use.
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So, there is an apparent way for Hobbes’s Dictum to become a version of psychological
egoism – namely, by being combined with the preference-satisfaction theory of the good,
which claims that it is always good for a person to satisfy his/her current desires or prefer-
ences. That way, Hobbes’s Dictum together with the preference-satisfaction theory of the
good would virtually be claiming that everybody is motivated by his/her own self-interest –
namely, to satisfy his/her current desires and preferences. This is a version of psychological
egoism that is sometimes called “tautological egoism.”9
The adjective “tautological”, here, is purposely used to express the writer’s reluctance
to acknowledge tautological egoism as a genuine version of psychological egoism. This is
understandable because tautological egoism does not in any way restrict the type of desires
or preferences that somebody may have in order for him/her to count as an egoist. Suppose
that you are a saint who greatly sacrificed your own personal well-being to advance some
humanitarian cause. A tautological egoist will say that you are an egoist, a selfish person,
rather than a selfless person; this is because you preferred to advance such humanitarian
cause yourself, and by acting accordingly, you satisfied such preferences, which amounts to
your own good. So, as long as people are motivated by their desires and preferences, we can
clearly see that tautological egoism is virtually non-falsifiable.
One should note at this point that being supplied with any other theory of self-interest
than the preference-satisfaction theory of the good will not make Hobbes’s Dictum a version
of psychological egoism. Suppose that one is a hedonist. Then, as long as one thinks that
there can be certain preferences the satisfaction of which are not always pleasurable, one is
not a psychological egoist even when one accepts Hobbes’s Dictum.
So, was Hobbes committed to Hobbes’s Dictum? It seems so. Consider how Hobbes
defines voluntary action. According to Hobbes, “a voluntary act is that which proceedeth
9See Gert (1967) and “Introduction to Thomas Hobbes” contained in Hobbes (1991) and Kavka (1986,
Chapter 2)
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from the will” 10 and the will is simply “the last appetite in deliberating”11. In other words,
what Hobbes is basically saying here is that every voluntary action proceeds from one’s
final preferences that emerges after one’s practical deliberation process. This is basically
Hobbes’s Dictum.
However, as we have just seen, the only way for Hobbes’s Dictum to imply psychological
egoism is for it to be combined with the preference-satisfaction theory of the good. But, as we
have seen previously, there are numerous pieces of textual evidence that suggest that Hobbes
was not committed to the preference-satisfaction theory of the good. This means that the
fact that Hobbes was committed to Hobbes’s Dictum does not make Hobbes a psychological
egoist.
3.3.3 What Psychological Egoism is for Hobbes and Whether He En-
dorsed it
Remember that psychological egoism generally claims that everybody ultimately seeks (ei-
ther consciously or unconsciously) to achieve their own personal good. I have explained
that different versions of psychological egoism can arise depending on what one thinks a
self-interest consists in part. Hobbes thinks that a person’s real self-interest (or real good)
consists in the achievement of the person’s own long-term self-preservation. This means
that, for Hobbes, psychological egoism would amount to be claiming the following:
[What “Psychological Egoism” claims for Hobbes]: Everybody ultimately aims to achieve
their real self-interests (or real good) whenever they act - that is, one’s actions
are always motivated at bottom by a desire to achieve one’s own long-term self-
preservation.
10Hobbes (1994, Leviathan: Chapter VI, Section 53)
11Hobbes (1994, Leviathan: Chapter VI, Section 53)
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So, in order to see whether Hobbes was committed to psychological egoism, we would have
to see whether Hobbes endorsed the above claim.
We can see that glory-seeking people, of which Hobbes acknowledges the existence,
have the potential to falsify the claim that Hobbes had endorsed psychological egoism as
it is formulated above. Glory-seekers are the type of people who pursue power and glory
even at the very expense of their long-term self-preservation. So, obviously, these people are
not achieving their real self-interest – namely, their long-term self-preservation – when they
act. However, as we have seen, psychological egoism is not a doctrine of achievement. It
is perfectly consistent with psychological egoism that people generally fail to achieve their
real self-interest as long as they are ultimately motivated by it.
This means that we would have to distinguish between two types of glory-seekers. The
first type of glory-seekers are the type of people who are, indeed, ultimately motivated by a
basic desire to secure their own long-term self-preservation (that is, their real self-interest),
but falsely believe that displaying typical glory-seeking behaviors is the best way to achieve
their long-term self-preservation. The second type of glory-seekers are the type of people
who display typical glory-seeking behaviors because they are motivated at bottom by a basic
desire or passion for (vain) glory, which is, according to Hobbes, not their real good (self-
interest.)
If I can show that Hobbes thought that there are at least some people who seek glory in
the second type of way, then this suffices to show that Hobbes was not a psychological egoist
in our current understanding of the term. Consider Hobbes’s general discussion of glory and
vain-glory:
Joy arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability is that exultation
of the mind which is called GLORYING...” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter
VI, Section 39]
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Also, because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security re-
quires, [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapther XIII, Section 4]
Vain-glorious men ... are inclined to rash engaging... [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan,
Chapter XI, Paragraph 12]
The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is ... great vain-
glory, ... [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VIII, Paraphraph 18, emphasis on
"madness" and "great vain-glory" are mine]
Here, we can clearly see that Hobbes is referring to people who are ultimately motivated by
the passion or desire for glory itself; this is different from falsely believing that seeking glory
is the best way to achieve one’s long-term self-preservation. We can further see that Hobbes
does not think of glory as something that constitutes one’s real self-interest (or real good);
he denounces the passion for glory as being a major cause of madness.
So, we can clearly see that Hobbes thought that these second type of glory-seekers are a
real possibility. Actually, not only does Hobbes think that these second type of glory-seekers
are a real possibility, but he also thinks that these second type of glory seekers actually ex-
ist, and as it will later turn out, the existence of such glory-seekers is essential to Hobbes’s
political philosophy.12So, according to Hobbes, not everybody is ultimately motivated by
their real self-interest, which is their long-term self-preservation; some are ultimately moti-
vated by a passion for glory which is Hobbes deems to be a representative case of madness.
Therefore, Hobbes did not hold psychological egoism.
Then, how are we supposed to make sense of the typical passages that apparently seem
to suggest that Hobbes was committed to psychological egoism? Let’s go back to the major
passages which many people think give support for thinking Hobbes as a psychological
egoist.
12They are the main culprits for the state of nature dissolving into a universal state of war.
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...of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself. [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIV, Section 8]
For no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is volun-
tary, and of all voluntary acts the object is to every man his own good... [Hobbes
1994: Leviathan, Chapter XV, Section 16]
As we have seen before, Hobbes explicitly distinguishes between real good and apparent
good (or what is merely called good.)13 Therefore, the term “good” in these passages can be
interpreted to mean either of two things: (1) an individual’s real good (i.e. real self-interest)
or (2) an individual’s apparent good.
If the term “good” in these passages denote an individual’s real good, then we would
have to say that Hobbes was, indeed, asserting psychological egoism in the above passages.
Remember that a voluntary action, for Hobbes, simply denotes an action that proceeds from
one’s final preferences after deliberation. The passages above would, then, basically be
saying that whenever people act in their most preferred way, they always ultimately seek
to achieve their real good (i.e. real self-interest), namely, their long-term self-preservation.
This is psychological egoism for Hobbes.
However, as we have just seen, this conflicts with Hobbes’s acknowledging the existence
of vain-glorious people who do not ultimately pursue their real self-interest or real good. If
one pursues such interpretation, one has no choice but to say that Hobbes was just plainly
inconsistent.
13
. . . good (like evil) is divided into real and apparent. [Hobbes 1991: De Homine, Chapter XI,
Section 5]
Whence it happens that inexperienced men that do not look closely enough at the long-term con-
sequences of things, accept what appears to be good, not seeing the evil annexed to it; afterwards
they experience damage. And this is what is meant by those who distinguish good and evil as
real and apparent. [Hobbes 1991: De Homine, Chapter XI, Section 5]
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However, we have an alternate option. We could interpret the term “good” in the above
passages as denoting an individual’s apparent good. An apparent good, for Hobbes, is some-
thing that the individual just happens to prefer; it is apparently good because the things that
people just happen to prefer are not always really good or in the best interest of the person
in question. Suppose that we interpret the term “good” in the above passages as denoting
an individual’s apparent good. Then, this combined with Hobbes’s definition of voluntary
act as an act “that which proceedeth from the will” 14 as well as his definition of the will as
“the last appetite in deliberating”15, would imply that the sentence, “of all voluntary acts the
object is to every man his own good”, would virtually be expressing the same proposition as
the sentence, “For every human being, the basic aim of acting in one’s most preferred way
is to obtain what one happens to prefer.” In other words, what Hobbes is claiming in the
above passages is that everybody is motivated by his/her preferences. This is just Hobbes’s
Dictum, and, as we have seen, Hobbes’s Dictum does not imply psychological egoism.
In order to show that this, indeed, is a better interpretative strategy, we would have to
show that interpreting the term “good” as denoting an individual’s apparent good does not
lead us to any similar inconsistency that interpreting the term as denoting an individual’s real
good does. And, we can see that it, indeed, does not.
Let’s go back to behaviors of the second type of glory-seekers. When these glory-seekers
acted voluntarily in typical glory-seeking ways, they were obviously not aiming to achieve
their own real good. However, we can still say that the glorious outcomes that were sought by
these glory-seekers when they acted voluntarily (i.e. when they acted in their most preferred
way) were, despite its being not really good for them, something that was at least what they
most preferred. As we have seen, for Hobbes, something that one happens to most prefer
at a given moment is one’s apparent good. Therefore, we can say that when these second
type of glory-seekers acted voluntarily by acting in their most preferred way, their basic aim
14Hobbes (1994, Leviathan: Chapter VI, Section 53)
15Hobbes (1994, Leviathan: Chapter VI, Section 53)
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was to achieve their apparent or seeming good. So, we can say that, for Hobbes, everybody,
including even these second type of glory-seekers, seek their (apparent) good when they act
voluntarily.
This is exactly what Hobbes would be saying in the above passages if we interpret the
term “good” as denoting an individual’s apparent good. And this seems to be the only way to
make the above passages consistent with what Hobbes says about the existence of the second
type of glory-seekers who obviously do not aim to achieve their long-term self-preservation,
which, according to Hobbes, is their real self-interest.
In short, Hobbes did not endorse psychological egoism. The many passages that make it
seem that he is advancing psychological egoism can be explained away by interpreting them
as stating Hobbes’s Dictum. And, Hobbes’s Dictum does not imply psychological egoism
unless it is combined with the preference-satisfaction theory of the good – a doctrine that
Hobbes rejects.
3.3.4 Was Hobbes a Subjective Egoist?
Now, we have just seen that Hobbes did not hold psychological egoism if we follow Hobbes’s
own conception of real self-interest interpreted as the achievement of one’s long-term self-
preservation. However, even though Hobbes was, indeed, not committed to psychological
egoism understood in terms of his notion of real good (or real self-interest), one might still
think that he is committed to a doctrine that many people would regard as a version of psy-
chological egoism. And that is a doctrine that claims that every human action aims to achieve
what each person thinks or believes to be his or her own real personal good. Let’s call this
doctrine, “subjective egoism” and formulate it as follows:
[SUBJECTIVE EGOISM]: Everybody seeks to achieve what they think or believe to be their
own personal good - that is, all human actions are ultimately motivated at bot-
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tom by a basic desire to promote what each person thinks or believes to be his
own real self-interest.
Note the difference between psychological egoism in its general form and subjective egoism.
Psychological egoism generally claims that everybody is always motivated at bottom by their
own self-interest. Here, what constitutes a person’s self-interest is specified by what theory
of personal good the evaluator adopts.
An important thing to remember is that one need not be consciously aware of the moti-
vational contents (viz. that they are directed towards one’s own self-interest) of one’s basic
desires in order for one’s actions to qualify as instances of psychological egoism; it is suffi-
cient for one’s actions to be ultimately derived from an underlying psychological mechanism
that always forces one to seek (either consciously or unconsciously) one’s self-interest when-
ever one acts.
By contrast, for subjective egoism, the motivational contents of each person’s actions
matter. Subjective egoism claims that everybody is always motivated at bottom by a basic
desire to achieve what each person thinks or believes to be his or her self-interest. So, in order
for somebody’s action to qualify as an instance of subjective egoism, that person would have
to have been consciously aware that he or she was pursuing what he or she thinks or believes
to be in his or her best self-interest.
Furthermore, what somebody thinks or believes may be incorrect. So, once we have
fixed the contents of our working theory of self-interest, the fact that object g is in individual
x’s best self-interest does not necessarily imply that individual x would think or believe that
object g is in his or her best self-interest. Conversely, the fact that individual x thinks or
believes that object h is in his or her best self-interest does not necessarily imply that object
h is in fact in x’s best self-interest.16
16The two coincide only if we adopt a theory of self-interest that claims that whatever a person thinks or
believes something to be good for him or her, that thing is, by that very fact, also really good for him or her.
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Let me illustrate the distinction between psychological egoism and subjective egoism by
a specific example. Suppose that, according to my theory of self-interest, maintaining good
physical shape is a major component of a person’s good. Suppose that somebody was aiming
to achieve what is in fact very bad for that person according to this theory of self-interest;
say, the person was ultimately motivated by a basic desire to intake as many saturated fat
calories as possible.
Assuming my theory of self-interest, such a person is a counter example to psychological
egoism; that is, the person was, in fact, not ultimately aiming for his own self-interest when
he tried to consume all of the junk food that he could find. However, such person is not
necessarily a counter example to subjective egoism. This is because even though the person
did not actually aim for his real self-interest, the person could still have (mistakenly) thought
or believed that intaking as many saturated fat calories as possible would be in his/her best
self-interest.
The same thing can be applied to the second type of glory-seekers that we have discussed
above. For Hobbes, the existence of this second type of glory-seekers is a counter-example
to psychological egoism; these glory-seekers are the type of people who do not seek what
is really good for their own self-interest by being ultimately motivated by a basic desire for
(vain) glory, (which Hobbes sees as a representative case of a pathological desire.) However,
it might still be the case that these glory-seekers think, albeit mistakenly, that the achievement
of glory is much better than the achievement of long-term self-preservation, and, thereby, are
generally aiming for what they think to be (albeit mistakenly) what is really good for them.
In other words, even though the typical actions of glory-seeking people cannot be properly
said to be ultimately based on a basic desire to promote what is in fact in their self-interest
(which is their long-term self-preservation), it might still be argued that these actions are
ultimately based on a basic desire to promote what glory-seeking people think to be in their
This means that the two coincide only when one adopts the simplistic version of the preference-satisfaction
theory of good.
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self-interest.
Showing that Hobbes was not a subjective egoist is more difficult than showing that he
was not a psychological egoist. This is because even the second type of glory-seekers cannot
count as counter-examples to subjective egoism. However, I believe that this can still be
done.
Consider again the typical actions displayed by glory-seeking people. When somebody
decides to pursue glory at the expense of one’s own self-preservation, this might be so for
three different reasons.
1. The person might (mistakenly) think that seeking glory is the best way to achieve his or
her own self-preservation – which he or she correctly thinks to be the greatest good for
him or herself. If this is the case, then such person is not a counter-example of subjec-
tive egoism (or even psychological egoism). This is because the typical glory-seeking
behaviors that such person displays are in fact ultimately based on a basic desire to
promote what is in fact his/her best self-interest – namely, his/her own long-term self-
preservation. The fault of such person’s behaviors lies in his/her faulty instrumental
reasoning – (that is, he/she mistakenly think that glory-seeking behaviors are a good
means to securing self-preservation) – not in a fault in the type of ultimate basic desire
that the person had derived his or her preferences from. So, although such person is
not acting in a way that is actually good for his/her own long-term interest, he/she is
still acting in a way which he or she thinks or believes to be good for his or her long-
term interest. Furthermore, we can say that such person’s actions are still motivated
at bottom by a basic desire to secure his or her self-preservation, which, according to
Hobbes, is the person’s greatest good. Therefore, the existence of such glory-seeking
person does not show that Hobbes was not a subjective egoist (or even a psychological
egoist).
2. The person might (mistakenly) think that the achievement of glory itself is a greater
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good than the achievement of his/her own self-preservation, and, thereby, bases all of
his/her actions ultimately on a basic desire for (vain) glory. If this is the case, then,
although such person is a counter-example of psychological egoism, such person still
does not count as a counter-example of subjective egoism. This is because although
the actions of such person are not in fact ultimately based on a basic desire to promote
his or her own personal good, we can say that the person’s actions are still based ulti-
mately on a basic desire to promote what the person thinks or believes to be his or her
own personal good. So, the existence of such glory-seeking person only reaffirms that
all human actions are ultimately motivated by what each person thinks or believes to
be his or her own good, which is what subjective egoism claims.
(These are the two types of glory-seekers that we have encountered in the previous
section. I, now, suggest a third type of glory-seeker. )
3. The person might correctly recognize that securing his/her own self-preservation is a
much greater good than achieving glory and might also correctly judge that display-
ing such (glory-seeking) behaviors is generally not a very good way to secure his/her
own self-preservation in the long run, but might have been swayed by his or her ve-
hement passion for glory, and, thereby, acted in a typical glory-seeking way. If this
is the case, then not only would the person’s glory-seeking behaviors not be based
on a basic desire to promote what is in fact conducive to the person’s own good, but
such behaviors would also not be based on a basic desire to promote what the person
personally thinks or believes to be conducive to his/her own good. In such case, the
person’s behaviors will be ultimately based on a basic desire (i.e. a basic desire for
glory or vain-glory) the satisfaction of which the person fully recognizes to be very
likely to be detrimental to the achievement of his or her self-preservation, which the
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person, again, fully recognizes to be his/her greatest good. The existence of this third
type of glory-seeking people, unlike the first two types of glory-seeking people above,
does serve as a counter-example to subjective egoism.
What remains to be shown is whether Hobbes himself acknowledges this third type of glory-
seeking people as a genuine possibility. If he does, then I believe that we can reasonably
conclude that Hobbes was not (even) a subjective egoist. The only thing that needs to be
done is to show that Hobbes does not necessarily think that people always think that they are
acting in their own best self-interest whenever they act.
Note that it is not very hard to observe this type of situation in our daily lives. I might
prefer to play video games when I should really be studying for an important exam that is
scheduled the next day. However, just because I preferred to play video games, and, then
actually played video games instead of studying for the exam, does not necessarily imply
that I was thinking or judging that playing video games was best for me at that very moment.
I could have correctly judged that studying for the exam would be in my best interests at that
very moment, but could have succumbed to my strong desire to play video games.
This is, I believe, an instance that can be explained by what Hobbes calls the perturba-
tions of the mind. Let’s go back to the part where Hobbes discusses about perturbations of
the mind. There, Hobbes writes:
Emotions or perturbations of the mind are species of appetite and aversion . . .
They are called perturbations because they frequently obstruct right reasoning.
. . . although . . . good must be sought in the long term, which is the job of reason,
appetite seizeth upon a present good without foreseeing the greater evils that
necessarily attach to it. Therefore appetite perturbs and impedes the operation
of reason; whence it is rightly called a perturbation. [Hobbes 1991: De Homine,
Chapter XII, Section 1 emphasis added]
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Here, we can see that Hobbes is distinguishing between the role of reason and the role of
appetites and desires that eventually become perturbations. Reason instructs the agent to seek
long term good, while appetites and desires, which eventually become perturbations, impel
the agent to concentrate solely on the immediate good without considering the long term
consequences that a given action would bring. The separation between the role of reason
and the role of appetites and desires that eventually become perturbations leaves room for an
agent to correctly judge what the best course of action would be by his or her reason, while
being impelled to act in a way which he or she acknowledges to be contrary to his or her best
interest by being overwhelmed by the influences of particular desires and aversions that are
perturbations.
This type of phenomenon - failing to act in ways that one judges to be best - is usually
known as the problem of weakness of will. One might think that Hobbes does not acknowl-
edge that the problem of weakness of will is even possible. As we have seen, a voluntary act,
for Hobbes, is an act that proceeds from one’s will, where one’s will is supposed to be one’s
final preference (in Hobbes’s words, “last appetite in deliberating”) to perform a specific ac-
tion. The will, interpreted this way, corresponds to the notion of revealed preference17 that
is used in modern economics theory. In the theory of revealed preferences, one’s actions or
choices reveal what one has preferred. Likewise, for Hobbes, one’s voluntary acts reveal
what one has willed. For Hobbes, there is a necessary connection between a person’s will
and the person’s voluntary actions; any desires that do not connect to a person’s actions are,
according to Hobbes, merely, inclinations.
And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing,
that nevertheless he forbore to do, yet that is properly but an inclination, which
17The intuitive idea is something like this. Suppose that somebody chose to buy the consumption bundle
X , when buying an alternative consumption bundle Y was perfectly within his/her budget constraints. Here,
economists say that the person’s action reveals that he/she preferred the consumption bundle X to the consump-
tion bundle Y . This is because if he/she chose to buy X when he/she could have bought Y instead, then the
reason for this, presumably, is because he/she preferred the consumption bundle X to the consumption bundle
Y . See, [Varian, 2006, Chapter 7]
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makes no action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last
inclination or appetite. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 53]
So, there is a sense in which the problem of weakness of the will does not exist within
Hobbes’s moral system. Since every voluntary action is, by definition, the result of one’s
will, and since one’s will simply denotes one’s final preference to perform a specific action
after deliberation, there is no way that one could have acted contrary to one’s final prefer-
ences; for Hobbes, one could not have preferred something but acted otherwise. This doesn’t
necessarily imply that Hobbes denied that one could act contrary to one’s best judgment. As
it is possible for one to judge that it would not be in one’s best self-interest to play video
games before the day of a very important exam, but, prefers to do so anyway; it is possible
for somebody to judge that displaying typical glory-seeking behaviors would be detrimental
to the achievement of his/her long-term self-preservation, which is one’s real self-interest,
while preferring to display such behaviors anyway. The passage above shows that this could
be possible if one’s deliberation process gets perturbed by, say, a vehement passion for glory.
So, we can see that Hobbes’s discussions of perturbations make room for him to acknowl-
edge the possibility for an agent to prefer to act in a way which the agent herself recognizes
to be contrary to her own best interest. That is, we don’t necessarily have to interpret Hobbes
as being committed to the view that all human actions are ultimately motivated at bottom by
a basic desire to promote what each person thinks to be his or her own exclusive personal
good. For Hobbes, some preferred acts may be acts that the agent does not think or believe
to be best. Therefore, Hobbes doesn’t necessarily have to be seen as a subjective egoist.
I am aware that my arguments do not conclusively show that Hobbes was not committed
to subjective egoism; it only alludes to a possible interpretation of him being not. However,
from my own perspective, such is not that much of an important issue as I will now argue that,
whatever is Hobbes’s stance on psychological egoism, psychological egoism is not needed
for his political philosophy.
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3.4 Psychological Egoism is Not Needed for Hobbes’s Po-
litical Philosophy
Many people think Hobbes has to assume some form of egoistic psychology in order to
explain why he thinks that the state of nature, which is without any government authority
or enforcement (and so is a state of anarchy) results in a state of war of all against all. This
state of war of all against all is a miserable situation which everybody wants to escape. And
the universal misery of the state of nature is, for Hobbes, what justifies the establishment of
governments.
One might naturally ask why Hobbes thinks that the absence of government inevitably
dissolves into a state of universal war. For instance, why can’t people live harmoniously and
peacefully without the enforcement of government power? What is usually regarded as the
Hobbsian answer to this question is: people are naturally and universally selfish.
For example, Kavka lists six characteristics of general human psychology which he
thinks are needed in order to properly explain why the state of nature, according to Hobbes,
inevitably dissolves into a state of war, and, thereby, justifies Hobbes’s argument against
anarchy.
There are six such characteristics, described below, (. . . ) All play a substantial
role in Hobbes’s arguments against anarchy, and several play a further role in
other of his arguments.
1.Egoism. Individuals are primarily concerned with their own well-being, and
act accordingly.
2.Death-aversion. Individuals are strongly averse to their own death, and act
accordingly.
3.Concern for Reputation. Individuals care about their reputations, about what
others think of them, and they act accordingly.
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4.Forwardlookingness. Individuals care about their future, as well as present,
well-being, and act accordingly.
5.Conflicting Desires. Satisfaction of one person’s desires often interferes with,
or precludes, satisfaction of another person’s. (. . . )
6.Rough Equality. People are fairly equal in their intellectual and bodily powers.
(. . . )
[Kavka [1986, pp. 33-34]]
Among these six characteristics, the first refers to psychological egoism18 while the third
refers to people’s desires for glory. According to Kavka, these characteristics play a sub-
stantial role in Hobbes’s argument against anarchy. In other words, according to Kavka,
some version of a general egoistic psychology is needed in order for Hobbes’s argument
against anarchy, which is the foundation of Hobbes’s entire political philosophy, to work.
As I have already explained in the beginning of this section, many contemporary Hobbes
scholars, who have been influenced by modern game theory, have modeled the state of nature
situation as a game of one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma.19 It is true that this gets the work
done; modeling the state of nature situation as a game of Prisoner’s Dilemma does explain
very well why, absent government enforcement, people in the state of nature will confront a
constant state of war.
However, in order to model Hobbes’s state of nature as a one-shot game of Prisoner’s
Dilemma, one has to assume that Hobbes thinks that people will generally prefer to perform
unitary defection even when there is assurance20 that the other player will cooperate. This
18Kavka later in the chapter argues that it is not, strictly speaking, psychological egoism, but only, what
he calls, “predominant egoism” that is needed for Hobbes’s argument against anarchy to work. According
to predominant egoism, human beings in general are predominantly motivated by their own good or well-
being. This leaves open that people can sometimes in certain situations act in altruistic and benevolent ways. I
personally think that not even predominant egoism is needed for Hobbes’s; what is needed is only that people
are not self-less masochists.
19See Kavka [1986, pp. 109-112], Gauthier [1969, p. 79], Gauthier [1984, p. 170]
20Of course, if there is such assurance, then the game will no longer be a PD game. What I am empha-
sizing here is the type of preferences that each of the players in the PD has independent of the other player’s
preferences; the main point is that, for each player in the PD game, defection strictly dominates cooperation.
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means that in order for the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game to be the correct model of
Hobbes’s state of nature, one has to think of Hobbes as being committed to some very re-
stricted form of psychological egoism; that is, one would have to interpret Hobbes as thinking
that people universally would not prefer to cooperate with another cooperator in the state of
nature.
This is very implausible. Many people would think that they would actually prefer to
cooperate with other cooperators rather than taking advantage of them in the state of nature.
So, if the fact that the state of nature will inevitably deteriorate into state of constant war can
only be explained by assuming that people are in general what Gauthier calls straightforward
maximizers21 (which are the type of people that a very restricted version of psychological
egoism claims people in general to be), then this means that Hobbes’s entire political philos-
ophy is based on a very weak foundation.
So, if we could find a way to explain why Hobbes’s state of nature will inevitably deteri-
orate into a state of constant war without relying on commonsensical psychological egoism,
then I believe that it will significantly bolster the plausibility of Hobbes’s political philoso-
phy.
I believe that such task can be done. Consider Hobbes’s own explanation for the cause
of conflict in the state of nature.
In the state of nature there is in all men a will to do harm, but not for the same
reason or with equal culpability. One man practices the equality of nature (. . . )
this is the mark of modest man (. . . ) Another, supposing himself superior to
other, wants to be allowed everything (. . . ) that is the sign of an aggressive
character. In his case, the will to do harm derives from vainglory. [Hobbes
1997: On the Citizen, Chapter 1, Section 4 emphasis added]
21See [Gauthier, 1984, Chapter VI, Section 2.1]
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Also, because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security
requires, if others (that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within mod-
est bounds) should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be
able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, section 4 emphasis added]
Here we can see that Hobbes does not think that everybody in the state of nature will be
primarily motivated by a desire for glory or vain-glory. It is true that Hobbes thinks that
there would be a certain portion of the entire population that would indeed be aggressive
and glory-hungry. However, Hobbes acknowledges that many people will be quite content
with living within modest boundaries; these modest people will gladly prefer to cooperate
with other people as long as they are assured that their counterparts will cooperate in return
and not take advantage of them. However, Hobbes thinks that even these modest people will
generally tend to attack other people. This is because,
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to se-
cure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master
the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough
to endanger him. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIII, section 4 emphasis
added]
In other words, the main reason why even the modest people tend to attack other people
in the state of nature, according to Hobbes, is because they are unsure about whether their
counterparts will actually return their cooperative behaviors with cooperation. That is, a
typical modest person will be unsure about whether his or her counterpart is another modest
person like him, or a glory-seeker who will take advantage of his good will.
If this is the case, then the main reason why the state of nature dissolves into a state of
war of all against all is not because everybody naturally seeks glory or tends to maximize
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his/her own immediate gain whenever they can, but rather because people in the state of
nature are faced with uncertainty.
If uncertainty is the major cause of war in the state of nature, then I believe that the
Hobbesian state of nature can be better modeled as a Incomplete Information Bayesian Game
rather than a complete information Prisoner’s Dilemma game.22 If this is the case, then one
does not need to assume that people in general would prefer to take advantage of other peo-
ple’s cooperatives behaviors. That is, one does not need to assume any restricted form of
egoistic psychology in order to explain the conflict that arises in Hobbes’s state of nature.
The only assumption that is needed is that people in general are not masochists who would
gladly prefer to be taken advantage of others’ ill intentions. This, I believe is a very modest
and plausible assumption. In short, regardless of whether Hobbes was actually committed to
such view, we do not really need psychological egoism to make sense of Hobbes’s political
philosophy.
22One of the later chapters will be primarily concerned with providing such model.
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Part II
Reinvigorating The Leviathan
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General Introduction for Part II
Our task, in part I, was to free Hobbes from three conventional interpretations with which
he is usually associated; I believe that we have, thereby, unleashed the Leviathan from the
traditional chains that obstructed its appreciation. In part II, we will try to restore and build-
up the Leviathan’s powers to its full potential via reconstruction.
The preliminary reconstruction process starts from chapter 4, titled, “Reconstructing
Hobbes’s Theory of the Good as an Ideal Advisor Theory.” There, Hobbes’s theory of the
good will first be summarized into an axiomatic format, and, then the theory will be recon-
structed as a version of an ideal-advisor theory of the good. The purpose of reconstructing
Hobbes’s theory of the good into an ideal-advisor theory is mainly for convenience. By iden-
tifying a person’s good as the satisfaction of the preferences that one’s idealized-self would
form on behalf of oneself, we will be then in a position to utilize contemporary utility theory
to give a precise formal representation of a person’s good from the perspective of Hobbes’s
moral and political philosophy.
Chapter 5, titled, A Contemporary Decision Theoretic Reconstruction of Hobbes’s The-
ory of the Good”, performs exactly the task that the title of the chapter suggests. Building up
from the axiomatic summary that has been provided in chapter 4, chapter 5 fully develops the
inchoate notions of quantity, summation, aggregation, and probability that were originally
expressed in Hobbes’s works in the lights of contemporary utility theory. As a result, we will
get a more sophisticated version of the theory of the good that Hobbes himself had implied
in his works.
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Building up from the formal apparatus that we have established in chapter 5, in chapter
6, titled, “A Bayesian Game-Theoretic Reconstruction of Hobbes’s State of Nature”, we will
oppose to the traditional attempts to model Hobbes’s state of nature as a Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, and provide what I believe is the best game-theoretic model of Hobbes’s state of
nature to date. Not only does the Bayesian game-theoretic model provided here provide
a more accurate representation of Hobbes’s state of nature than the traditional Prisoner’s
Dilemma game by attributing the main cause of conflict to, just as it is described in Hobbes’s
original text, uncertainty rather than selfishness, it frees Hobbes’s political philosophy from
being based on a very contestable theory of human psychology which many people believe
to be false: namely, psychological egoism.
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Chapter 4
Reconstructing Hobbes’s Theory of the
Good as an Ideal-Advisor Theory of the
Good
One of the main purposes of Hobbes was to erect a deductive system in which all norma-
tive conclusions about morality and political philosophy can be derived from non-normative
facts. The project, initially, was intended to be reductive to the very bottom level in the most
ambitious way. Normative concepts, such as moral or political obligation, moral goodness
and rightness, were supposed to be grounded on and derived from facts about human psy-
chology, such as what people, as a matter of fact, desire and prefer, and these facts about
human psychology were, in turn, supposed to be ultimately grounded on and explained by
physical motions. The major motive behind such grand project was to purge moral and polit-
ical philosophy of any vestiges of Aristotelean metaphysics and to allign moral and political
philosophy perfectly with the then burgeoning scientific view of the universe.
However, as we have seen so far, Hobbes wasn’t able to pursue this project in a com-
pletely consistent manner. This is because Hobbes’s entire moral system completely rests
on the fact that self-preservation is each and every individual’s greatest good. As we have
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seen, for Hobbes, it is not that self-preservation is the greatest good because everybody just
happens to desire it as a matter of fact; rather it is because self-preservation is each and every
individual’s greatest good that each and every individual should desire it and aim to achieve
it as best as he or she can. The fact that, within Hobbes’s moral system, the goodness of self-
preservation does not really depend on anybody’s actually desiring it is reflected in Hobbes’s
discussion of madness. Madness, for Hobbes, is defined as being under the influence of any
type of passion (e.g. a desire for glory) that makes one act in ways that are generally detri-
mental to the attainment of one’s self-preservation. In essence, for Hobbes, madness consists
in desiring or preferring to do something at the very expense of one’s self-preservation. And
as we have seen so far, the fact that something else is preferred to self-preservation does
not make that something better than self-preservation. This, again, is because, for Hobbes,
self-preservation is each and every individual’s greatest good, and the reason why suffering
madness is so bad is mainly because it directs the individual’s attention away from its very
achievement.
Keeping all of this in mind, let us now try to reconstruct Hobbes’s theory of good in a
slightly more systematic way.
4.1 Systematizing Hobbes’s Theory of Personal Good
As I have just mentioned, the whole system of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy is
based on the fact that self-preservation is objectively one’s greatest good for each and ev-
ery individual. Let’s state this as our primary axiom for the task of reconstructing Hobbes’s
moral system.
[AXIOM (A1)] (Primary Axiom For Hobbes’s Moral Philosophy): For every individual, self-
preservation is (objectively) his/her greatest good.
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We now define Hobbes’s notion of general rationality as follows:
[DEFINITION (D1)] (General Rationality): Rationality is the ability to identify one’s great-
est good and direct one’s actions towards its achievement.
First of all, I would like to mention that rationality, here, is construed in a very different
manner than how it is usually construed in other social sciences, such as economics. In
economics or standard rational choice theory, rationality is defined as a set of consistency
requirements (e.g. [negative] transitivity, a[nti]symmetry, and so on) that one’s preferences
need to meet in order for those preferences to be properly represented by a suitable real-
valued utility function. Here, rationality is defined as a set of formal constraints that are
imposed on the preference-relation itself ; it does not question nor evaluate the specific con-
tents of those preferences.
This is not how Hobbes sees rationality. For Hobbes, reason has an end of itself ; it aims
at and seeks to achieve one’s greatest good. And, as I have stated in the axiom 1, there is
something that Hobbes deems to be (objectively) the greatest good of each and every individ-
ual: namely, his or her self-preservation. From this, we can derive the following proposition.
[PROPOSITION (P1)] (Definition of Substantial (Hobbesian) Rationality): Rationality is
the ability to identify what is most conducive to the achievement of one’s self-
preservation and direct one’s actions towards it.
This follows from axiom 1 and the definition of general rationality. Let us regard the contents
of this proposition as our definition of “substantial Hobbesian rationality.” As we have seen
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from chapter 1, one’s rationality is the operation and realization of one’s combined rational
faculties, which are one’s prudence, reasoning, and scientific knowledge.
It should be noted that it is possible for somebody who is irrational in this substantial
(Hobbesian) sense to be, nonetheless, rational in the standard decision theoretic sense that I
have just explained.
An example of such person would be the “consistent glory-seeker” that we have seen
previously. A consistent glory-seeker is a person who prefers outcomes that are glorious
over outcomes that are conducive to his or her self-preservation. The fact that this person
prefers glory over self-preservation indicates that this person is irrational in the substantial
(Hobbesian) sense stated above.
However, this does not imply that the preferences of this consistent glory-seeker violates
any of the standard axioms of decision theory. For example, this person’s preferences might
be perfectly transitive; that is, if this person sees outcome A as more glorious than outcome B
and, thereby, strictly prefers outcome A to outcome B, then whenever this person encounters
a third outcome C which the person perceives to be far less glorious than outcome B, which
makes the person strictly prefer outcome B to outcome C, the person, then, strictly prefers
outcome A to outcome C as well. If this is the case, then there is nothing irrational about
this person’s preferences in the standard decision theoretic sense. It would be useful to have
a separate notion of this minimal or formal sense of rationality in our tool box.
[DEFINITION (D2)] (Formal (Minimal) Rationality): One’s preferences are formally (or
minimally) rational if and only if they satisfy the axioms of decision theory.
Here, one should note that this definition of “formal (or minimal) rationality is context-
specific. There are many different decision theoretic representation models that rely on
different sets of axioms. So, when I say that one’s preferences are formally or minimally
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rational in the decision theoretic sense, I will be referring to the specific decision theoretic
model that is being applied in that particular context.1 Again, the fact that one’s preferences
are formally (or minimally) rational in this sense merely indicates that one’s preferences are
mutually consistent enough for there to be a real-valued utility function representing them.
We will later use this notion of formal (or minimal) rationality to derive the utility functions
of glory-seekers.
Now, if we look at the definition of substantial Hobbesian rationality (i.e. P1) carefully,
we can see that it requires one’s rational abilities to perform two distinctive tasks: one is
to identify what would best achieve one’s self-preservation, and the other is to direct (by
effectively motivating) one’s actions towards achieving what has been so identified. When-
ever one’s combined rational abilities perform these two tasks successfully, one will always
prefer to act in ways that are actually conducive to one’s own self-preservation. This means
that if one happens to prefer to act in ways that are not only in-conducive but are actually
detrimental to the achievement of one’s self-preservation, then this means that one’s rational
capabilities are failing in either (or both) of these two ways. The resulting preferences, from
the perspective of the substantial Hobbesian sense, will, thereby, be irrational. We have just
derived the following notion of irrational preferences:
[PROPOSITION (P2)] (Irrational Preferences): One’s preferences are irrational in the sub-
stantial Hobbesian sense if and only if one prefers to act in ways that are detri-
mental to the achievement of one’s self-preservation
As we have just seen, there are two distinct ways for one’s preferences to be (substantially) ir-
rational. One is for one to fail to correctly identify what best achieves one’s self-preservation.
1Asymmetry and negative transitivity might be the only set of axioms that I am referring to if the context
is requiring only an ordinal representation, whereas the so called independence and archimedian axioms might
be needed if the context is requiring an expected utility representation.
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The other is for one to be not strongly motivated to act according to what has been identified
as the best way to achieve self-preservation. As we have seen from the previous chapters,
according to Hobbes, the former happens when one is insufficiently informed about the rele-
vant facts , while the latter happens when one is swayed by the wrong type of basic passion.2I
have called preferences that are irrational in the first way, "unconsidered", and preferences
that are irrational in the second way "unbalanced." (As we have seen, when one’s preference
are unbalanced, it is usually the result of what Hobbes calls “madness.”)
We now derive the corollary of P2.
[COROLLARY OF P2 (C1)] (Irrational Preferences): One’s preferences are irrational in
the substantial Hobbesian sense if and only if one’s preferences are (a) uncon-
sidered or (b) unbalanced.
As we have seen, Hobbes thinks that the satisfaction of such substantially irrational prefer-
ences are only apparently (as opposed to really) good for the agent. The follwing notion of
rational preferences is logically equivalent to the corollary.
[Corollary of P2 (C1)] (Rational Preferences): One’s preferences are (substantially) ratio-
nal if and only if they are (a) well-considered and (b) well-balanced.
When an agent’s preferences are well-considered and well-balanced - that is, when the
agent’s preferences are substantially rational - the agent will always prefer to act in ways
2Here, the wrong kind of basic passion, in most cases, will denote one’s basic desire for (vain-) glory;
however, any other basic passion (such as “severe dejection” as mentioned by Hobbes) that obstructs the proper
operation of one’s basic desire for self-preservation in one’s deliberation process would be equally deemed as
“the wrong kind of basic passion."
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that are, in fact, most conducive to his or her self-preservation. According to Axiom 1,
self-preservation is each and every individual’s greatest good. Something that is the greatest
good implies that it is really good. From this, we now arrive at the main theorem of Hobbes’s
theory of individual good.
[MAIN THEOREM (T1)] (Real Good): An object O is really good for a given individual
X if O satisfies X’s rational preferences - preferences which are both well-
considered and well-balanced.
This can be derived from A1, P2 and its corollaries. For Hobbes, the satisfaction of just
any kind of preferences is apparently good. However, when the preferences are substantially
irrational, their satisfaction would be only apparently good and not really good. The satisfac-
tion of preferences that are substantially rational are not only apparently good but also really
good.
There is one thing that we should be careful about here. Stated in this particular way, it
seems as though the fact that one has preferred something, given that such preferences are
rational, is what actually made that something to be really good for that particular person. In
other words, it seems that one’s rational preferences are (what may be called as) the good-
makers.
However, this is not entirely correct. Within Hobbes’s moral system, what is really good
for any given individual is already fixed and given; it is, namely, the person’s own self-
preservation which amounts to the person’s greatest good. The basic role that rationality
plays in this picture is simply to identify what course of action would best achieve this pre-
determined greatest good - namely, the individual’s self-preservation, and direct the individ-
ual’s non-cognitive passions so that the individual actually manages to prefer acting in this
pre-identified way.
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When a given individual’s preferences are (substantially) rational, this simply means that
these preferences have detected and, thereby reflect, the best course of action that would lead
to the individual’s self-preservation. It is true that what is really good for a given individual
(namely, the achievement of the individual’s long-term self-preservation) is extensionally
equilvalent to the satisfaction of the individual’s rational preferences. However, this does
not imply that the status of self-preservation being the greatest good for a given individual
was causally determined by its being preferred by some rational agent.
4.2 Reconstructing Hobbes’s Theory of Personal Good as
an Ideal-Advisor Theory
We have just seen that, within Hobbes’s moral system, achieving long-term self-preservation
is objectively the greatest good for each and every individual. Practically speaking, in order
for one to properly achieve this greatest good, one’s preferences would have to be substan-
tially rational in the Hobbesian sense. This means that one would have to be sufficiently
informed about the relevant facts (such as the nature of the consequences that are expected
to ensue by performing each available course of action as well as their respective prob-
abilities of occurring) as well as be primarily concerned about achieving one’s long-term
self-preservation when making a decision on how one should act.
It is not very hard to expect that, in reality, people are not always in a position to form sub-
stantially rational preferences in this way; in some situations people might not have enough
information and in some situations people might be swayed by the wrong kind of passion
and wrongfully value something that is inimical to the achievement of his or her long-term
self-preservation.
In such cases, it might be quite true that somebody else who does have a sufficient amount
of information and is, more than anything else, concerned about the agent’s long-term self-
93
preservation could be in a better position to make decisions on how to act on behalf of the
agent. This is a possibility that Hobbes explicitly acknowledges.
. . . so that he who hath by experience or reason the greatest and surest prospect
of consequences deliberates best himself, and is able, when he will, to give the
best counsel unto others. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 57]
The person who is able to deliberate best for himself would be, of course, a person who is
capable of forming substantially rational preferences. However, Hobbes states above that a
person who deliberates best for himself (namely, a person who is sufficiently informed and is
motivated in the right way) is not only in a position to form substantially rational preferences
for him or herself, but such person would also be in a position to provide the best available
advice concerning what would be substantially rational to prefer for other people as well.
Of course, such person, in order to give proper advice concerning the formation of sub-
stantially rational preferences, would need to be primarily concerned about the advisee’s
long-term self-preservation rather than his or her own when he or she is giving advise. Fur-
thermore, among the set of sufficient information that the advisor possesses, complete infor-
mation concerning the advisee’s bio-medical condition as well as the advisee’s psychological
dispositions (such as the set of desires and aversions the advisee has) should be included. For
instance, if the advisee happens to have diabetes, then certain types of foods that are normally
recommended to people who do not have diabetes might not be recommendable to the ad-
visee. If the advisee happens to have a very weak heart (in the physical sense), then certain
types of exercises might not be recommendable. Also, if the advisee is psychologically dis-
posed such that he or she feels certain types of situations abnormally stressful or unpleasant,
then this fact should be taken into account when providing advice to the advisee.
Now, among the many entities (such as one’s parents, close friends, significant other,
etc.) that might be able to perform such advisory role, the best candidate would seem to be
what I would call one’s “idealized-self ”. A person’s idealized-self is an imaginary entity that
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possesses full information concerning the nature as well as the likelihoods of the chain of
consequences that will ensue by performing a specific course of action available to the person
at a given time. A person’s idealized-self also possesses complete first-hand knowledge of
the actual person’s bio-medical condition, personal history as well as his or her psychological
dispositions.
In chapter 1, I have argued that Hobbes was not committed to any version of the preference-
satisfaction theory of the good. Not only did I argue that Hobbes wasn’t committed to
the most simplistic form of the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, but, I have also,
specifically, argued that there is no way for us to interpret Hobbes as being committed to,
what may be called, “the idealized preference-satisfaction theory of the good” (i.e. the theory
that claims that what is really good for somebody is the satisfaction of the type of preferences
that he/she would have formed if he/she were deliberating in idealized circumstances) in a
non question-begging way. So, a reader might naturally wonder why I am heading towards
a direction which I have argued against previously.
However, the reader should note my acknowledgment at the end of chapter 2 where
I claimed that it may be possible for us to interpret Hobbes as advancing an idealized
preference-satisfaction theory of the good given that we are willing to relax just one re-
quirement in Hobbes’s ambitious project of trying to propose a moral system that is fully
reducible to non-normative facts; that is, to grant that long-term self-preservation is objec-
tively each and every individual’s greatest good.
By granting this one single relaxation, we are now able to respect the rest of Hobbes’s
reductive project by interpreting him as proposing a version of an idealized preference-
satisfaction theory of the good that claims: “An object O is really good for somebody if and
only if (a) it is consistent with the achievement of the person’s long-term self-preservation
and, (b) it satisfies the type of preferences that the person would have formed if he/she were
deliberating in idealized circumstances.”
Such formulation is undoubtedly normative from the very start; it tries to define what is
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really good for somebody by already assuming that the person’s long-term self-preservation
is objectively good for him/her. However, analyzing normative terms in such non-reductive
ways is not an uncommon feature of similar types of dispositional theories of value that
have been proposed in contemporary ethical theory. Consider the dispositional theory of
value that Michael Smith proposes:
According to the dispositional theorist we can analyze rightness in terms of a
disposition to desire under suitable conditions. But what are these ’suitable con-
ditions’? The dispositional theorist should say that an agent’s φ -ing is right just
in case he would desire to φ if he were to deliberate in accordance with the prin-
ciples of reason corresponding to moral principles, principles that permit us to
derive evaluative truths from truths about our circumstances, principles like the
principle of limited altruism. [Smith et al. 1989, p. 110, emphasis added]
In other words, according to Smith, doing X is morally right if and only if one would desire to
do X if one were to deliberate in accordance with certain moral principles which we already
accept as valid principles of reason. Such analysis tries to ground moral truths on the basis
of desires and preferences that we would have formed under idealized circumstances; yet,
it never tries to be fully reductive. So, a dispositional theory of value, (which idealized
preference-satisfaction theories of the good could be seen as a specific type of), need not be
fully reductive to be meaningful.
Given that we relax the requirement of full reductivity, we can see that Smith’s disposi-
tional analysis of value (if one remembers) is very similar to the general spirit of Hobbes’s
analysis of real good; as we have seen in chapter 1, Hobbes thinks that what is really good
for a given individual is the satisfaction of the type of desires or preferences that he/she
would form after he/she went through a deliberation process that had fully incorporated the
laws of nature, which, according to Hobbes, are “precept[s] or general rule[s], found out
by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh
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away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best
preserved.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIV, Pargraph 3] Here, as one can see, the
achievement of long-term self-preservation is already assumed to be objectively each and
every individual’s greatest good. But, this (as I have just argued) does not entirely prevent us
from reconstructing Hobbes’s theory of real good as some sort of dispositional theory.
So, let us build into our notion of a person’s idealized-self that he/she knows that long-
term self-preservation is objectively the greatest good for his/her actual-self, and cares, more
than anything else, to help achieve this aim for his/her actual-self. We might think of a
person’s idealized-self as a private angel, who is fully knowledgeable about the person’s
circumstances, and who, more than anything else, wants the person’s life to go as well-off as
possible.
As it may be readily expected, an actual person, due to numerous practical constraints,
might not always be in a position to form substantially rational preferences. However, the
preferences that are formed on behalf of a person by the person’s idealized-self in any given
situation is guaranteed to be substantially rational. Let us state this fact as an extension of
corollary C1.
[EXTENSION OF C1 (E1)] (Alternate Characterization of Rational Preference): One’s pref-
erences are substantially rational (in the Hobbesian sense) if and only if it is the
type of preference that would be formed by one’s idealized-self on behalf of
one’s actual-self.
The fact the preferences formed by one’s idealized-self is substantially rational (in the Hobbe-
sian sense) means that the satisfaction of the preferences given by one’s idealized-self is
guaranteed to be really good for one’s actual-self in any given situation; note that this was
not true of the satisfaction of one’s actual preferences. From this, we are now able to derive
an alternate formulation of real goodness for a given individual.
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[ALTERNATE THEOREM (T2)] (Real Good): An object O is really good for individual X
if and only if O satisfies the preferences formed by O’s idealized-self on behalf
of O’s actual-self.
This is derived from T1 along with the fact that the preferences formed by one’s idealized-self
on behalf of one’s actual-self are guaranteed to be both well-considered and well-balanced,
and, thereby, substantially rational (i.e. E1).
As noted before, one should be cautious not to think that it was the fact that the prefer-
ences were given by one’s idealized-self that made its satisfaction really good for the indi-
vidual in question. The primary role that one’s idealized-self plays in this picture is simply
to correctly detect and suggest the best way to achieve what has already been predetermined
to be objectively one’s greatest good - namely, one’s long-term self-preservation.
Viewed in this way, we can see that our reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of non-moral
good can be seen as a version of, what might be called, “The the Ideal-Advisor Theory of
Good”, which has been proposed by Peter Railton.3 According to Railton’s account, what is
objectively non-morally good for a given individual is what one’s idealized-self – who has an
“unqualified cognitive and imaginative powers, and full factual and nomological information
about his physical and psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, history and so
on. [Railton, 1986a, contained in 2003, see pp. 10-11]” would advise one’s actual-self to do.
Let’s see how Railton describes his theory himself.
...let us introduce the notion of an objectified subjective interest for an individual
A, as follows. Give to an actual individual A unqualified cognitive and imagi-
3See [Railton, 1986b,a]. Other people who have presented a similar approach regarding (not a person’s
individual good) but regarding moral goodness or moral right are Roderick Firth and Richard Brandt. See
[Firth, 1952, 1955, Brandt, 1955, 1998]. These latter views (that concern moral goodness and moral rightness)
are usually known as “the ideal observer theory”. People who try to distinguish the sort of approach taken
by Railton (which concerns a person’s own individual good) with these latter views sometimes call the former
view “the ideal advisor theory”. (Note that Railton does extend his basic approach to questions concerning
moral goodness and moral rightness in the latter parts of the papers.)
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native powers, and full factual and nomological information about this physical
and psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, history, and so on. A
will have become A+, who has complete and vivid knowledge of himself and
his environment, and whose instrumental rationality is in no way defective. We
now ask A+ to tell us not what he currently wants, but what he would want his
nonidealized self A to want - or, more generally, to seek - were he to find him-
self in the actual condition and circumstances of A. [Railton 1986a, contained in
2003, p. 11]
This, as we have just seen, is remarkably similar to our current reconstruction of Hobbes’s
theory of (non-moral) good. Our reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of (non-moral) good fur-
ther resembles Railton’s ideal-advisor theory in the sense that, just as on our theory, Railton
thinks that it is not, properly speaking, what one’s idealized-self’s wants one’s non-idealized-
self to want that makes something to be objectively in one’s subjective interest. Rather, it
is, what Railton calls, the reduction basis, that objectively determines and grounds what is
non-morally good for a given individual.
Let us say that his reduction basis is the constellation of primary qualities that
make it be the case that [A] has a certain objective interest. That is, we will
say that Lonnie has an objective interest in drinking clear liquids in virtue of
this complex, relational, dispositional set of facts. Put another way, we can say
that the reduction basis, not the fact that [A+] would have certain wants, is the
truth-maker for the claim that this is an objective interest of [A’s.] The objective
interest thus explains why there is a certain objectified interest, not the other way
around. [Railton 1986a, contained in 2003, pp. 11-12, emphasis added]
The reduction basis in our reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of (non-moral) good would
be, by using Railton’s terminology, the complex, relational, dispositional set of facts that
makes the achievement of long-term self-preservation objectively good for each and every
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individual. So, again, our current reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of (non-moral) good is
remarkably similar to that proposed by Railton.
Now, the question to ask concerning our current reconstruction is this: to what extent can
we reasonably say that our current reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of non-moral good is
really Hobbesian?
First, it is obviously not Hobbesian in the conventional sense since the conventional
interpretation sees Hobbes as advocating one of the most simplest version of the preference-
satisfaction theory of the good. However, I believe that I have, in the previous chapters,
provided sufficient textual evidence that demonstrates that Hobbes was not committed to
such theory. So, we can say that what is commonly thought as Hobbesian theories in con-
temporary moral philosophy do not accurately represent Hobbes’s real views. So, the fact
that my reconstruction is rather un-Hobbesian in this conventional sense does not really show
that my theory is un-Hobbesian properly sort of speak.
However, it might be argued that, even if we concede that Hobbes was not committed to
the most simplistic version of the preference-satisfaction theory of the good, reconstructing
Hobbes’s theory of non-moral good as a version of the ideal-advisor theory is going too
far. For one thing, there is nowhere where Hobbes explicitly mentions the notion of one’s
idealized-self giving advise to one’s non-idealized-actual-self. The only textual evidence that
justifies my reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of non-moral good as a version of the ideal
advisor theory comes from the quoted passage above which claims that the best deliberators
are the type of people who could give the best counsel to other people as well.
However, Hobbes does think that one’s deliberation process can be significantly im-
proved by being sufficiently influenced by one’s combined rational faculties, and that the
preferences derived from such deliberation process would be substantially more rational
than the preferences derived from deliberation processes that were devoid of such rational
process. Furthermore, we have seen that Hobbes explicitly distinguishes between what is
apparantly good and what is really good for a given individual, and strictly thinks that it
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is only the satisfaction of one’s substantially rational preferences that count as really good
for the individual.4 This already implies that the preference-ordering that a given individ-
ual would form if he or she were substantially rational, in very many cases, would be quite
different from the individual’s actual preference-ordering.
In other words, we can say that there are basically two preference-orderings that are
associated with any given individual; (a) the individual’s actual preference-ordering, and (b)
the individual’s substantially rational preference-ordering. The fact that this view is acually
Hobbesian is supported, as we have seen, by various textual evidence found in Hobbes’s
work.
Now, my suggestion is that we just go a little further and think of an individual’s sub-
stantially rational preference-ordering, (which is distinguished from the individual’s actual
preference-ordering), as the preference-ordering given by what we have been calling the
individual’s “idealized-self.” I believe that such a stretch is innocuous since it is simply in-
terpreting an individual’s substantially rational preferences, which Hobbes already acknowl-
edges to be possibly distinct from the individual’s actual preferences, to be the type of pref-
erences that would be given by the individual’s idealized-self on behalf of the individual’s
non-idealized-actual-self.
As we can see from the quoted passage above, Hobbes clearly thinks that people who
deliberate best for themselves are also the type of people who can provide the best counsel
to others. If it is the case that Hobbes thinks that the best deliberators (who are the best
deliberators in virtue of being substantially rational) can give the best advice to other people,
I don’t see any reason why Hobbes would deny that these people are the type of people who
4So, it is slightly ironic when Railton characterized Hobbes as an advocate of the preference-satisfaction
theory of good as we have see from Chapter 1, and then argued that:
Yet this theory is deeply unsatisfactory, since it seems incapable of capturing important elements
of the critical and self-critical character of value judgments. [Railton, “Fact and Value”(1986b)
contained in 2003, p.49]
The full-information ideal advisor theory of good that Railton proposes is intended to solve this very problem
of capturing the critical and self-critical character of value judgments. What Railton did not notice was the fact
that Hobbes had already proposed a theory of good that was very similar to the one that he had proposed!
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could also give the best advise (not only to other people, but also) to themselves in non-
idealized circumstances. So, I believe that adding the notion of preferences given by one’s
idealized-self is, on the whole, consistent with a broadly Hobbsian spirit.
Now, the reason for adding the notion of an ideal-advisor into our current reconstruction
of Hobbes’s theory of non-moral good is only for convenience. Once we have the notion of
two distinct preference-orderings (one attributed to one’s actual non-idealized-self and the
other attributed to one’s idealized-self), we are now in a position to utilize contemporary
utility theory to give a numerical representation of these two distinct preference-orderings.
Contemporary utility theory has been developed in order to analyze and give mathemat-
ical representations of people’s preferences. Contemporary utility theory attempts to do this
by constructing “utility functions” that represent a person’s preference-relation. A utility
function is a mathematical function that takes alternatives (or consequences or outcomes or
propositions) as arguments and generates a real-number as its value such that: for a given
individual, alternative a is preferred to alternative b if and only if U(a) > U(b).
In this section, I have tried to identify a person’s real good with the preferences formed by
the person’s idealized-self. The major strength of this approach is that, by this identification,
the utility function that is supposed to represent the preferences of the person’s idealized-self
can now be further interpreted as representing what is really good for the person’s non-
idealized actual self. In other words, the utility function of a person’s idealized-self can
be seen as representing, not only the person’s idealized-self’s preference-ordering, but also,
what John Broome calls, the actual non-idealized person’s betterness relation.5 I believe that
such approach could give a more precise understanding of some of Hobbes’s key texts that
we have encountered previously.
5See [Broome, 1991, pp. 121-122]
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Chapter 5
A Contemporary Decision Theoretic
Reconstruction of Hobbes’s Theory of the
Good
The purpose of this chapter is to give a formal representation of Hobbes’s theory of real
good. In order for one to appreciate the significance of what I am trying to do in this section,
one would have to have a general understanding of contemporary decision theory, which is
known as utility theory. I have tried to write the earlier parts of each subsection to serve as
a rather non-technical introduction to modern utility theory for those who are uninitiated to
the field. I hope that this section will turn out to be helpful for the uninitiated. Furthermore,
I feel that there is a general tendency to misunderstand the major purpose of modern utility
theory as well as its major claims in the philosophical community. I will try to correct these
misunderstandings as best as I can as I move on.
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5.1 Measurement Theory and the Assignment of Numbers
5.1.1 A General Introduction
Modern utility theory can be seen as a sub-field of what is now known as measurement
theory.1 In our everyday lives, we try to measure various things by assigning numbers to
those things. We assign numbers and measure people’s height to know which person is
taller (or shorter) than another person. We assign numbers and measure temperature to know
which object is hotter (or colder) than another object. The numbers that are assigned are
meant to represent a certain relation that holds among the things that are being measured.
So, height (which is a number) represents the relation “... is taller than ...” in the sense that
a is taller than b if and only if the height of a is greater than the height of b. Temperature
represents the relation “... is hotter than ...” in a similar way.
Measurement theory is concerned with the foundational issues of such measuring prac-
tice; it focuses on when and how a given type of measurement can take place for a given set
of objects, and what kind of manipulations of the assigned numbers can be justifiably per-
formed without rendering a statement totally meaningless. For example, if a toddler is 100
cm tall and Joe is 180 cm tall, then we can justifiably say that Joe is 1.8 times taller than the
toddler. However, if location A is 10◦C and location B is 18◦C, then we cannot justifiably
say that location B is 1.8 times hotter than location A.
As we have seen, a given relation can be represented by more than one scales. Length
can be represented in millimeters, centimeters, meters, inches, foot, etc. Temperature can
generally be represented by the Fahrenheit scale (◦F) or the Celsius (centigrade) scale (◦C).
The reason why it is meaningful to say that Joe (who is 180 cm tall) is 1.8 times taller than
the toddler (who is 100 cm tall) is because the fact that the number assigned to Joe within
a given scale of length is 1.8 times greater than the number assigned to the toddler remains
1See Krantz et al. [1971], Roberts [1979] Everything written in this subsection is based on these two books
and Professor Blume’s lecture notes on “Ordinal Representations.”
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unchanged regardless of the particular scale we use to measure Joe and the toddler’s height.
For example, if we use the meter scale, Joe’s height (which is 1.8 M tall) is still 1.8 times
greater than the toddler’s height (which is 1 M), and if we use the inch scale, Joe’s height
(which is roughly 70.9 inches) is still 1.8 greater than the toddler’s height (which is roughly
39.4 inches.) We can easily see that this does not hold in the case of temperature. Specif-
ically, the number 64.4, (which represents the same temperature as 18 ◦C in the Fahrenheit
scale), is not 1.8 times greater than the number 50 (which represents the same temperature as
10◦C in the Fahrenheit scale.) Therefore, saying that the temperature of a particular location
is x times greater than the temperature of another location is just plainly meaningless. This
shows that we have to be extremely careful in interpreting what the numbers signify when
we are dealing with a particular area of measurement.
As I have briefly stated above, measurement, in general, is concerned with assigning
numbers to objects in a way that preserves, corresponds, and represents the relations that
the objects bear to one another. In mathematical terms, measurement is about finding homo-
morphisms from a given empirical relational system that we wish to investigate to a certain
numerical relational system. A relational system is a n+1 tuple of the form (X , R1, ..., Rn)
where X denotes a set of objects and Ri denotes a relation that bears on X . For instance,
when we are dealing with measuring temperature of different locations, the empirical rela-
tional system that we are interested in would be the 2-tuple (L (= the set of locations), H (=
the binary relation “...is hotter than...”)) An example of a numerical relational system would
be: (R (= the set of real numbers), >, ≥, +, ×)
Formally, A homomorphism of one relational system to another relational system is a
mapping f from one relational system into another relational system which preserves all the
relations of the former.
Suppose α and β are two relational systems such that α = (A, R1,R2, ..., Rn) and β =
(B, R#1,R
#
2, ..., R
#
n). Then, a function f : A→ B is a homomorphism from α into β , if and
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only if, for all a1, a2, ..., ari ∈ A,
Ri(a1, a2, ..., ari)⇐⇒ R#i [ f (a1), f (a2), ..., f (ari)], i = 1, 2, ..., n
2
Here, we can see that the mapping f preserves the relational structure of the former
set in the sense that any elements that bore a certain relation to one another in the former
set will be mapped to elements in the latter set which bear a corresponding relation to one
another in a similar way. When the relational system β is a numerical relational system,
then we might roughly think of f as a scale that measures the non-numerical objects in the
former set. The function f does not need to be onto or one-to-one in order for it to qualify
as a homomorphism. However, when a homomorphism is one-to-one is, then it is called a
isomorphism.
For instance, in the case of measuring temperature of different locations, we can say that
we are seeking a homomorphism t (temperature) from the empirical relational system (L (=
the set of locations), H (= the binary relation “...is hotter than...”)) into the numerical rela-
tional system (R (= the set of real numbers), >). So, the function t (temperature) represents
the empirical relation H “...is hotter than...” in the sense that, for all a,b∈ L, aHb (a is hotter
than b), if and only if, t(a)> t(b).
A major part of measurement theory is to specify sufficient (or, more ideally, necessary
and sufficient) conditions for such homomorphism from a given empirical, non-numerical
relational system to a given numerical relational system to exist. (In most cases, the numeri-
cal relational system into which we map the empirical and non-numerical relational system
will be the real number system.) The problem of finding sufficient conditions for there to be
a homomorphism is called the representation problem.
The major theorem that states that a certain set of conditions (i.e. axioms) are sufficient
2See Roberts [1979, p. 52]
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for there to be such homomorphism is called a representation theorem. When we are dealing
with the problem of measuring people’s preferences, the representation theorem is usually
stated in terms of the existence of a utility function. We will get back to this in the following
subsections.
Now, the main reason why we assign numbers to nonnumerical objects in the first place
is to grasp the qualitative relational structure of the objects in a more convenient and parsi-
monious way. Suppose that L is the set that consists of five different locations: a,b,c,d, and
e. Suppose that we want to know which is the second hottest location among the five. With-
out using a numerical scale, such a temperature, we might have to compare every possible
pair among the five to determine how each location bears the relation “... is hotter than...” to
another. This is very inefficient. However, suppose we are given each location’s temperature,
say, t(a) = 30(◦C), t(b) = 13(◦C), t(c) = 15(◦C), t(d) = 7(◦C), and t(e) = 25(◦C). Then, by
comparing these numbers, we can see right away that location e is the second hottest location
among the five.
The reason why assigning numbers to represent a certain relational system is so conve-
nient is due to the fact that we are very much familiar with using and manipulating numbers
by many years of habit. By many years of habit, we know intuitively, almost by second
nature, that that the set of real numbers (i.e. R) is ordered by the binary relation >(i.e. “...is
greater than...”), which is both asymmetric (i.e. x > y imply y≯ x) and negatively transitive
(i.e. x ≯ y and y ≯ z imply x ≯ z.) Even if one has never heard of the terms “asymmetry”
and “negative transitivity” before, one is still very much aware of the implications of >and
how it behaves; for instance, one knows that 30 > 25 imply 25 ≯ 30 almost instantly. So,
when we see the temperatures of the five different locations, we can list them in the order of
t(a) = 30(◦C) > t(e) = 25(◦C) > t(c) = 15(◦C) > t(b) = 13(◦C) > t(d) = 7(◦C) and from
this we are able to see that e is the second hottest location among the five.
However, this familiarity of numbers is a double-edged sword. Since we are so familiar
with certain kinds of mathematical operations such as addition (+) and multiplication (×), it
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is very easy for us to misapply these operations to the numerical representations even when
there is no corresponding operation in the empirical, nonnumerical relational system that we
are seeking to measure. In other words, it is very easy for us to read into the numbers too
much and mistakenly think that certain properties that only hold for the real number system
also hold for the empirical nonnumerical relational system which are merely represented
numerically.
For instance, temperature in our current example is a homomorphism from the nonnu-
merical relational system (L, H) into the numerical relational system (R, >). Here, we can
see that the original nonnumerical relational system does not have any concatenation op-
erations that behave similarly to the mathematical operation of addition or multiplication.
Therefore, we should not say such statements as “the sum of locations b, c, d, e is twice
as hot as location a.” Although it is true that “13+ 15+ 7+ 25 = 2× 30”, such mathe-
matical operation does not reveal any significant empirical structure of the nonnumerical
system (L, H), since there are simply no nonnumerical operations of this nonnumerical rela-
tional system that corresponds and behaves like the mathematical operation of addition and
multiplication. We can state this fact alternatively by saying that although there exists ho-
momorphisms (namely, different scales of temperature) from (L, H) into (R, >), there exists
no homomorphisms from (R, >, +, ×) into (L, H).
As we have seen, in many cases, a given nonnumerical relational system can be repre-
sented by more than one numerical scale. We all know that temperature can be measured
either from the Fahrenheit or the Celsius scale.3 Both the Fahrenheit scale and the Celsius
scale are perfectly adequate representations of the “...is hotter than...” relation of nonnu-
merical objects. And it is interesting to see how these two different scales are related to
each other. As it is well known, we can convert any given temperature written in the Cel-
sius scale (C) to a temperature written in the Fahrenheit scale (F) by the following formula:
3Note that absolute temperature is measured by the Kelvin scale, which behaves very differently from the
Fahrenheit and Celius scale.
108
F = 95C+32. We can see that this is a specific instance of a mathematical transformation of
the form: φ(x) = αx+β where α > 0,β ∈R. Such transformation Φ is generally known as
a “positive affine (or linear) transformation.”
In the case of temperature, any scale that is a positive affine transformation of some
other temperature scale is another legitimate temperature scale. The newly obtained scale is
legitimate in the sense that any statement that was true (or false) of the former scale remains
true (or false) of the new scale. When this holds, we say that the scale is unique up to positive
affine transformation.
This basically means that performing a positive affine transformation of one legitimate
scale will result in another legitimate scale which represents the relational features of the
nonnumerical relational system just as well as the original scale. In other words, the family
of scales that equally represent the nonnumerical relational system under investigation is
picked out by performing a positive affine transformation to one scale to another.
Not all scales are unique up to positive affine transformation. Some scales are only
unique up to (strictly) increasing (ordinal) transformations (i.e. x ≥ y iff φ(x) ≥ φ(y)) and
other scales are unique up to similarity transformations (i.e. φ(x) = αx,α > 0), and so on.
Each type of transformation picks out a particular family of scales.
From this, it is possible to determine the scale type of a particular scale by looking at what
kind of admissible transformations can be legitimately performed in a way that preserves the
relational structure of the nonnumerical relational system in question.
The following table summarizes some common scale types and their admissible transforma-
tions.
Table 5.1: Some Common Scale Types
4
4This table is taken from Roberts [1979, p. 64] with only minor modifications.
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Admissible Transformations Scale Type Example
φ(x) = x (Identity) Absolute Scale Counting
φ(x) = αx,α > 0 Ratio Scale Mass, Temperature on Kelvin scale,
(Similarity Transformation) Length, etc.
φ(x) = αx+β ,α > 0,β ∈ R Interval Scale Temperature (Fahrenheit, Celsius), etc.
(Positive Affine (Linear) Transformation)
x≥ y iff φ(x)≥ φ(y) Ordinal Scale Preferences, Hardness, etc.
(Strictly ) Monotone Transformation
(=Increasing transformation, Ordinal transformation)
Any One-to-One Transformation Nominal Scale Number Uniforms, etc.
As we can see from the table, temperature is unique up to positive affine transformation,
and, is, therefore, an interval scale. While length is unique up to what is known as similarity
transformation, and, is, therefore, an ratio scale. A given scale type determines what kind
of statements can be meaningfully asserted about the non-numerical relational system in
question. A statement is meaningful if and only if its truth-value remains the same in all
admissible transformations of a given scale type.
In a ratio scale, the ratio between two magnitudes remain constant among all admissible
transformations. So, it is meaningful to say that the length of a certain object is n times
greater than that of another object. In an interval scale, the ratio between differences remain
constant among all admissible transformations.5So, in the case of temperature, it is meaning-
ful to say that the degree to which a is hotter than b is n times as great as the degree to which
c is hotter than d. Some scales are only preserve the order of the objects. We might think of
the number of stars that a particular movie receives from any of one’s favorite movie review
5Here is a proof. Suppose that a,b,c, and d are four values in an interval scale and | a−b | / | c−d |= n.
Now, suppose that we perform a positive affine transformation φ(x) = αx+ β ,α > 0,β ∈ R for these four
values. Then, φ(a)=αa+β , φ(b)=αb+β , φ(c)=αc+β , φ(d)=αd+β . | φ(a)−φ(b) | / | φ(c)−φ(d) |=|
(αa+β )− (αb+β ) | / | (αc+β )− (αd+β ) | = α | a−b | /α | c−d |=| a−b | / | c−d |= n. Therefore,
the ratio (n) between the differences ((a−b) and (c−d)) are preserved in an interval scale.
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site is an ordinal scale. A movie that receives 4 out of 5 stars might be better than a movie
that receives 1 out of 5 stars. However, it is meaningless to say that a 4 star movies is 4 times
greater than a 1 star movie or that the degree to which a 3 star movie is greater than a 1 star
movie is twice as the degree to which a 5 star movies is greater than a 4 star movie. Suppose
that we perform a strictly increasing ordinal transformation φ(x) = x3 to all of the values (i.e.
stars) that each movies receives. Then, the order of the movies remain unchained. However,
we can see that none of the statements concerning the ratios or the ratio of the differences
between the movies remain true after such transformation.
A scale that is unique up to (strictly) increasing transformation is called an ordinal scale,
while interval, ratio, and absolute scales are instances of what are known as cardinal scales.
5.1.2 Why Bother with Utility Theory in Interpreting Hobbes?
So, this is the basics of measurement theory. What does all of this have to do with Hobbes?
I have said that the purpose of this section is to provide a formal representation of Hobbes’s
theory of real good. Why provide such a formal representation?
To begin with, I would like to point out that it was Hobbes himself who already had a
rather quantified, albeit under-developed, notion of preferences and the good. Consider how
Hobbes explains the process of deliberation:
When in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning
one and the same thing arise alternately, . . . , so that sometimes we have an
appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do
it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions,
hopes and fears continued till the–6884 be either done or thought impossible, is
that we call DELIBERATION. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph
49, emphasis added]
In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to action, or
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to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL, the act (not the faculty) of
willing. . . . Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating. [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 53]
Here, we can see that Hobbes thinks that one of the essential features of deliberation is to
somehow sum up the various desires and aversions that one feels towards particular conse-
quences to determine on the whole what one most prefers to act. The fact that Hobbes thinks
that desires and aversions can generally be summed up to determine (what he calls) one’s
“last appetite” indicates that Hobbes thought that it is, in principle, possible to measure the
strength and degrees of various desires and aversions, and aggregate these varying degrees
of desires and aversions into a whole. The notion of aggregation is more apparent in the
following passage:
And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of
the good and evil consequences and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate,
the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of
consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But
for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the
evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or seeming good. And
contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent or seeming
evil; so that he who hath by experience or reason the greatest and surest prospect
of consequences deliberates best himself, and is able, when he will, to give the
best counsel unto others. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 57
emphasis added]
Remember that one’s apparent good was interpreted as the satisfaction of what one just
happens to prefer at a given moment; as we have seen, getting what one happens to prefer at
a given moment may not always be really good for one.
In any case, we can see that Hobbes was implicitly utilizing the notion of expectation
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in order to explain people’s preferences. That is, according to Hobbes, one prefers act a to
act b if and only if the expectation of act a is greater than the expectation of act b, where
the expectation of an act is calculated by aggregating all of the good and bad consequences
that the act is expected to generate and weighing them up according to each consequence’s
respective probabilities. This already assumes that the goodness and badness of different
types of consequences is measurable, and that the overall goodness of the whole is somehow
determined by the goodness of the individual parts that constitute it.
Furthermore, the fact that Hobbes thinks that one’s estimations of likelihoods can be
improved by more experience and better reasoning powers indicate that his notion of proba-
bilities were somewhat objective. That is, he assumes that one’s estimations of probabilities
can get closer and closer to the truth.
The general intuition behind all of this, I believe, is remarkably similar to the (objec-
tive) expected utility theory developed by John von-Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in
[Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. And I believe that it would be quite interesting to
see how Hobbes’s general intuition concerning the quantification of desires, aversions, and
goodness can be formalized in the light of contemporary utility theory.
5.2 An Ordinal Representation of Hobbes’s Theory of Real
Good6
5.2.1 An Ordinal Representation for Bobi
We are aiming to represent Hobbes’s theory of real good. According to T2 (from section
4.2), something is really good for a given individual if and only if that something satisfies
the preferences formed by the individual’s idealized-self on behalf of the individual’s actual-
self.
6The general flow of this subsection follows that of Kreps [1988, chapters 2, 3]
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Let us take an arbitrary individual: Bob. Now, we would need to distinguish three dif-
ferent types of Bob: (a) The idealized-Bob (i.e. Bob+) who is substantially rational in the
sense defined in P1 and whose preferences for Bob are always fully-considered and fully-
balanced, (b) The actual non-idealized Bob (i.e. BobS) who is primarily under the influence
of a basic passion for self-preservation , and (c) The actual non-idealized Bob (i.e. BobG)
who is primarily under the influence of a basic passion for glory.
For simplicity, let the set of consequences be: C ={Death, Mortified Life, Moderate
Life, Glorified Life} All three types of Bobs have strict preferences (denoted by the binary
relationi, i = Bob+,BobS,BobG) on C. a BobS b will be interpreted as expressing the
proposition that the actual non-idealized Bob, who is primarily under the influence of a
basic passion for self-preservation, strictly prefers option a to option b; using Hobbes’s own
terminology, a BobS b will mean that when given a choice between a and b, BobS wills a.
This interpretation applies to the other two types of Bobs as well.
Without giving any interpretation,  is simply a binary relation. Now, we should ask:
what sort of properties should the binary relation  satisfy in order for it to be properly
regarded as a strict preference relation? A rather obvious thing that comes to mind is that
should be asymmetric. A binary relation R is asymmetric if and only if xRy imply not yRx.
This is a reasonable property that one would expect to hold for a strict preference relation 
. Suppose that any given type of Bob strictly prefers Moderate Life to Death. Then, it seems
very natural to think that this implies that that type of Bob does not strictly prefer Death to
Moderate Life.
This, by itself, does not say that there is something intrinsically wrong about preferring
Death to Moderate Life in itself. (Although Hobbes does think that there is something intrin-
sically wrong about not desiring self-preservation.) What it says is that given that one strictly
prefers Moderate Life to Death it would be inconsistent to strictly prefer Death to Moder-
ate Life as well. If Bob claimed that he strictly prefers Moderate Life to Death and also
claimed that he strictly prefers Death to Moderate Life, we would seriously be suspicious of
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his sincerity. So, here is our starting axiom for .
[AXIOM(A-2-1)]: The binary relations Bob+,BobS , and BobG are asymmetric.
Another property that we might require of the binary relationi (i= Bob+, BobS, BobG), in
order for it to be properly regarded as a strict preference relation, is negative transitivity. If
the binary relation is negatively transitive, then a b7 and b c imply a c.
Empirically speaking, there are some situations where negative transitivity does not seem
to hold for strict preferences. This is, in many cases, due to the fact that our perceptual
abilities are not fine enough to detect small differences, but are able to discriminate when
these small differences accumulate. For example, one might not have a strict preference
between one spoon of sugar to two spoons of sugar in one’s cup of coffee. Furthermore,
one might not have a strict preference between two spoons of sugar to three spoons of sugar.
However, it might very well be true that one does have a strict preference between one spoon
of sugar and three spoons of sugar in one’s cup of coffee. If this is the case, one’s preferences
do not obey negative transitivity.
Negative transitivity can also fail when the objects have multiple attributes that influ-
ences one’s preferences separately. Suppose that the two things that one considers when
choosing an automobile are performance and fuel economy. Suppose that there are three
cars: A=(moderate performance, high fuel economy), B=(high performance, low fuel econ-
omy), and C=(moderate performance, moderate fuel economy). Then, one might not prefer
A to B and one might not prefer B to C. But, one might very well prefer A to C. Again, this
violates negative transitivity.
However, despite all of its problems, assuming that the strict preference relation  is
negatively transitive seems to be unproblematic at least in our current framework. There are
only four elements in the set of consequences C: namely, Death, Mortified Life, Moderate
Life, and Glorious Life. And there does not seem to be any issues of epistemic indiscrimina-
7Read as: it is not the case that a is strictly preferred to b.
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cies that might add up to cause problems for negative transitivity, nor does there seem to be
any issues concerning multiple attributes that might cause incomparability issues that violate
negative transitivity. So, I believe that it is safe to state negative transitivity as a property that
our strict preference relations satisfy as one of our axioms.
[AXIOM(A-2-2)]: The binary relations Bob+,BobS , and BobG are negatively transitive.
The fact that our strict preference relations are both asymmetric and negatively transitive
implies that they are also transitive (i.e. a b and b c imply a c.).
[LEMMA(L-2-1)]: The binary relations Bob+,BobS , and BobGare transitive. 8
We now define the following two relations in terms of i.
[WEAK PREFERENCE(%i) (D-2-1)]: a%i b≡d f bi a
and
[INDIFFERENCE(vi) (D-2-2)]: avi b≡d f ai band bi a
from this, we can prove the following properties of these two induced relations.
[LEMMA(L-2-2)]: For i = Bob+,BobS,BobG,
(a) %i is complete (i.e. for all x, y, either x%i y or y%i x ) and transitive,
(b) vi is an equivalence relation; that is, vi is reflexive (i.e. for all x, x vi x),
symmetric (i.e. for all x, y, xvi y implies yvi x ), and transitive.
8Proof . Suppose that ai b and bi c (i = Bob+, BobS, BobG). Since ai b, negative transitivity implies
that either a i c or c i b. (According to negative transitivity, (x  y and y  z) ⇒ x  z. This is logically
equivalent to x  z⇒either x  y or y  z.) However, c i b cannot be the case since we’ve already assumed
b i c and, by asymmetry, this implies c i b. Therefore, a i c (i = Bob+, BobS, BobG). This completes the
proof. 
116
(c) [(xi y) ∧ (y∼i z)⇒ xi z] and [(x∼i y) ∧ (yi z)⇒ xi z]9
Note that we have interpreted the absence of strict preference in either direction as indiffer-
ence. However, such interpretation might be problematic in some cases when the absence of
strict preference in either direction does not imply real indifference but rather incomparabil-
ity.
This again can be illustrated by the automobile example that we have seen when we were
discussing about some possible problems for negative transitivity. Take again the three cars:
A=(moderate performance, high fuel economy), B=(high performance, low fuel economy),
and C=(moderate performance, moderate fuel economy). Suppose that one strictly prefers
one car over another if and only if one of the cars is at least as good as the other car in both
performance and fuel economy and that one of the cars is strictly better than the other car
in at least one aspect. If so, then we can see that the two cars A and B are incomparable to
each other, and the two cars B and C are incomparable to each other. So, Ai Band Bi A,
which implies A ∼i B according to our definition, and B i C andC i B, which implies
B ∼i C according to our definition. However, it turns out A i C, which violates transitivity
of ∼i.
What this shows is that, unlike indifference, incomparability is not transitive. So, if
there is a possibility that the absence of strict preference in either direction would imply,
not indifference, but incomparibility, our definition of ∼i, as well as the fact that it is an
9Proof.
(a) By asymmetry, for all x and y, either x i yor y i x. By definition of %i , this means that for all x and y,
either x -i yor y -i x. Therefore, %i is complete. By negative transitivity, for all x, y, and z, x i y and y i z
imply xi z. By definition of %i, this means that x-i y and y-i z imply x-i z. Therefore, %i is transitive. 
(b) By asymmetry of i, for all x, x i x. And this implies x vi x. Therefore, vi is reflexive. Now, suppose
x vi y. Then, x i yand y i x. By definition of vi, this implies y vi x. Therefore, vi is symmetric. Now,
suppose x vi y and y vi z. Then, by definition of vi, this implies x i yand y i x and y i zand z i y. By
negative transitivity of i, this implies xi zand zi x, which means xvi z. Therefore, vi is transitive. Since,
vi is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, it is an equivalence relation. 
(c) By asymmetry of i, for all x, z, there are only three possibilities: xi z or zi x or x∼i z (i.e. xi z and
zi x .) According to the definition of ∼i, y∼i z if and only if yi zand zi y. By asymmetry, xi y implies
yi x. Therefore, by negative transitivity, zi x. So, either xi z or x∼i z has to be the case. Suppose x∼i z.
Then, by symmetry and transitivity of ∼i, x ∼i y , which contradicts our assumption that x i y. Therefore,
xi z. The other part can be proved in a similar way. 
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equivalence relation (which implies transitivity) might not be justifiable.
However, again, the issue does not arise in our current model where the set of conse-
quences C has only four elements which are distinct enough to reasonably expect that there
would be no cases of incomparability issues. The only possible problem that might occur is
when we try to determine BobG’s preferences over the two lives – Mortified Life and Death.
Between the two lives, which would BobG, who is primarily under the influence of the
basic passion for glory, prefer? This depends on how much BobG dislikes a life without
power, and this, again depends on how strongly BobG is being influenced by the basic passion
for glory. If BobG happens to just utterly abhor a life without power, then BobG might strictly
prefer Death to Mortified Life; if not, he would prefer Mortified Life to Death, but to a much
lesser extent to which Bob+ and BobS would prefer Mortified Life to Death. The main point
is that regardless of the direction of preference, the two lives, Mortified Life and Death,
would be comparable for BobG. So, the problem of incomparability does not arise in our
current model.
This is enough for us to state our first representation theorem for there to exist an ordinal
representation.
[THEOREM(T-2-1)]: i (i = Bob+,BobS,BobG) is a strict preference relation if and only
if there exists a function Ui : C→R such that for all x, y∈C, xi y if and only if
Ui(x)>Ui(y). Furthermore, ui is unique up to strictly increasing transformation.
The general strategy for proving a representation theorem is to provide an example of a
function that does the job; by doing so, we have shown that at least one such function exists.
Here is one such example. Define Ui(x) ≡d f #{y | x i y} That is, let Ui(x) be the
cardinality (i.e. the number of elements) of the set of elements that x is strictly preferred to.
Note that the function is well-defined - that is, for every value x, Ui(x) exists. The function
works not only in our current model, but also when C is an arbitrarily finite set as well.10
10The theorem holds true for sets that are denumerable (i.e. countably infinite) as well. For uncountably
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Before we move on, I think that it would be helpful to understand the general intuition
behind the entire process. When the strict preference relation (i.e. ) defined on the set
of consequences is asymmetric and negatively transitive, we can see that it behaves in the
same way as the “...is the greater than...” relation (i.e.>) defined on the set of real numbers.
Moreover, we can see that the weak preference relation (i.e. %), which is complete and
transitive, behaves in the same way as the “...is the greater than or equal to...” relation
(i.e.≥), and the indifference relation (i.e. ∼), which is an equivalence relation, behaves in
the same ways as the “... is equal to...” relation (i.e. =)
This means that we can find a homomorphism from the nonnumerical relational system
(C, , %, ∼) to the numerical relational system (R, >, ≥, =) by mapping each consequence
to a real number, the relation to >, the relation% to ≥, and the relation∼ to =. And this is
exactly what the utility function Ui is in effect doing.
I believe that this can be more intuitively understood graphically. Consider the following
diagram that summarizes the representation part of Theorem T-2-1.
infinite sets, we would have to require that the set of consequences to have a countable order-dense subset in
addition to  being asymmetric and negatively transitive in order for there to be an ordinal representation to
exist.
11Proof. (The proof is based on the proof contained in Larry Blume’s lecture notes “Ordinal Representa-
tions.”) Suppose xi y. Then, by the transitivity of i (Lemma L-2-1), for all z such that yi z, xi z. There-
fore, z∈{w | xi w} and z∈{w | yi w}which implies #{w | xi w}≥ #{w | yi w}. Now, there is at least one
element that is in {w | xi w}which is not in {w | yi w}; namely, y. Therefore, #{w | xi w}> #{w | yi w}
which implies Ui(x)>Ui(y).
Now, suppose Ui(x) > Ui(y). By asymmetry of i, for all x, y, there are only three possibilities: x i y or
y i x or x ∼i y (i.e. x i y and y i x .) y i x cannot be the case, since y i x implies Ui(y) > Ui(x) which
contradicts our assumption. Suppose x ∼i y. Then, by Lemma L-2-2c (and the symmetry of ∼i), y i z if and
only if x i z, which implies that z ∈ {w | y i w} if and only if z ∈ {w | x i w}. Therefore, #{w | x i w} =
#{w | yi w}, which implies Ui(x) =Ui(y). This contradicts our assumption that Ui(x)>Ui(y). Therefore, if
Ui(x)>Ui(y), then xi y.
Now, for the uniqueness part of the theorem. Suppose that F : R→ R is a strictly increasing function.
Then, F(Ui(x))> F(Ui(y)) if and only if Ui(x)>Ui(y) if and only if xi y. Therefore, if Ui is a function that
represents i on C, then any strictly increasing function F of Ui also represents i on C. That is, Ui is unique
up to strictly increasing transformation. 
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FIGURE 5.1: HOW FUNCTION U REPRESENTS ONE’S PREFERENCE-ORDERING ON
THE REAL LINE
We can think of the utility function Ui as a “thermometer” (in this case, an ordinal ther-
mometer) that measures each type of Bob’s preferences, just like an ordinary thermometer
measures temperature. And just as there are more than one thermometers that can be used
to measure temperature, we can expect that there will be more than one utility functions that
can be used to measure each type of Bob’s preferences. It happens to be that the difference
utility functions that can be used to measure each Bob’s preferences, in our current frame-
work, are picked out by performing a (strictly) increasing transformation of any given utility
function of Bobi. This is what is claimed by the uniqueness part of Theorem T2-1, which
claims that the utility function Ui is unique up to strictly increasing transformation. This,
again, can be represented graphically as below.
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FIGURE 5.2: FUNCTION V AS A STRICTLY INCREASING TRANSFORMATION OF
FUNCTION U
Here, V is a strictly increasing transformation of Ui. And we can see that V ◦Ui is another
utility function that represents Bobi’s preferences in the sense that, for Bobi, xi y if and only
if V (Ui(x))>V (Ui(y)). The way that V ◦Ui serves as another utility function is by retaining
the order of the values of Ui, which, in turn, retains the order of the consequences ordered by
Bobi’s preferences.
We have just shown the most general result that whenever Bob+, BobS, and BobG’s
strict preference relations are asymmetric and negatively transitive, (both of which, as we
have seen, are quite plausible assumptions to make of a strict preference relation), there exit
utility functions Ui : C→ R that represent each Bobi’s preferences over the consequences.
This does not specify what the actual order of the consequences that represent each type of
Bobi’s preferences would be; it only claims that as long as each type of Bobi’s preferences are
asymmetric and negatively transitive there are utility functions to represent them. However,
for us, it is possible to infer from Hobbes’s text what may be considered to be the actual
preference-ordering of each Bobi .
I think that it is quite apparent what each type of Bobi’s preference concerning the two
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consequences, Death and Moderate Life, would be: For all types of Bobi, Death ≺Bobi Mod-
erate Life. It also seems obvious that Death ≺BobS,Bob+ Mortified Life ≺BobS,Bob+ Moderate
Life and Death≺BobG Moderate Life≺BobG Glorified Life. This follows from our stipulation
that BobS and Bob+ are the two types of Bob who are primarily concerned with securing the
actual-Bob’s long-term self-preservation (which would make them think that even a Morti-
fied life is better than Death), and that BobG is the type of Bob who is primarily concerned
with obtaining glory and honor (which would make him think that a Glorified Life is defi-
nitely better than a Moderate Life.)
What needs to be figured out is: (a) where Glorified Life would fit into the preference-
ordering of BobS and Bob+, and (b) where Mortified Life would fit into the preference-
ordering of BobG.
To answer (a), I claim that, for both BobS and Bob+, their preferences on C would be:
Death ≺BobS,Bob+ Mortified Life ≺BobS,Bob+ Moderate Life ≺BobS,Bob+ Glorified Life. To
this, one might argue: why would anybody like BobS or Bob+, who are assumed to be
primarily under the influence of a basic desire for self-preservation, care anything about
whether their lives are glorious?
To this, I believe that it would be helpful to recall what Hobbes means by “glory.” Ac-
cording to Hobbes, glory is the pleasure that one experiences by the self-recognition of one’s
own superior power over other people. 12 This means that a Glorified Life is a life that has
everything that a Moderate Life has plus power. Now, for Hobbes, power is defined as one’s
present means to satisfy one’s yet unmet preferences.13Therefore, everything being equal,
not only a person who is primarily motivated by a desire for glory, but also a person who is
primarily motivated by a desire for self-preservation, would prefer a life that has more power
to a life that has less; for having more power would imply that one has better means to secure
12“Joy arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is
called GLORYING...” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 39]
13“The power of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain some future apparent good. . . ”
[Hobbes 1991: Leviathan, Chapter X, Paragraph 1]
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one’s own self-preservation. Hobbes explains the reason why even people who are primarily
motivated by his or her own self-preservation would prefer a Glorified Life (i.e. a life with
power) to a Moderate Life in the following way:
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all man-kind, a per-
petual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And
the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than
he has already, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well,
which he hath present, without acquisition of more. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan,
Chapter XI, Paragraph 2]
This means that all three types of Bobis would prefer a Glorified Life to a Moderate Life
other things being equal.
Now, how should we answer question (b)? That is, how would BobG, who is primarily
under the influence of a basic passion for glory, feel about a Mortified Life. The major issue
is whether BobG would find a Mortified Life a life that is worth living or whether he would
find such a life even worse than Death? I believe that the following passage from Leviathan
is indicative of the correct answer to this question.
Vain-glorious men ... are inclined to rash engaging, and in the approach of
danger or difficulty, to retire if they can; because not seeing the way of safety,
they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse, than
their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter
XI, Paragraph 12]
What this passage is suggesting is that BobG would, in general, rashly engage in risky ac-
tivities in an attempt to obtain glory and honor which BobG values very highly. However,
when the prospects for gaining glory becomes significantly dim, and when the prospects for
getting killed becomes significantly high, even a person like BobG, who is primarily under
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the influence of a basic passion for glory, would opt for dishonor which would, at least, keep
him alive. This suggests that BobG would actually prefer a Mortified Life to Death.
From this, we can summarize the preferences of the three type of Bobis as follows:
<Bob′is Preferences>
- [Bob′+s Preferences] : Death ≺Bob+ Mortiﬁed Life ≺Bob+ Moderate Life ≺Bob+ Gloriﬁed Life
- [Bob′Ss Preferences] : Death ≺BobS Mortiﬁed Life ≺BobS Moderate Life ≺BobS Gloriﬁed Life
- [Bob′Gs Preferences] : Death ≺BobG Mortiﬁed Life ≺BobG Moderate Life ≺BobG Gloriﬁed Life
We can see here that, ordinally speaking, the three types of Bobis have the same pref-
erences on C. This is because what distinguishes between the preference of a person who
is primarily motivated by glory, (such as BobG), and the preference of a person who is pri-
marily motivated by self-preservation, (such as BobS and Bob+), is not the order of the
respective consequences itself, but rather, the relative distance of each of the consequences
to one another.
For instance, suppose that we fix the distance from Death to Glorified Life for all three
types of Bobi. Then, the relative distance between Death and Mortified Life will be much
shorter for BobG than it is for BobS and Bob+, and the relative distance between Moderate
Life and Glorified Life will be much longer for BobG than it is for BobS and Bob+. What this
implies is that, unlike either of the two BobS or Bob+, BobG would be much likelier to accept
a risky gamble between a Glorified Life and Death rather than choosing an option that would
firmly secure a Moderate Life. What this means will become more apparent in the next
section. What is important to understand at this point is that, when there are no aspects of
risk or uncertainty involved, the preferences of all three types of Bobis are indistinguishable.
Combining the results of Theorem T-2-1 and each type of Bobi’s preferences, we are now
able to derive the (ordinal) utilities of each consequence (i.e. type of life) for each type of
Bobi’s.
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<Bob′is (Ordinal) Utilities>
- [Bob′+s Utilities]: UBob+ (Death) < UBob+ (Mortiﬁed Life) < UBob+ (Moderate Life) < UBob+ (Gloriﬁed Life)
- [Bob′Ss Utilities]: UBobS (Death) < UBobS (Mortiﬁed Life) < UBobS (Moderate Life) < UBobS (Gloriﬁed Life)
- [Bob′Gs Utilities]: UBobG (Death) <UBobG (Mortiﬁed Life) < UBobG (Moderate Life) < UBobG (Gloriﬁed Life)
Note that at this point, there are no specific numbers assigned. Any set of real numbers
that satisfy the above inequalities will be able to be deemed as the utilities of each type of
life for the specific Bobi in question. And, once values are assigned, any strictly increasing
transformation of the values will qualify as another legitimate assignment of utilities for each
type of life.
We now state our main theorem for this subsection.
[THEOREM (T3)] (Ordinal Represenation of Hobbes’s Theory of Real Good): For all x,
y ∈C, x is really better (or substantially better) than y for Bobi (i = S,G) if and
only if UBob+(x)>UBob+(y).
14
We are also able to derive some results about the rationality of BobS’s and BobG’s prefer-
ences as well. Theorem T1 states that what is really good for somebody is to satisfy the per-
son’s substantially rational preferences, where, here, “(substantially) rational preferences”
mean, according to the corollary of P2, preferences that are both well-considered and well-
balanced. We have seen that preferences formed by one’s idealized-self on behalf of one’s
actualized-self is guaranteed to be substantially rational in this way. From this, we derive the
following proposition.
14Proof. In section 7.2, we have established that something is really good for a given person if and only if
that thing satisfies the type of preferences that is formed by the person’s idealized-self on behalf of the person’s
actualized-self. ( This is Theorem T2.) Theorem T-2-1 claims that, given that one’s strict preferences are
asymmetric and negatively transitive, there exists a utility function such that one prefers x to y if and only if
the utility of x (i.e. U(x)) is greater than the utility of y (i.e. U(y)). Bob+ is assumed to be the idealized-self
of BobS and BobG. Furthermore, by Axiom A-2-1, Bob+’s strict preferences (i.e. the binary relation Bob+)
are both asymmetric and negatively transitive. Therefore, there is a utility function UBob+ such that x Bob+ y
if and only if UBob+(x) > UBob+(y). Therefore, by T2, T-2-1, A-2-1, and by our assumption that Bob+ is the
idealized-self of Bobi (i = S,G), for all x, y ∈ C, x is really better than y for Bobi (i = S,G []f and only if
UBob+(x)>UBob+(y). 
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[PROPOSITION (P3)]: It is substantially rational for Bobi(i = S,G) to strictly prefer x to y
if and only if xBob+ y if and only if UBob+(x)>UBob+(y).
From <Bobi’s Preferences> and <Bobi’s Utilities> above, we can see that all three types of
Bobi’s preferences are substantially rational for all pair-wise comparisons of the elements in
C.
Furthermore, D2 claims that one’s preferences are formally (or minimally rational) if and
only if they satisfy the axioms of decision theory. I have said that the axioms of decision the-
ory are context-specific in the sense that they depend on what sort of representation theorem
we are looking for. In our current framework of ordinal representation, it was both necessary
and sufficient for one’s strict preference relation to be asymmetric and negatively transitive
for there to be a utility function representing those preferences. Axioms A-2-1 and A-2-2
state that all three types of Bobi (i = +,S,G)’s preferences are asymmetric and negatively
transitive. Therefore, we can say that all three types of Bobi (i = +,S,G)’s preferences are
all formally (or minimally) rational as well.
5.2.2 Clarifying the Meaning of Utility Functions
Before I move on to the next step of our formalization, I would like to clarify one thing about
utility functions. It is quite unfortunate that the term “utility” has been used, historically, in
so many different ways in both the economics as well as the philosophy community alike.15
The term “utility” started with classical utilitarianism. At first, the term meant a dis-
position or a tendency to produce good consequences. Consider how Jeremy Bentham, the
forefather of classical utilitarianism, defines “utility”:
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves
of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have
15See John Broome’s “Utility” contained in [Broome, 1999]for a very informative discussion about this
topic.
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to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question ...
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce bene-
fit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case comes to
the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happen-
ing of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is consid-
ered... [Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”
contained in [Mill and Bentham, 1987, pp. 65-66 emphasis added]]
However, throughout the history of moral philosophy, the dispositional aspect of the term
“utility” gradually dropped, and now, the term is simply used to denote a type (or types) of
good consequences (e.g. pleasure, happiness, etc.) that the utilitarian urges one to maximize.
Utilitatianism, in contemporary moral philosophy, is understood as a form of consequential-
ism, which, in its most general form, claims that what is morally right is to maximize the
realization of good consequences.16Consider how J.J.C. Smart defines act-utilitarianism:
Act-utilitarianism is the view that rightness or wrongness of an action is to be
judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself. ... According
to the act-utilitarian, then, the rational way to decide what to do is to decide
to perform that one of those alternative actions open to us (including the null-
action, the doing of nothing) which is likely to maximize the probable happiness
or well-being of humanity as a whole, or more accurately, or all sentient be-
ings. [Smart, “An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics” contained inSmart
and Williams 1973, p. 9, p. 42, emphasis added]
So, when a utilitarian philosopher claims that people should maximize utility, what he/she
is claiming is that people should maximize good consequences. I believe that this is the
16Some writers restrict utilitarianism to a narrower category, which claims that what is morally right is to
maximize utility (where this is supposed to denote either pleasure or happiness), and distinguish utilitarianism
from a more broader category, which utilitarianism is one part of, called “consequentialism” which recognizes
that there could be good consequences other than utility (i.e. pleasure or happiness.)
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definition of “utility” to which philosophers in general are most accustomed; “Utility”, for
philosophers, is understood in the lights of utilitarianism, and, understood in this way, the
term simply denotes a kind of externally measurable good consequence which may be related
to, but are largely independent of, people’s preferences.
This is not how the term “utility” is used in contemporary economic theory or formal
decision theory. In contemporary economic theory or formal decision theory, utility is simply
a numerical value that represents a person’s preferences in the sense that, relative to a utility
function U, a person prefers x to y if and only if the utility of x is greater than the utility of y
(i.e. U(x)>U(y))”
However, when a philosopher, (who understand “utility” in the lights of utilitarianism),
hears the statement of the form, “a person prefers x to y if and only if the utility of x is
greater than the utility of y (i.e. U(x) > U(y))”, uttered by a decision theorist, it is very
easy for him/her to interpret the statement as saying that the reason why the person either
should or would prefer x to y is because x generates greater amounts of good consequences
(in many cases, pleasure) than y. Described in this way, this makes it sound that it would
have been perfectly possible for the person to prefer y to x even when the utility of y is lesser
than the utility of x if the person had happened to not care at all about maximizing good
consequences (especially, pleasure.)
Similarly, game theory, which is an extension of decision theory, assumes that every
player is a utility-maximizer. To a moral philosopher, who understands the term “utility”
in terms of utilitarianism, such assumption can be very easily read as saying that, in game
theory, everybody is assumed to care only about good consequences and their maximization.
Such assumption seems very problematic, since, to the moral philosopher, it seems quite
evident that utility (understood as meaning good consequences) is not the only thing that
people in general care about. The natural corollary of this type of reasoning is that the
purpose of both ethics and political philosophy would be better served without knowing any
formal decision theory or game theory. I believe that this represents part of the reasoning
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processes of many moral philosophers who tend to think that formal decision theory and
game theory can offer very little, if not zero, insights to questions of ethics and political
philosophy.
Such objection makes sense only when “utility” is construed in the lights of utilitarianism
as denoting pleasure or some narrow category of good consequences. However, when utility
is construed in that way, then the objection is no longer directed towards formal decision
theory or game theory.
As I have explained, in contemporary economics and decision theory, a utility function
is merely a scale (i.e. a thermometer) that measures people’s preferences. When the decision
theorist says that, relative to a utility function U, one prefers x to y if and only if the utility
of x is greater than the utility of y, what he/she was saying was something that is akin to the
statement: x is hotter than y if and only if the temperature of x is higher than the temperature
of y. So, when a moral philosopher argues that it is possible for one to prefer y to x even
when the utility of y is lesser than the utility of x, this, for the decision theorist, would sound
something similar to: y can be hotter than x even if the temperature of y is lower than the
temperature of x.
As we already know, this is impossible unless the thermometer behaves in very weird
ways, which, at that point, would make the thing useless as a thermometer. The same thing
holds for preferences. It is just simply impossible for somebody to prefer y to x when U(x)>
U(y); if that happened, we can say that the function U is not a utility function. In decision
theory, a utility function is simply defined as a measure of a person’s preferences; the amount
of good consequences is irrelevant to the assignment of utilities. If somebody happens to
prefer y to x even when the amount of good consequences of x far exceeds that of y, then
this, by definition, implies U(y)>U(x). 17
Such utility measure does not always exist; and this is why proving a representation
17It would also imply that the maximization of good consequences is not the only thing that the person cares
about.
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theorem is important. But when it does exist (and if U is any such function), it is almost a
tautological truth that one prefers x to y if and only if U(x)>U(y). 18
So, here is where the confusion lies. Utilitarianism, as it is understood in contemporary
moral philosophy, claims that what is morally right, and, thereby, the most rational way to
act is to maximize utility – namely, to maximize good consequences (such as, pleasure, hap-
piness, and so on.) Decision theory, which is supposed to tell us something about rational
decision-making, claims that, as long as people are rational19, they are utility maximizers
– meaning that there is a utility function (representing their preferences) of which people
can be seen as maximizing the numeric value when they act. Conflating the two mean-
ings together makes it sound that decision theorists are claiming that everybody is a perfect
act-utilitarian who always succeeds in maximizing good consequences without a mistake,
whereas what the decision theorist was merely saying was that people can be seen as acting
according to their well-behaved preferences.
In short, the term “utility” is used in completely different ways in both contemporary
economic theory/formal decision theory and in contemporary moral philosophy. Unneces-
sary confusion inevitably arise when one inadvertently conflates the two meanings together.
So, one needs to be extremely careful either when one encounters the term “utility” in other
people’s writing or when one decides to use the term in one’s writing oneself.
There is one last thing that I would like to clarify about utility functions before moving
on to the next subsection. I have explained above that what distinguishes between the pref-
erences of BobG and the preferences of BobS and Bob+ are the relative distances that each
consequence in C bears to one another in each type of Bobis preference-ordering. However,
18A related, but a slightly different objection might be: “Applying decision theory or game theory to ethics
and political philosophy is problematic, since it assumes that there can always be utility functions that can be
used to properly represent people’s preferences.” This is a better objection since it is not based on confusing
the meaning of utility; what the objection is basically claiming is that people’s preferences seldom meet the
necessary and sufficient conditions for there to exist a utility function representing them. This is an important
issue for those who would like to use rational choice theory as a positive theory of human behavior and social
explanation. I will say more on this on the following chapter.
19which means that their preferences meet a minimum set of conditions.
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at this point, the utility function that we have derived is only an ordinal utility function. And
with an ordinal utility function, it is impossible to measure the relative distances between
two consequences in each type of Bobis preference-ordering.
With an ordinal utility function, only the order of the numbers matter. For instance,
suppose UBobG(Death) = 0, UBobG(Mortified Life) = 1, UBobG(Moderate Life) = 10, and
UBobG(Glorified Life) = 100. This is a legitimate assignment of utility numbers, since it
correctly represents BobG’s preferences ordinally. However, with such assignment of utility
numbers, it is just simply meaningless to say such things as, “For BobG, Moderate Life is
10 times better than Mortified Life” or “BobG would prefer going up from Moderate Life to
Glorified Life 90 times as much as he would prefer going up from Death to Mortified Life.”
This is because UBobG(Death) = 3, UBobG(Mortified Life) = 4, UBobG(Moderate Life) = 5,
and UBobG(Glorified Life) = 6 is another legitimate assignment of utility numbers and we
can see that none of these statements hold true in the new assignment of utility numbers.
As it will turn out, we will only be able to estimate the relative distances of each con-
sequence in each type of Bobis preference-ordering only when each type of Bobi faces risk
or uncertainty. And this is when each type of Bobis preferences will start to become distin-
guishable.
5.3 An Expected Utility Representation of Hobbes’s The-
ory of Real Good
In the previous subsection when we were giving an ordinal representation of Hobbes’s theory
of real good, the consequences that each type of Bobi was expressing his preference towards
were sure-outcomes that involved no elements of uncertainty. This is not what usually hap-
pens in real life. In real life, when somebody performs a certain action, it is seldom the case
that a specific outcome occurs for sure. Whether or not a specific outcome realizes depends
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on what the state of the world actually turns out to be. And what state of the world actually
turns out to be comes in various degrees of likelihoods (or probabilities.)
5.3.1 Clarifying the Meaning of Expected Utility Theory
To model this correctly, we would have to use what is known as “expected utility theory.”
And expected utility theory is another field, which I believe, is very easy to misunderstand.
Confusion is likely to occur by, again, borrowing the meaning of “utility” from classical
utilitarianism (as denoting good consequences) and interpreting the phrase “expected utility
theory” in terms of it.
When the term “utility” is understood in terms of utilitarianism, as denoting good con-
sequences, it is very easy to think that expected utility theory is some normative ethical
theory that claims that the (morally) right thing to do is to maximize the expectation of good
consequences.
Expected utility theory, understood as a normative ethical theory in this way (call it “ex-
pected utilitarianism”), has its appeal when the action that one had performed, despite one’s
intention to maximize good consequences, turns out to be a complete disaster. According
to utilitarianism, in such cases, what one had done was, as a matter of fact, morally wrong.
However, even somebody who has very strong utilitarian inclinations might still want to
leave some room to say that such action was at least morally admissible or even rational.
That is, for all that one may have known, the probability of such disaster from happening
might have been extremely low, while the probability of there being maximum amount of
good consequences might have been very high. If one pursues this line of thought a little bit
further, one might end up advocating expected utilitarianism that claims that what is morally
right (or rational) to do is, not to maximize good consequences per se, but to maximize the
expectation of good consequence.
Such is the appeal of expected utilitarianism. But, as a normative ethical theory, expected
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utilitarianism is very implausible. To illustrate this, consider the following example. Sup-
pose that you are chosen randomly by an all-powerful being who gives you the following
two options to choose from: (a) everybody in the universe lives a very modest but indepen-
dent life, and (b) the all-powerful being flips a fair coin; if the coin lands heads, everybody
becomes a slave and lives a very miserable life; if the coin lands tails, everybody lives an
extremely luxurious and independent life. Suppose that the expected life quality of (b) is
greater than that of option (a). What would you choose?
It is obvious what you should choose if you adopted expected utilitarianism; you should
choose option (b) since it has a higher expectation of good consequences.
It is not obvious that such a prescription is right; I believe that many people would think
that option (a) is better. And the reason why many people might think this way is because
they think that risk (or variance) is another aspect that we should take into account when
making important decisions.
Option (a) might have a lower expected life quality than option (b); however, option (a)
is completely risk-free. Option (b) might have a higher expected life quality than option (a);
however, option (b) is very risky (i.e. it has high variance.) So, when expected utilitarianism
requires you to choose option (a) over option (b) solely by the fact that option (a) has a
higher expectation of good consequences, what it is, in effect, requiring is for you to be
completely risk-neutral about the consequences in question. In other words, it requires you
to be care-free about risk.
This is not how we normally think. When we try to decide what to do, we usually take
both the expectation as well as the risk (i.e. variance) into consideration. If a normative
ethical theory requires one to be risk-neutral, it, at least, owes one an explanation as to why.
I believe that there is no such explanation that expected utilitarianism offers. One could very
well be risk-neutral about external consequences; but, this does not mean that one has to be.
The implausibility of expected utilitarianism can be also illustrated by the following ex-
ample that involves insurance. Suppose that you buy a new car that costs $20,000. You are a
133
safe driver; but, suppose that there is a 1% chance of your car getting completely destroyed
by some external cause that is out of your control. An insurance company offers you a full
coverage of your car at $401. Should you buy the insurance or not?
If you buy the insurance you retain $19,599 worth of cash and merchandise for sure.
If you do not buy the insurance, then your expected pay-off becomes: 99100($20,000) +
1
100(−$20,000) = $19,600. Other things being equal, expected utilitarianism would require
you not to buy the insurance.
When we think that most insurance policies generally work in this way, (that is, they
offer you a certainty equivalent that is lower than the expectation), expected utilitarianism
would virtually imply that it is almost always morally wrong (or, at the very least, irrational)
to buy insurance.
This is not how we normally think. And, this is why expected utilitarianism does not
seem to provide the right prescriptive guidelines when there is a lot of risk involved. So, as
a normative ethical theory, the plausibility of expected utilitarianism is not something that is
intuitively apparent.
Whatever the plausibility of “expected utilitarianism”, it is not what “expected utility
theory” in decision theory claims. So, one should be cautious not to read any connotations
of expected utilitarianism into expected utility theory.
As we have seen, in contemporary utility theory, the term “utility” is exclusively used to
denote a numerical value that represents a person’s preference. A “utility function” is a scale
that is designed to measure a person’s preference. The same thing holds for expected utility
theory as well.
In contemporary decision theory, expected utility theory consists in a set of axioms and
a main representation theorem (derived from the axioms) that claims, “ if a decision maker’s
preferences abide by the set of axioms, there exists a utility function such that the decision
maker strictly prefers x to y if and only if the expected utility of x is greater than the expected
utility of y.” What this is basically saying is that as long as a decision maker’s preferences
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(which are revealed by his or her choice behaviors) meet the set of axioms, we can find a util-
ity function (i.e. a scale) which the decision maker is acting as if he or she was maximizing
the expectation of.
The “as if” clause here is very important. Expected utility theory does not require the
decision maker to understand anything about utility functions or probabilities or require the
decision maker to be consciously aware that he or she is acting in a way the expected util-
ity theory describes. What expected utility theory is saying is that as long as the decision
maker’s preferences (which are revealed by his or her choice behaviors) abide by the set of
axioms, there exists a utility function that enables us to interpret the decision maker’s choice
behaviors as if he or she was maximizing the expectation of this utility function.
Now, if one understands the significance of what this is saying, one would realize that
the claim is something that is very bold that requires theoretical defense. We have just seen
that maximizing the expectation of something can be the sole consideration in one’s practical
deliberation only when one is (or is required to be by some normative ethical theory) risk-
neutral about the values or consequences the expectation of which is being sought to be
maximized. We have seen that when one is either risk-averse or risk-loving, the fact that a
certain action maximizes the expected consequences is not a decisive reason to act in that
way.
However, expected utility theory claims that whenever somebody’s preferences meet a
certain set of axioms (all of which, as we will soon see, seem pretty reasonable), we can
always find a utility function the expectation of which the person acts as if he or she was
seeking to maximize.
What’s remarkable is that this holds regardless of one’s attitude towards risk. That is,
whether one is generally risk-averse or whether one is generally risk-loving, one can always
be interpreted as a expected utility maximizer as long as one’s preferences satisfy a certain
set of formal conditions. (Of course, the respective utility functions of a risk-averse person
and a risk-loving person will turn out to be different.)
135
What is also remarkable of expected utility theory is that the number of axioms that
jointly purport to render one to be an expected utility maximizer is quite few, and, they
all seem to be pretty reasonable assumptions; assumptions that one would expect that any
reasonable person’s preferences would satisfy.
In reconstructing Hobbes’s theory of real good, I plan to combine the strategies of both
Von Neumann and Morgernstern’s objective expected utility theory20 and Leonard Savage’s
subjective expected utility theory.21 I will not delve too much into the technical details and
try to simplify the exposition as best as I can.
5.3.2 An Expected Utility Representation (Von-Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s Framework)
We first describe our current framework. As before, the set of consequences is C={Death,
Mortified Life, Moderate Life, Glorified Life}. We now think of the set P of all proba-
bility distributions on C. A probability distribution is a function p : C → [0,1] such that
∑x∈C p(x) = 1. It might be convenient to think of p ∈ P as a lottery ticket that gives you
prize x ∈C with probability p(x).
Remember that P is the set of all possible probability distributions on C. Since C has
more than one members, P is, in effect, an uncountably infinite set. Furthermore, we also
assume that any convex combination of any two members of P is also a member of P. That
is, if p ∈ P and q ∈ P, then for a ∈ [0,1], ap+(1−a)q ∈ P. It might be convenient to think
of ap+(1−a)q as a compound lottery which gives the lottery p (with probability a) and the
lottery q (with probability 1−a) as its respective prizes.
20John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s expected utility theory has been first appeared in [Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, 1944]. The theory has been reproduced in many books (see [Luce and Raiffa, 1957,
Fishburn, 1970, Harsanyi, 1977]) afterwards, and has been explained in introductory text books in decision
theory (see [Resnik, 1987, Kreps, 1988, Binmore, 2009].)
21The major contribution of Leonard Savage is to combine the theory of subjective probability with Von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. The ground breaking work is [Savage, 1972]. The theory
is reproduced and explained in [Fishburn, 1970, Kreps, 1988].
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In this framework, each type of Bobi (i = +,S,G) is offered to express his preferences
towards lotteries (i.e. probability distributions) in P. If we are willing to identify the lottery
p ∈ P that gives x ∈C as its prize with probability p(x) = 1 with the sure consequence x ∈C
, then C can be seen as a proper subset of P, and, therefore, each type of Bobi can also be
seen as expressing his preference on C as well.
Lotteries in P would be options such as: “one-half chance of achieving a Glorified Life
and a one-half chance of Death”, “.1 chance of Death, .4 chance of Mortified Life, .3 chance
of Moderate Life, .2 chance of Glorified Life”, etc.
We can see that when each type of Bobi is required to express his preferences towards
lotteries, the objective probabilities of the lotteries are already predetermined and given to
him. So, the choice that each type of Bobi is making is different from betting on a horse
race or a sports event in which it is standardly assumed for there to be no such objective
probabilities that can be given.
We now state the axioms.
[AXIOM(A-3-1)]: Bobi (i =+,S,G.) on P and C is asymmetric and negatively transitive.
As we have seen, asymmetry and negative transitivity are two properties that fit very well
with our intuitive understanding of what a preference-relation should be. The other relations,
%Bobi (weak preference) andvBobi(indifference) are defined in a similar way as in D-2-1 and
D-2-2.
[AXIOM(A-3-2)]: (Reduction of Compound Lotteries) Let a,b,c ∈ [0,1]. Then, for all
p,q ∈ P, c(ap+(1−a)q)+(1− c)(bp+(1−b)q)∼Bobi (ac+b−bc)p+(1−
(ac+b−bc))q
I believe that what this axiom is claiming can be more easily understood by a concrete ex-
ample. Consider the following two lotteries.
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Figure 5.3: Reduction of Compound Lotteries
Lottery B is a simple lottery that gives the prizes Glorified Life with probability 1/12,
Moderate Life with probability 5/12, Mortified Life with probability 1/12, and Death with
probability 5/12. Whereas, lottery A is a compound lottery that gives the lottery (which gives
the prizes Glorified Life, Moderate Life, Mortified Life, and Death, each with probability
1/4) as a prize with probability 1/3, and the lottery (which gives the prizes Moderate Life
and Death each with probability 1/2) as a prize with probability 2/3. The two lotteries are
different. However, if we calculate the probabilities of each lottery, we can confirm that
both lottery A and lottery B provide each of the prizes (i.e. Glorified Life, Moderate Life,
Mortified Life) with exactly the same probabilities.
Axiom A-3-2 claims that, in such cases, each type of Bobi is indifferent between the two
lotteries. That is, according to axiom A-3-2, the only things that each type of Bobi considers
in determining his preference between two options are the specific consequences and their
respective final probabilities of occurring; and not the particular way the consequences are
randomized.
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Such assumption might not be true for ordinary people in many cases. For example, I
believe that, for many people, it is not obvious, at first sight, that lottery A provides the prize
Moderate Life with probability 5/12. To know that lottery A provides Moderate Life with
probability 5/12 requires computation. The computation will become more complicated as
the compound lottery becomes more complex. People might not like computation. If so, then
they might actually prefer lottery B to lottery A even though each lottery generates exactly
the same probabilities for each of the consequences. So, what axiom A-3-2 is basically
assuming is that computation comes for free.
This might be problematic for ordinary people. However, I believe that this will not be
a problem for at least Bob+(i.e. the actual Bob’s idealized-self ) who is assumed to be fully-
rational in the Hobbesian substantial sense. I believe that assuming that such idealized being
has the requisite computational abilities to be indifferent between two different compound
lotteries that assign exactly the same final probabilities for each of the consequences would
not be such a problematic assumption.
The assumption might be contestable for BobS and BobG. However, I believe that the
axiom can be applied to even non-idealized people if they are patient enough to go through
the computations of probabilities when required.
For now, let’s assume that both BobS and BobG are such patient individuals. In the
end, both BobS and BobG will not be required to understand anything about probabilities in
Savage’s framework which will be dealt in the next subsection. Until then, let us assume that
they do have some elementary knowledge of arithmetic and probability theory which enable
them to compute probabilities in compound lotteries.
[AXIOM(A-3-3)]: (Independence) For all p,q,r ∈ P and a ∈ (0,1], if pBobi q then ap+
(1−a)r Bobi aq+(1−a)r
Suppose a given type of Bobi is considering the following two options: (a) an arbiter tosses
a fair coin, and if the coin lands heads Bobi experiences Moderate Life, and if the coin lands
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tails he suffers Death, and (b) an arbiter tosses a fair coin, and if the coin lands heads Bobi
experiences Mortified Life, and if the coin lands tails he suffers Death.
Here, we can see that what happens when the coin lands tails is exactly the same for both
options (a) and (b). What axiom A-3-3 claims is that, in such cases, Bobi preference for the
two options (a) and (b) should be determined by what happens when the coin lands heads.
As it turns out, all types of Bobi strictly prefers a Moderate Life to a Mortified Life
which are the respective consequences for (a) and (b) when the coin lands heads ; therefore,
all types of Bobi strictly prefers (a) to (b). The basic logic behind this reasoning is this: if
one is going to die no matter what one chooses if the coin lands tails, then why not choose
an option that at least gives a better result when the coins lands heads?
This axiom is usually known as the independence or the substitution axiom. The thought
behind this is that as long as what happens at a particular state of the world is the same for
any two options, the decision maker’s preference between the two options is not influenced
by what particular consequence is realized in that particular state of the world.
This means that, for all types of Bobi, [12Moderate Live +
1
2X] Bobi[12Mortified Life
+ 12X] for all X ∈ C. I believe that this is a reasonable assumption in our current context
although, historically, there have been objections that have been raised against it.22
[Axiom(A-3-4)]: (Archimedean) For all p,q,r ∈ P, if p Bobi q Bobi r , then there exist
22
Table 5.2: Allais Paradox
The famous objection is what is now known as the
Allais Paradox. Suppose that there are one hundred
balls in a bag that are numbered from 1 to 100.
Exactly one ball is drawn, and you receive a prize according to the lottery you choose. You are offered a choice
between the two lotteries p1and p2 which are described in the table below.
Lottery p1
Ball # 1 2 to 11 12 to 100
Prize $100 $100 $100
Lottery p2
Ball # 1 2 to 11 12 to 100
Prize $0 $500 $100
Which lottery do you prefer? Many subjects in the experiment answered that they prefer lottery p1to
p2. Suppose that you are now asked to choose between the following two lotteries p3and p4.
140
a,b ∈ (0,1) such that ap+(1−a)r Bobi qBobi bp+(1−b)r.
This, I believe, is the axiom that does the most heavy duty in deriving the representation
theorem. What it is basically claiming is that if there are three options that one strictly
prefers the first to the second and one strictly prefers the second to the third, we can always
find a lottery that takes the first and third options as prizes which one would strictly prefer to
the second option, and another lottery for which one would strictly prefer the second option
to it. What this virtually amounts to saying is that there are no options that are infinitely good
or infinitely bad. Let me explain.
Suppose that one strictly prefers having a Ferrari to having a Honda which one strictly
prefers to having no car at all. Now consider the lottery [a · Ferrari + (1− a) ·NoCar]
which gives you a Ferrari with probability a(0≤ a≤ 1) and No Car with probability (1−a).
Presumably, with a high enough a, we could expect that one would strictly prefer the lottery
to getting a Honda for sure. Similarly, with a low enough a, we could expect that one would
strictly prefer getting a Honda to the lottery. And this is exactly what the Archimedean axiom
Lottery p3
Ball # 1 2 to 11 12 to 100
Prize $100 $100 $0
Lottery p4
Ball # 1 2 to 11 12 to 100
Prize $0 $500 $0
Which lottery do you prefer? Many subjects in the experiment answered that, this time, they prefer lottery
p4to p3. It can be easily seen that this violates the independence axiom.
Proof. Suppose that a denotes the lottery that gives the outcome $1,000,000 for sure, b denotes the lottery
that gives $0 with probability 111 and $5,000,000 with probability
10
11 , d the lottery that give $0 for sure. Then,
we can write each of lotteries as follows: p1 = 11100 a+
89
100 a, p2 =
11
100 b+
89
100 a, p3 =
11
100 a+
89
100 d, p4 =
11
100 b+
89
100 d. According to the independence axiom, this implies, p1  p2 iff 11100 a+ 89100 a  11100 b+ 89100 a iff 11100 a+
89
100 d  11100 b+ 89100 d iff p3  p4. ∴ Therefore, if the agent reports p1  p2 and p4  p3, then this violates the
independence axiom. 
There are many ways to respond to this objection. One is to think that this example invalidates the plausibil-
ity of the independence axiom. Another is to think that the subjects in the experiment were acting irrationally;
that once they are informed of their mistakes there are likely to change their preference according to the inde-
pendence axiom. (It is known that this is the stance that Leonard Savage took after he realized that he failed to
be consistent with the independence axiom in Allais’s experiment himself.) Lastly, one might try to argue that
the results of the experiment is not really inconsistent with the independence axiom by individuating outcomes
more finely. For example, one might argue that getting $0 in lottery p2is different from getting $0 in lottery p4;
one is more likely to feel regret in the former than the latter. See [Broome, 1991, Chapter 5] for an account of
such solution.
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is claiming. Of course, the specific values of a that would reverse one’s preferences would
depend on how much one values a Ferrari as well as how much one dislikes having no car.
However, now, consider a more drastic example. Presumably, many people would strictly
prefer receiving $100 to receiving no money at all, which they would strictly prefer to death.
The Archimedean axiom claims that there is a number a ∈ (0,1) such that one would strictly
prefer the lottery [a · $100 + (1− a) ·Death] to receiving no money. To many people, this
would sound outrageous. To them, having even the slightest probability of death would
render the lottery not worth playing. Many people think that death is something that is very
close to being infinitely bad, of which the Archimedean axiom denies the existence.
The usual defense of the Archimedean axiom to this kind of objection goes as follows.23
Suppose that a trustworthy friend tells you that, across the street, there is an envelop that has
a a hundred dollar bill inside in his mailbox which he would like to give me as a gift. You
can either refuse the gift or accept the gift and cross the street to retrieve it. I believe that
many people would gladly choose to accept the gift and cross the street even though crossing
the street increases ever so slightly the chances of getting hit by a car and dying. This shows
that death, unlike what many people commonly think, is not something that is infinitely bad.
I think that the same thing can be reasonably argued for each type of Bobi.
First of all, it is obvious that BobG will not have an infinite aversion against death. If he
did, then he would never choose a gamble that involved a good chance of glory and a slight
chance of death over securing a moderate life, which defies the basic spirit of Hobbes’s main
text.24
Next, I believe that the Archimedean axiom can even be defended for Bob+ and BobS
as well. It is true that both Bob+and BobS are the type of Bobs that are primarily influ-
enced by a basic desire for self-preservation. And because of that, both BobSand Bob+
23See [Fishburn, 1970, p.110] and [Kreps, 1988, p. 45]
24“Vain-glorious men ... are inclined to rash engaging...” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XI, Paragraph
12] “Another, supposing himself superior to other, wants to be allowed everything (. . . ) that is the sign of an
aggressive character. In his case, the will to do harm derives from vainglory.” [Hobbes 1997: On the Citizen,
Chapter 1, Section 4 emphasis added]
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would, more than anything else, be concerned with securing his (i.e. the actual-Bob’s) long-
term self-preservation. This implies that Bob+ would have a very strong aversion against
death; however, this does not mean that they would have infinite aversion towards death.
For instance, I believe that it is not unreasonable to assume that both Bob+ and BobS would
strictly prefer the lottery (which gives 99.9999999999% chance of living a Moderate Life
and 0.0000000001% chance of Death) to living a Mortified Life for sure.
So, all of the axioms from A-3-1 to A-3-4, at least, seem to be defensible assumptions for
each type of Bobi. The remarkable thing is that this is all that we need to derive the expected
utility representation theorem, which is stated below.
[THEOREM(T-3-1)] (Expected Utility Representation): The binary relationBobi (i=+,S,G)
(i.e. Bobi’s strict preference) on P satisfies axioms A-3-1 to A-3-4 if and only if
there exists functions UBobi : P→R and uBobi : C→R such that: For all p,q∈ P,
p Bobi q if and only if UBobi(p) >UBobi(q) if and only if ∑x∈C p(x)uBobi(x) >
∑x∈C q(x)uBobi(x). Furthermore, functions UBobi and uBobi are unique up to pos-
itive affine transformation.
Some writers distinguish the big utility function (i.e. UBobi) with the small utility function
(i.e. uBobi) by calling the latter a “pay-off function.” The difference is that the domain of
UBobi is P while the domain of uBobi is C. However, we can think of them as the same thing
if we are willing to think that a consequence x in C is the same thing as a lottery (i.e. a
probability distribution) in P that gives x as its prize with probability 1. And, this is what
I will be doing from now on; that is, from what I write afterwards, I will not distinguish
between UBobi and uBobi .
Granting this, what the theorem is basically claiming is that as long as each type of Bobi’s
preferences meet the four axioms from A-3-1 to A-3-4, we can find a utility function such
that: (a) it represents a given Bobi’s preferences, and (b) the utility of a lottery equals its
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expected utility.25
Remember that we say that a utility function represents a person’s preference if the person
strictly prefers option p to option q if and only if the utility of p is greater than the utility of q.
So, what the theorem is basically claiming is that as long as each type of Bobi’s preferences
meet the four axioms, any given type of Bobi strictly prefers lottery p to lottery q if and only
if the expected utility of p is greater than the expected utility of q.
That is, as long as a given type of Bobi’s preferences meet the four axioms, there is
a utility function that makes it look as if that given type of Bobi was a expected utility
maximizer. Furthermore, if we find one such utility function, then we can find another utility
function by performing a positive affine transformation on the former.
I hope that everybody who is reading this finds this remarkable. As we have seen, people
do not generally act in order to maximize the expectation of some external value. This is
because, as we have seen, maximizing the expectation of some external value, in effect,
requires one to be risk-neutral about the value in question. And, as we have seen, people
can be risk-averse or risk-neutral about many things. However, theorem T-3-1 claims that as
long as a decision maker’s preference meet the four axioms, it is possible for us to see the
decision maker as an expected utility maximizer.
As one can see, there is absolutely no axiom above that requires one to be risk-neutral
about anything. This means that, as long as their preference meet the axioms, even risk-
averse or risk-loving people can be seen as expected utility maximizers. To put this in another
way, we can say that, as long as one’s preference satisfy the four axioms, there is a utility
function whose value towards which one is risk-neutral regardless of one’s attitude towards
risk! (I hope that everybody who is reading this finds this quite remarkable.)
I will not go into the details of the proof. Anybody who is interested should consult any
standard textbook in modern decision theory.26 What is important for our current purpose is
25That is, UBobi(px+(1− p)y) = pUBobi(x)+ (1− p)UBobi(y). When a utility function has this property, it
is said that the the utility function is linear or expectational.
26The original proof is in [Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. Many people have reproduced the proof
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to understand the general strategy that one uses to prove the main theorem.
The first major step is to establish the following lemma from the axioms:
[LEMMA(L-3-1)]: (Continuity) Suppose p,q,r ∈ P and p Bobi q Bobi r. Then, there
exists a unique a ∈ [0,1] such that ap+(1−a)r ∼Bobi q.
Some authors even state this lemma as a separate axiom.27 What this lemma is saying is that
if a given type of Bobi strictly prefers option p to option q to option r, then there is a single
lottery (whose prizes consists in option p and option r) to which Bobi will be indifferent with
getting option q for sure.
The basic intuition is something like this. Let’s go back to the car example where one’s
preferences are Ferrari  Honda  NoCar. Now, compare the lottery [a ·Ferrari + (1−
a) ·NoCar] (where a ∈ [0,1]) with the option of getting a Honda for sure. The Archimedean
axiom claims that when a is sufficiently close to 1, one would prefer the lottery to the Honda,
and when a is sufficiently close to 0, one would prefer a Honda to the lottery.
Now, pick a a where one strictly prefers the lottery to getting a Honda for sure. Con-
tinuously decrease the value of a by making it less and less. Eventually, one is going to
reach a certain point where one feels indifferent between the lottery and a Honda (i.e. where
decreasing the value of a anymore will result in making one strictly prefer a Honda to the
lottery.) This is the point that lemma L-3-1 claims to exist.
At this point, the decision maker will be indifferent to getting the lottery to getting a
Honda for sure. And since a utility function represents the decision maker’s preference, this
implies that the utility of the lottery will be equal to the utility of a Honda.
Now, let’s apply this fact to our current framework. What we have to do is to use continu-
ity (i.e. Lemma L-3-1) to calibrate the utilities of each type of Bobi for the consequences in
C⊆ P. What we are aiming to do is to construct a utility function that represents a given type
of the main theorem by using slightly different sets of axioms. Different versions of the proof can be found in
[Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Jensen, 1967a, Fishburn, 1970, Harsanyi, 1977, Resnik, 1987, Kreps, 1988, Binmore,
2009], etc.
27For instance, see[Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Harsanyi, 1977, Resnik, 1987]
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of Bobi’s preferences for lotteries in P such that the utility of a lottery equals the expected
utility of the lottery.
To do so, we first arbitrarily assign two different numbers to represent the utilities of two
distinct consequences in C (or two lotteries in P that assigns probability 1 to two different
consequences.) Assigning any two numbers for any two distinct consequences will be fine
as long as one assigns a greater number to the preferred consequence between the two.
However, it is convenient to assign utility 0 to the least preferred consequence and utility
1 to the most preferred consequence in C. This process is called normalization - which means
that we are assigning the zero and unit for the utility scale under consideration. This means
that, in our current framework, we assign UBobi(Death) = 0 and UBobi(Glori f ied Li f e) = 1
for all i.
We now try to find a lottery between Death (which is the worst outcome) and Glorified
Life (which is the best outcome) (i.e. [p·Glorified Life + (1− p)·Death]) to which each type
of Bobi would feel indifferent to securing a Moderate Life for sure.
Let’s start with Bob+. Presumably, since Bob+ is defined as the idealized-Bob who is,
more than anything else, concerned with achieving the actual-Bob’s long-term self-preservation,
the value of p ∈ [0,1] would be quite high (i.e. very close to 1.) In any case, we know from
Lemma L-3-1, (which can be derived from Axioms A-3-1 to A-3-4), that such p is guaran-
teed to exist.
Let p+ be the value of p that makes Bob+ feel indifferent between the lottery [p·Glorified
Life + (1− p)·Death] and securing a Moderate Life for sure. For now, let’s do not specify
the value that p+ takes. Just remember that it has to be quite close to 1. Now, assign the
utility of Moderate Life as p+. So, UBob+(ModerateLi f e) = p
+.
We do the same thing for the consequence, Mortified Life. That is, let q+ ∈ [0,1] be
the value of q that would make Bob+ indifferent to playing the lottery [q·Glorified Life +
(1−q)·Death] and securing a Mortified Life for sure. Obviously the value of q+ should be
smaller than that of p+ (i.e. p+ < q+.) Again, such a value is guaranteed to exist by Lemma
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L-3-1. Now, assign q+ as the utility of Mortified Life. So, UBob+(Morti f ied Li f e) = q
+.
We have just constructed an expected utility function for Bob+. That is:
• UBob+(Glori f ied Li f e) = 1,
• UBob+(ModerateLi f e) = p
+
• UBob+(Morti f ied Li f e) = q
+
• UBob+(Death) = 0
We can easily verify that our current utility function UBob+ has the expected utility property
(i.e. it is linear); the utility of any lottery equals to its expected utility of the sure outcomes.
For instance, we know that Bob+ is indifferent between the lottery [p+·Glorified Life +
(1− p+)·Death] and the sure outcome Moderate Life. This means that the utility of the
lottery [p+·Glorified Life + (1− p+)·Death] and the utility of Mortified Life should be the
same; that is, UBob+(ModerateLi f e) =UBob+(p
+ ·Glori f ied Li f e+(1− p+) ·Death).
Now, take the expected utility of the lottery [p+·Glorified Life + (1− p+)·Death]:
p+UBob+(Glori f ied Li f e)+ (1− p+)UBob+(Death) = p+ ·1+(1− p+) ·0 = p+, which, as
it turns out, is equal to UBob+(ModerateLi f e).
Combining all of this we get:
UBob+(ModerateLi f e)
=UBob+(p
+ ·Glori f ied Li f e+(1− p+) ·Death)
= p+UBob+(Glori f ied Li f e)+(1− p+)UBob+(Death)
= p+
We can see here that the utility of the lottery [p+·Glorified Life + (1− p+)·Death]
equals to taking the expectation of the utilities of its sure consequences, Glorified Life
147
and Death. Furthermore, if we think of the sure consequence of a Moderate Life as a lot-
tery that gives Moderate Life with probability 1, then we can also confirm that the util-
ity of the lottery [1·Moderate Life] equals the expected utility of its sure consequence:
UBob+(1 ·ModerateLi f e) = 1 ·UBob+(ModerateLi f e) = p+. The same thing applies for
the utility of Mortified Life. That is, UBob+ is a expected utility function where the utility of
a lottery is equal to the expected utility of the lottery.
Remember that a utility function is a scale that measures a person’s preference in such
a way that the person strictly prefers option a to option b if and only if the utility of option
a is greater than the utility of option b. So, for any lotteries (i.e. probability distributions)
p,q ∈ P, Bob+ will strictly prefer the lottery p to lottery q if and only if the utility of lottery
p is greater than the utility of lottery q. However, we have just seen that, for UBob+ , the utility
of a lottery equals the expected utility of its sure outcomes.
This means that, Bob+ will strictly prefer lottery p to lottery q if and only if the ex-
pected utility of lottery p is greater than the expected utility of lottery q. In short, Bob+ is
an expected utility maximizer who acts as if he was trying to maximize the expectation of
UBob+ .
Furthermore, the uniqueness part of theorem T-3-1 claims that the expected utility func-
tion UBob+ is unique up to positive affine transformation. This means that if UBob+ is a utility
function that represents Bob+’s preferences and has the expected utility property explained
above, then V = aUBob++b (a > 0,b ∈ R) is another utility function that represents Bob+’s
preferences and has the expected utility property as well.28
28Here is a general proof where C is assumed to be an arbitrary finite set. Suppose x1, ..., xn∈C. Since Bob+’s
preferences on P have a expected utility representation, this implies that pBob+ q iff UBob+(p)>UBob+(q) iff
∑xi∈X p(xi)uBob+(xi) >∑xi∈X q(xi)uBob+(xi) iff p(x1)uBob+(x1)+ ....+ p(xn)uBob+(xn)> q(x1)uBob+(x1)+....+
q(xn)uBob+(xn) iff a{p(x1)uBob+(x1)+ ....+ p(xn)uBob+(xn)}> a{q(x1)uBob+(x1)+ ....+q(xn)uBob+(xn)} (for
a > 0) iff p(x1)auBob+(x1) + ....+ p(xn)auBob+(xn) > q(x1)auBob+(x1) + ....+ q(xn)auBob+(xn) iff (since
both{p(x1) + .... + p(xn)} = 1 and {q(x1) + .... + q(xn)}=1) p(x1)auBob+(x1) + .... + p(xn)auBob+(xn) +
{p(x1) + ....+ p(xn)}b > q(x1)auBob+(x1) + ....+ q(xn)auBob+(xn) + {q(x1) + ....+ q(xn)}b (for any real
number b) iff p(x1){auBob+(x1) + b} + .... + p(xn){auBob+(xn) + b} > q(x1){auBob+(x1) + b} + .... +
q(xn){auBob+(xn)+b} Therefore, if Bob+’s preferences on P have an expected utility representation with the
pay-off function on prizes uBob+ : X −→ R, then the pay-off function v = auBob++b (for real numbers a > 0
and b) can also be used in the expected utility representation to represent the same preferences. That is, uBob+
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I said that it is convenient to assign utility 1 to the most preferred outcome and utility 0 to
the least preferred outcome. The reason why such assignment is convenient is because, that
way, the utility of any sure-outcome will be equal to the probability of the most preferred
outcome in a lottery [p·Most Preferred Outcome + (1− p)·Least Preferred Outcome] to
which the individual will be indifferent with the sure-outcome in question.
In section 7.1, I have explained that the type of admissible transformations determines the
scale type of a particular scale. As we have seen, what type of transformations are admissible
is stated in the uniqueness part of theorem T-3-1. There, it was stated that UBob+ is unique up
to positive affine transformation. According to table 7.1, a scale that is unique up to positive
affine transformation is an interval scale. An interval scale is one kind of cardinal scale.
And in an interval scale, the ratio between differences remain constant for all admissible
transformation.
This means that, when | UBob+(x)−UBob+(y) |= k· | UBob+(w)−UBob+(z) |, it is not
completely meaningless to say that the distance between option x and option y in Bob+’s
preference-ordering is k times as great as the distance between option w and option z in
Bob+’s preference-ordering.29
From this, we are able to state the relative distances between the consequences in C
in Bob+’s preference-ordering without rendering such statements meaningless. There is no
textual evidence in Hobbes that would enable us to know the relative distances among conse-
quences in Bob+’s preference-ordering in a precise way. But, we are able to make reasonable
estimations.
First, remember that Bob+ is the idealized-Bob who is, more than anything else, con-
cerned with securing the actual-Bob’s long-term self-preservation. This implies that, within
Bob+’s preference-ordering, moving up from Death to Mortified Life would worth more than
moving up from Mortified Life to Moderate Life or moving up from Moderate Life to Glori-
is unique up to positive affine transformation.
29See footnote 5 for a proof that shows that a positive affine transformation retains the ratio of differences.
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fied Life. Since, UBob+ is an (interval) scale that measures Bob+’s preferences (cardinally),
this implies that |UBob+(Morti f ied Li f e)−UBob+(Death) |= q+−0 = q+
>|UBob+(ModerateLi f e)−UBob+(Morti f ied Li f e) |= p−q and
|UBob+(Morti f ied Li f e)−UBob+(Death) |= q+−0 = q+
>|UBob+(Glori f ied Li f e)−UBob+(ModerateLi f e) |= 1− p.
Furthermore, Bob+ (unlike BobG) would not attach much value to glory (i.e. power) per
se; Bob+’s concern for power would be limited to his interests in securing the actual-Bob’s
self-preservation. Therefore, for Bob+, moving up from Moderate Life to Glorified Life
would not be worth more than moving up from Mortified Life to Moderate Life (which means
moving up from an abject life to a decent life.) This implies that |UBob+(ModerateLi f e)−
UBob+(Morti f ied Li f e) |= p+−q+
>|UBob+(Glori f ied Li f e)−UBob+(ModerateLi f e) |= 1− p.
Summarizing all of this we get:
(a) p+ > q+ (i.e. a Moderate Life is strictly preferred to a Mortified Life)
(b) 2q+ > p+
(c) p++q+ > 1
(d) 2p+ > 1+q+
Of course, there will be more than one set of values for p+ and q+ that satisfy the in-
equalities (a), (b), (c), (d). However, as one can easily confirm by simple algebra, there are
lower bounds for both p+ and q+, which are:
• q+ > 13 -
30
• p+ > 23 -
31
30Multiplying 2 to each side of (b) and connecting it with (d), we get: 4q+ > 2p+ > 1+q+. From this, we
get: q+ > 13 .
31From the fact that q+ > 13 and (d), we get: 2p
+ > 1+q+ > 1+ 13 =
4
3 . From this, we get: p
+ > 23 .
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Summarizing this, we get:
• UBob+(Glori f ied Li f e) = 1,
• UBob+(ModerateLi f e) = p
+ > 23
• UBob+(Morti f ied Li f e) = q
+ > 13
• UBob+(Death) = 0
We now go over the same process for BobS and BobG. Remember that in our current stage
of reconstruction (which utilizes Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s objective expected utility
theory) all three types of Bobs are expressing his preferences towards lotteries with known
objective probabilities. Therefore, if any of their preferences (along with their respective
utility functions that represent those preferences) diverge, it will not be because any given
type of Bob was insufficiently informed about the relevant probabilities, but rather because
they were primarily being influenced by different kinds of basic passions.
Both Bob+ and BobS are assumed to be primarily influenced by the basic passion for self-
preservation. Therefore, BobS’s utilities for each of the consequences in C will be identical
to that of Bob+. Let pS and qS respectively be the values of p in the lottery [p·Glorified
Life + (1− p)·Death] to which BobS would be indifferent to securing a Moderate Life and
a Mortified Life. Then, we are able to summarize BobS’s (cardinal) utilities for the sure
consequences as follows:
• UBobS(Glori f ied Li f e) = 1,
• UBobS(ModerateLi f e) = p
S = p+ > 23
• UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e) = q
S = p+ > 13
• UBobS(Death) = 0
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Now, let’s move on to the preferences of BobG. Obviously, BobG, who is primarily influenced
by the basic passion for glory, will have different preferences towards the various lotteries in
P. And based on BobG’s preferences between the lottery [p·Glorified Life + (1− p)·Death]
and the sure consequences Moderate Life and Mortified Life, we are able to calibrate the
relative distances of these sure consequences in BobG’s preference-ordering as we did before
fin the case of Bob+.
Again, BobG is the type of Bob who is assumed to be primarily under the influence of a
basic passion for glory. It is not hard to expect that such type of Bob would value a glorified
life extremely highly. So, for BobG, moving up from Moderate Life to Glorified Life would
definitely worth more than moving up from Mortified Life to Moderate Life or moving up
from Death to Mortified Life in BobG’s.
Furthermore, the fact that BobG strongly desires glory and honor implies that he would
have a strong aversion against dishonor and mortification. Of course, as we have seen,
BobG’s aversion against dishonor would not be so strong to the extent that he would rather
prefer Death to a Mortified Life: but his preference for a Mortified Life would not be that
strong. This implies that, for BobG, moving up from Death to Mortified Life would worth
less than moving up from Mortified Life to Moderate Life.
Let pG and qG respectively be the values of p in the lottery [p·Glorified Life + (1−
p)·Death] to which BobG would be indifferent to securing a Moderate Life and a Mortified
Life. By summarizing all of the facts above, we get the following four inequalities:
(a) pG > qG (i.e. a Moderate Life is strictly preferred to a Mortified Life)
(b) 1− pG > pG−qG
(c) 1− pG > qG
(d) pG−qG > qG
Again, there will be more than one set of values of pG and qG that would satisfy these
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four inequalities. However, we are able to derive the lower bounds of pG and qG from these
inequalities, which can be summarized below:
• qG < 13 -
32
• pG < 23 -
33
From this, we are able to summarize BobG’s (cardinal) utilities for the sure consequences as
follows:
• UBobS(Glori f ied Li f e) = 1,
• UBobS(ModerateLi f e) = p
G < 23
• UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e) = q
G < 13
• UBobS(Death) = 0
It will be convenient to see what we have established so far graphically.
32Multiplying 2 to each side of (d) and connecting it with (b), we get: 1+qG > 2pG > 4qG. From this, we
get: qG < 13 .
33From the fact that qG < 13 and (b), we get: 2p
G < 1+qG < 43 . From this, we get: p
G < 23 .
153
Figure 5.4: Cardinal Preferences of Each Type of Bob
We can see that for Bob+ and BobS, among the four consequences in C, the distance be-
tween Mortified Life and Death is the greatest, the distance between Moderate Life and Mor-
tified Life is next, and the distance between Glorified Life and Moderate Life is the shortest
within their respective preference-ordering. For BobG, the distance between Glorified Life
and Moderate Life is the greatest, and the distance between Moritified Life and Death is
the shortest within his particular preference-ordering. The relative distances between two
consequences correspond to each type of Bob’s utilities, which, in turn, indicates how much
moving up from one consequence to another is subjectively worth for that particular type of
Bob.
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We now state our main theorem for this section.
[THEOREM (T4)] (Expected Utility Representation of Hobbes’s Theory of Real Good):
For all p, q ∈ P, p is really better (or substantially better) than q for Bobi
(i= S,G) if and only if UBob+(p)>UBob+(q) if and only if∑x∈C p(x)UBob+(x)>
∑x∈C q(x)UBob+(x). That is, lottery p is really better (or substantially better) than
another lottery q for Bobi (i = S,G) if and only if the expected utility of option
p for Bob+is greater than the expected utility of option q for Bob+.
34
We are also able to derive some interesting results about the rationality of BobS’s and
BobG’s preferences as well. I will not repeat the arguments, but we can give a similar account
(as we did at the end of section 7.2.1) of what it means for the preferences of BobS and BobG
to be substantially rational in our current expected utility representation framework.
[PROPOSITION (P4)]: It is substantially rational for Bobi(i= S,G) to strictly prefer p to q
if and only if pBob+ q if and only if ∑x∈C p(x)UBob+(x)> ∑x∈C q(x)UBob+(x).
That is, it is substantially rational to prefer p to q if and only if the expected utility for the
idealized-Bob of p is greater than the expected utility for the idealized-Bob of q.
In the framework of ordinal representation, all three types of Bobis were substantially ra-
tional. We can easily see that this is not the case in our current expected utility representation
framework.
Consider the lottery [a·Glorified Life + (1−a)·Death] where pG < a < 23 . The lottery is
basically a lottery that gives you less than 2/3 chance of obtaining a Glorified Life and more
than 1/3 chance of Death. As one can see, the lottery is a pretty risky gamble to take.
34Proof. Again, this can be proved by T2 (which states that what is really good for a given individual
is the satisfaction of the preferences formed by the individual’s idealized-self on behalf of the individual’s
actual-self), T-3-1 (which states that as long as each type of Bobi satisfies axioms A-3-1 to A-3-4, there exists
an expected utility function UBobi such that Bobi strictly prefers x to y if and only if the expected utility of
x is greater than the expected utility of y), A-3-1 (i.e. each type of Bobi’s strict preference relation is both
asymmetric and negatively transitive), A-3-2 (i.e. compound lotteries can be reduced to simple lotteries), A-3-
3 (i.e. Independence), A-3-4 (i.e. Archimedean) and by our assumption that Bob+ is the idealized-self of Bobi
(i = S,G). (I will omit the details.) 
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Given a choice between this lottery and securing a Moderate Life for sure, BobG would
gladly take the lottery rather than securing a Moderated Life. This is because the expected
utility of the lottery (which is a), is greater than the expected utility of a Moderate Life
(which is pG) for BobG. Indeed, in such cases, we can say that BobG is mad (in Hobbes’s
sense); he is too much infatuated by a basic passion for glory! In short, BobG’s preferences
are substantially irrational.
Our framework captures this fact very nicely. According to P4, strictly preferring the
lottery [a·Glorified Life + (1−a)·Death] to securing a Moderate Life would be substantially
rational if an only if Bob+ strictly prefers the lottery to securing a Moderate Life, which
happens if and only if the expected utility of the lottery [a·Glorified Life + (1− a)·Death]
for Bob+ is greater than the expected utility of securing a Moderate Life.
As we can see, this is not the case. For Bob+, the expected utility of the lottery, which is
again a, is lesser than the expected utility of Moderate Life, which, for Bob+, is p+ where
p+ > 23 . So, given the two options, the idealized-version of Bob would prefer to secure a
Moderate Life for sure rather than to choose the lottery.
This means that in this situation, the glory-hungry version of the actual-Bob, BobG, will
be preferring to do what his idealized-self would advice him not to do. And this, according
to our current framework, indicates that BobG’s preferences are substantially irrational in the
Hobbesian sense.
We can confirm that in choosing between lotteries, the self-preserving version of the
actual-Bob, BobS’s preferences will always be substantially rational. This is because, for
any lottery p ∈ P , the expected utility of p will be identical for both BobS and Bob+. This
comes from the fact that both versions of Bob are motivated by the right kind of basic passion
(i.e. the basic passion for self-preservation) so that when they are provided with the objective
probabilities of each option they are able to assess its merits in the same way.
This relates back to our working definition of substantial (Hobbesian) rationality (C1)
which states: one’s preferences are (substantially) rational if and only if they are (a) well-
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considered and (b) well-balanced. One’s preferences are well-considered when they are
based on sufficient information about the relevant facts about each option. In our current
framework, this, most importantly, implies that one’s estimations of probabilities for each
of the consequences in the options that one is facing are correct. However, in our current
framework, the objective probabilities of p ∈ P is already given.
This means that, in our current framework, each type of Bob′is preferences are guaranteed
to be well-considered. Therefore, if any type of Bob′is preferences are substantially irrational
in the Hobbesian sense, this implies that such preferences were irrational mainly because
they were unbalanced; that is, they were generated when Bob was primarily being influenced
by the wrong kind of basic passion. This is exactly the case for BobG, who is primarily being
influenced by a basic passion for glory, which, according to Hobbes, is one of the major
forms of madness.35So, our current reconstruction fits very well with Hobbes’s main text.
I would like to end this section by mentioning the formal (or minimal) rationality of the
three types of Bobs. Again, D2 claims that one’s preferences are formally (or minimally)
rational if and only if they satisfy the axioms of decision theory. In our current framework,
which aims to provide an expected utility representation, the axioms of decision theory are
the four axioms A-3-1 to A-3-4. WE assumed that all three types of Bob satisfy these four
axioms. Therefore, according to D2, all three types of Bobs are formally (or minimally)
rational. This applies to even BobG who is substantially irrational in the Hobbesian sense.
5.3.3 A Note on One’s Attitudes Towards Risk
Before I move on I would like to say something about one’s attitude towards risk. I have
explained that when one is the type of person who tries to maximize the expectation of some
external value, this requires one to be risk-neutral about the external value in question. We
35“The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is either great vain-glory, which is com-
monly called pride and self-conceit, or great dejection of mind.”Hobbes [1994, Leviathan: Chapter VIII, Sec-
tion 18]
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have seen that all three types of Bobs are expected utility maximizers of their respective
utility functions. This implies that each type of Bobi is risk-neutral about the values that his
particular utility function UBobi produces. However, this does not imply that all three types
of Bobs are risk-neutral in general.
The fact that Bob+ and BobS will be indifferent between a lottery [p·Glorified Life +
(1− p)·Death] and the sure outcome Moderate Life only when the value of p is very high
(i.e. close to 1) indicates that both Bob+ and BobS are generally very risk-averse towards
variances in life. Then, what exactly happened here? How could a risk-averse person, such
as Bob+ and BobS, be seen as an expected utility maximizer, which implies that the person
is risk-neutral about utility?
The answer is that when we construct the respective utility functions UBob+ , UBobS , and
UBobG by trying to find the value of p that would make each type of Bobi indifferent between
the lottery [p·Glorified Life + (1− p)·Death] and the sure outcome Moderate Life, each type
of Bobi’s attitude towards risk became naturally incorporated into the construction of the
utility functions themselves during the process.
Consider a very rash and risk-loving individual BobG who would strictly prefer to play
the lottery [p·Glorified Life + (1− p)·Death] to securing a Moderate Life for sure for values
of p that are lesser than 2/3. We have seen that BobG is indifferent to the two options when p
is pG(pG > 23), which makes UBobG(ModerateLi f e) = p
G. That is, the utility of a Moderate
Life for BobG would be pG, which will be much less than the utility of Moderate Life for
Bob+ and BobS (i.e. UBob+,S(ModerateLi f e) = p
+,S), which, as we have seen, is at the very
least greater than 2/3, and probably very close to 1. That is, UBobG(ModerateLi f e) = p
G <
UBob+,S(ModerateLi f e) = p
+,S.
Generally speaking, when we construct expected utility functions for different individu-
als, it is very likely that different utility numbers will be assigned to the same sure-outcomes
for different individuals’ utility functions depending on each individual’s attitude towards
risk. The utility numbers are derived from each individual’s preferences towards risky gam-
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bles, and since the preferences of each individual towards risky gambles reflect his or her
attitude towards risk, the utility numbers that are assigned by the construction process will
naturally reflect the individual’s attitudes towards risk as well.
For instance, the fact that UBobG(ModerateLi f e) = p
G <UBob+,S(ModerateLi f e) = p
+,S
indicates that BobG will gladly choose the lottery [a·Glorified Life + (1− a)·Death] (a ∈
[0,1]) over securing a Moderate Life for much lesser values of a than Bob+, and this, in turn,
indicates that BobG is much more risk-loving than Bob+ and BobS, and that both Bob+ and
BobS are much more risk-averse than BobG. However, once the utility numbers are assigned
by this construction process, all three types of Bob’s will be risk-neutral towards the values
that are generated by their respective utility functions.
The way that people’s attitude towards risk gets incorporated into their utility functions
can be illustrated in a more instructive way when we look at people’s preferences towards
some predetermined quantified value; such as money.
As we have seen from the insurance example introduced in section 7.3.1, many people are
not expected monetary-value maximizers. And there aren’t any good reasons why they even
should be. For, as we have already seen, requiring that one should maximize the expectation
of monetary value would basically imply that one should be risk-neutral about money, and
there are many situations where it makes perfect sense for one to be risk-averse (or even
risk-loving.) about money. This is basically why people in general buy insurance.
Then, what does it exactly mean for one to risk-averse, risk-neutral, risk-loving about
some standard of value, e.g. money? Basically, we can identify a person’s attitude towards
risk by observing how the person feels about the variances of different kinds of lotteries that
contain prizes measured by the standard of value in question.
Let [a(p) + b(1− p)] denote a gamble that gives prize a with probability p and prize
b with probability 1− p. Now, consider the following series of gambles: [$0(12)+ $0(12)],
[$100(12)− $100(12)], [$10,000(12)− $10,000(12)], [$1,000,000(12)− $1,000,000(12)]. The
expectation of all four gambles is the same: it is $0. What they differ is in their variance.
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I expect that most people will not feel exactly the same way towards all four gambles.
Take the gamble [$0(12)+$0(
1
2)] as our reference point. This gamble give you $0 for sure; it
involves no risk. If one happens to prefer this sure outcome to any of the other gambles that
gives the same expectation but involves risk, then one is said to be risk-averse. The underly-
ing intuition is that given that the expectation is the same, what one hates is the variance that
is involved in all of the other gambles and this is what determined one’s preference between
the sure outcome and all of the other gambles.
Conversely, if one happens to prefer the other gambles that involve risk to the risk-free
sure-outcome, then one is said to be risk-loving. Again, the underlying intuition is that what
made one prefer the riskier alternatives is the fact that one likes variance; that is, the fact that
one can earn a lot of money if things go well means more than the fact that one can lose a lot
of money if things go badly.
However, if one happens to be indifferent to all four gambles, then this implies that one
is risk-neutral towards all of the monetary values listed above. The underlying intuition is
that variance does not matter to him or her.36
Generally speaking, when we want to know somebody’s attitude towards risk, we look
at the person’s preference over: (a) getting the expectation of the gamble (i.e. a1 p1+a2 p2+
...+an pn. remember that this is a determinate value, not a gamble) for sure, and (b) playing
the gamble (i.e. [a1(p1)+a2(p2)+an(pn)] that involves risks.
One is risk-averse if and only if one strictly prefers getting the expectation of the gamble
for sure to the gamble (i.e. a1 p1+a2 p2+ ...+an pn  [a1(p1)+a(p2)+a(pn)]); one is risk-
neutral if and only if one is indifferent between getting the expectation of the gamble for sure
and the gamble (i.e. a1 p1+a2 p2+ ...+an pn ∼ [a1(p1)+a(p2)+an(pn)]); one is risk-loving
36Note that it is possible for one to be risk-loving for some monetary values, but is, at the same time,
risk-neutral or risk-averse to others. For example, one might prefer [$100( 12 )− $100( 12 )] to [$0( 12 )+ $0( 12 )],
but may be indifferent between [$10,000( 12 )−$10,000( 12 )] and [$0( 12 )+$0( 12 )], and prefer [$0( 12 )+$0( 12 )] to
[$1,000,000( 12 )−$1,000,000( 12 )]. This would imply that one is risk-loving when there is not that much money
involved, but becomes risk-neutral for $10,000, and then becomes risk-averse for monetary values exceeding
$10,000.
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if and only if one prefers the gamble to the sure outcome (i.e. a1 p1 + a2 p2 + ...+ an pn ≺
[a1(p1)+a(p2)+a(pn)].)
We have seen that a utility function (U) is a measure that represents person’s preferences.
Applying this to one’s various attitudes towards risk that we have summarized above, we
get: one is risk-averse if and only if the utility of the expectation is greater than the expected
utility of the gamble (i.e. U(a1 p1+a2 p2+ ...+an pn)> p1U(a1)+ p2U(a2)+ ...+ pnU(an));
one is risk-neutral if and only if the utility of the expectation is equal to the expected utility
of the gamble (i.e. U(a1 p1+a2 p2+ ...+an pn) = p1U(a1)+ p2U(a2)+ ...+ pnU(an)); one
is risk-loving if and only if the utility of the expectation is lesser than the expected utility of
the gamble (i.e. U(a1 p1+a2 p2+ ...+an pn)< p1U(a1)+ p2U(a2)+ ...+ pnU(an).)
It is convenient to represent these results in a graph. Let U1be a utility function of a risk-
averse individual, U2 be a utility function of a risk-loving individual, and U3be a utility
function of a risk-neutral individual. Then, each individual’s utility function will respec-
tively have the following general form:
Figure 5.5: Risk-Averse
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Figure 5.6: Risk-Loving
Figure 5.7: Risk-Neutral
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So, when we construct utility functions for various people, we can say that each indi-
vidual’s attitude towards risk basically gets incorporated into the curvature of his or her
utility function. An individual is risk-averse (towards the value in question) if and only if
his or her utility function is strictly concave; An individual is risk-loving (towards the value
in question) if and only if his or her utility function is strictly convex; and an individual is
risk-neutral (towards the value in question) if and only if his or her utility function is linear.
However, once an individual’s attitudes towards risk get incorporated into the curvature
of his or her utility function, the individual’s utility function for his or her utilities is guaran-
teed to be linear. This means that the individual is risk-neutral towards his or her utilities,
which is required for the individual to be an expected utility maximizer just as expected
utility theory claims him or her to be.
5.3.4 An Expected Utility Representation (Savage’s Framework)
In section 7.3.2, all three types of Bobs were required to express their preference towards
lotteries in P where the objective probabilities of each lottery was already predetermined
and provided. However, this is not what usually happens in real-life situations. We are never
provided with explicit lotteries to choose from. We almost never calculate probabilities and
there are no utility numbers written inside our heads that would make it possible for us to
calculate the expected utility of any given option. Rather, we simply choose among the
available actions open to us, and depending on the state of the world, our actions generate a
specific consequence.
This would be the situation that the actual Bobs (i.e. BobS and BobG) would be facing in
the state of nature. That is, not only would they have no concept of utilities, but there will
also be no objective probability distributions given to them when they are trying to decide
how to act. What these people know are merely the fact that certain types of actions are
available to them when they are making decisions and that these actions will generate a
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certain consequence. They have preferences towards these available actions. And from these
preferences we would need to extract probabilities and utilities that would let us explain why
these people are acting in the way they do, and enable us to predict the future behaviors of
these people.
In order to model the choice behaviors of decision makers in such situations we would
need to use the (subjective) expected utility theory of Leonard Savage.37 And the main gist of
Savage’s expected utility theory is that as long as people’s preferences towards actions meet a
certain set of conditions, then we are able to interpret their actions as if they had probabilities
on states, utilities on outcomes, and that they were aiming to maximize expected utility.
We begin by describing the main framework of our current model. Here, is a list of
entities that inhabit our current model:
• The set of consequences: C={Death, Mortified Life, Moderate Life, Glorified Life}
• The set of all states of the world: W
• The set of all events (i.e. subsets of W ): E
• The set of all acts: A
Let me briefly explain each of these sets. Again, we have the set of consequences C which is
the same set as in our earlier models. A state w ∈W is a complete description of a particular
state of the world; one may think of a single state w∈W as a conjunction of almost infinitely
many propositions that describe all of the facts instantiated in a particular state of the world.
Any subset a⊆W will be called an event. We can basically think of an event as a collection
of several states. The set of all events, that is, the set of all subsets of W will be denoted
by E. In our current framework (which mimics that of Savage), an action a is regarded as a
function from the set of states W into the set of consequences C: that is, a : W →C. The set
of all such functions (i.e. acts) is denoted by A.
37See Savage [1972]
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I believe that it would be easier to understand what is going on by looking at a specific
example. Suppose that you are hungry. You go to your fridge. You discover a plate of salmon
rolls that you bought yesterday morning and have put in the fridge, and a turkey sandwich
that you bought today. You strongly prefer salmon rolls to a turkey sandwich given that
both are fresh. However, the salmon rolls might have gone bad. You know that the turkey
sandwich is fresh. How would we model this type of situation which respects the general
spirit of Savage’s expected utility theory? Here is one such model.
• C={Feel Very Satisfied(c1), Feel Barely Satisfied(c2), Get Food Poisoned(c3)}
• W={The Salmon Rolls Got Bad(w1), The Salmon Rolls Are Still Fresh(w2)}
• A={Eat Salmon Roll(a1), Eat Turkey Sandwich(a2)}
• c1  c2  c3
• a1(w1) = c3, a1(w2) = c1
• a2(w1) = c2, a2(w2) = c2
Here, we can see that the action “Eat Salmon Roll(a1)” is a function that generates the
consequence “Get Food Poisoned(c3)” as its value when it takes the state “The Salmon Rolls
Got Bad(w1)” as its argument, and generates the consequence “Feel Very Satisfied(c1)” as
its value when it takes the state “The Salmon Rolls Are Still Fresh(w2).” Similarly, the
action “Eat Turkey Sandwich(a2)” is a function that generates the consequence “Feel Barely
Satisfied(c2)” as its value regardless of which state it takes as its argument.
Now, there are some important things that one needs to be careful about when one tries
to model this type of situation in this way.38
First of all, in Savage’s expected utility theory, states are assumed to be independent of
acts. What this means is that performing a particular action should not influence the likeli-
hoods of any particular states from realizing. Suppose that one was trying to model the arms
38Most of the things that I described below are inspired by Joe Halpern’s class notes on Decision Theory.
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race between the US and the USSR during the cold war. Suppose that one was thinking from
the US perspective and modeled the situation in the following way.
Table 5.3: The Arms Race
Acts \ States War Peace
Arm Mutual Annihilation Status Quo
Disarm Become Communist State Improved Society
Suppose that the preferences of the US is as follows: Improved Society the Status Quo
 Become Communist State  Mutual Annihilation. Described in this way, it seems ob-
vious how the US should act; it should “Disarm.” For the act “Disarm” dominates the act
“Arm”; that is, the act “Disarm” generates a more preferred consequence regardless of what
particular state of the world instantiates. However, this might not be the correct prescription
because the fact that the US unilaterally disarms might make it much more likelier for the
USSR to initiate a war.
In other words, what is wrong about this “US-USSR Arms Race Model” is that the states
are not described in a way that they are independent of the acts. In our “What Should I
Eat?” model, the likelihood of whether or not the salmon rolls had gone bad does not seem
to depend on whether one chooses to eat the salmon rolls or whether one choose to eat the
turkey sandwich. So, our “What Should I Eat?” model seems to meet the requirement that
the states should be independent of the acts.39
Second, the states should be described in detail enough for the acts to be properly re-
garded as a function. Suppose that the salmon rolls really did get bad. However, suppose
that the strength of the germs and bacteria in the bad salmon rolls are weak enough for some-
39The widely known “Newcombe’s Problem” is primarily concerned about the issue of whether or not states
should be interpreted as independent of acts in that particular setting.
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body who has an extraordinarily strong stomach to be immune from suffering food poison
by taking them. If this is the case, eating the salmon rolls when they are bad will not generate
a single-valued consequence. That is, it might be either a1(w1) = c3(get food poisoned) or
a1(w1) = c1 (feel very satisfied), which would make the act of eating the salmon rolls (i.e.
a1) no longer a function.
There are two basic ways to rectify this. One way is to enrich the state space W in such
a way that the individual acts do turn out to be a function. So, instead of S={The Salmon
Rolls Got Bad(w1), The Salmon Rolls Are Still Fresh(w2)}, we might take
• S*={The Salmon Rolls Got Bad and You Have a Strong Stomach(w1), The Salmon
Rolls Got Bad and You Have a Weak Stomach(w2), The Salmon Rolls Are Still Fresh(w3)}
as our state space.
Another way to rectify the problem is to say that the act, Eat Salmon Roll(a1), generates,
not a single consequence in C, but a probability distribution over c1 and c3, when it takes
the state “The Salmon Rolls Got Bad(w1)” as its argument. In that case, a1(w1) will take the
probability distribution p · c1+(1− p) · c3 as its value (where p denotes the probability that
you have a strong stomach) instead of a single consequence c3. Any of these two ways will
solve the problem.
Third, it is important in our current framework, (which follows that of Savage’s expected
utility theory), that the set of states W is infinite. And how W can be properly seen as a set
that has infinitely many elements needs some explanation.
Remember that a single state must include a complete description of a particular state
of the world. I have been speaking a little sloppily by explaining that w1, w2, and w3 are
individual states that are members of W ; but, technically speaking, w1, w2, and w3 do not
qualify as individual states because they do not include a complete description of a particular
state of the world. In this sense, it might be better to think of w1, w2, and w3 as events, (that
is, a set of states), which each share a common proposition that describes the world.
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Now, it can be easily shown that a single event e (which is a subset of W) can be divided
into arbitrarily many events as one wishes. Consider the event w1 “The Salmon Rolls Got
Bad and You Have a Strong Stomach.” This event can be arbitrarily divided into the event
w1.1 “The Salmon Rolls Got Bad and You Have a Strong Stomach and Your Next Door
Neighbor is Wearing a red Sweater” and the event w1.2 “The Salmon Rolls Got Bad and You
Have a Strong Stomach and Your Next Door Neighbor is Wearing a blue Sweater.” Each of
the event can further be arbitrarily divided into n events (for any number n); for example,
let w1.1.n be the event “The Salmon Rolls Got Bad and You Have a Strong Stomach and
Your Next Door Neighbor is Wearing a red Sweater and there are exactly n grains of sand in
Waikiki Beach.”
So, by arbitrarily dividing individual events in this way, we can, in effect, partition the
set of states W into any number of n-parts40 as we wish. As we will soon see, Savage is
going to require us to divide W into n parts for any number n in order to derive the main
representation theorem. And such process can be legitimately performed only when the set
of states W is infinite.
Now, let’s get back to our original framework. As I have already explained, unlike the
Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework which we used in the last section, within Sav-
age’s framework, each type of Bobi is not provided with objective probability distributions
to choose from. Instead, they simply have preferences towards the available actions open to
them (that is, they have preferences on the set of actions A). Based on this information alone,
we would have to, somehow, derive subjective probability distributions that each type of Bob
(non-consciously) associates with each course of action that would make it possible for us to
interpret their behaviors as maximizing expected utility given their subjective probabilities.
And, this is the project that Savage’s expected utility theory aims to accomplish.
Again, we can see that the framework makes more practical sense; we are hardly ever
40Formally, a partition of a set X is a set of non-empty subsets of X such that: (a) the union of its members
equals X (i.e. the individual partitions are collectively exhaustive), and (b) the intersection of any two members
is empty (i.e. the individual parts are mutually exclusive.)
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provided with objective probability distributions in real life choice situations. The frame-
work is also more ambitious; it tries to accomplish the same thing as Von-Neumann and
Morgenstern’s expected utility theory even when predetermined objective probabilities are
not given.
However, the cost for this is that the theory relies on more axioms - (it requires seven
rather than four of what Savage calls “postulates”) - and the process of deriving the main
representation theorem is extremely complicated. Again, I will not go into the details of
each step of the proof. Those who are really interested should read [Savage, 1972] or the last
chapter of [Fishburn, 1970].41 What is important for us is to understand the overall picture
and the general strategy of the theory rather than the minute details of each step of the proof.
My exposition of Savage’s expected utility theory will follow the general flow of [Fishburn,
1970, Chapter 14].
Before we begin, we would first need to add some more preliminary definitions to be
used in our framework.
[DEFINITION(D-4-1)] (Conditional Preferences): For i= S,G,+ and f , g∈A, e∈E (e⊆
W ), f Bobi ggivene ≡d f f ′ Bobi g′ whenever f = f ′ and g = g′ on e, and
f ′ = g′ on ec
Let me explain what this is saying. The definition is trying to characterize what it means
for a given type of Bob to strictly prefer act f to act g given that event e has occurred (i.e.
conditional on event e.) According to the definition, Bobi strictly prefers act f to act g
conditional on event e if and only if: (i) there are two acts f ′ and g′ that generate the same
consequence outside of event e, (ii) act f ′ generates the same consequence as act f when
event e occurs and act g′ generates the same consequence as act g when event e occurs, and
(iii) Bobi strictly prefers act f ′ to act g′.
41Savage explains the proof in roughly 100 pages. Fishburn condenses it into less than 20 pages. However,
it takes about the same amount of time to read through each.
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[DEFINITION(D-4-2)] (Null Event): For i = S,G,+ and f , g ∈ A, e ∈ E (e⊆W ), e is null
≡d f f ∼Bobi g whenever f = g on ec
The intuition behind this definition is that an event e is null if and only if one does not
care at all about what happens when event e occurs. Suppose that there is a fair coin and
somebody offers you the following two options to choose from: (a) the person pays you $1
if the coin lands heads and you pay the person $1 if the coin lands tails and the person pays
you $1,000,000 if the coin stays in mid-air for a 27 minutes and starts to break into exactly
39 pieces (call this event n), and (b) the person pays you $1 if the coin lands heads and you
pay the person $1 if the coin lands tails and you pay the person $1,000,000 if event n occurs.
Presumably, many people will feel indifferent between the two options (a) and (b). Of
course, the two options are different; with option (a), you would get paid $1,000,000 when
event n happens, and with option (b), you would have to pay $1,000,000 when event n
happens. But, presumably, it is impossible for event n to happen; it is a null event. So, what
happens on event n does not influence your preference between the two options; you simply
do not care!
However, if you happen to be the person who actually does care between option (a) and
option (b) (say, you prefer (a) to (b)), then this just shows that you think that there actually
is a possibility (no matter how slight) for event n to happen. In such case, event n will no
longer be a null event for you. However, if you truly think that a certain event is null (i.e.
it will not happen), then it seems plausible to assume that you would not care about what
(whatever that is) happens on that event. And this is what the definition is saying.
[DEFINITION(D-4-3)] (Constant Acts): For i = S,G,+ and f , g ∈ A, x,y ∈ C, x Bobi y
≡d f f Bobi g when f = x and g = y on W
Remember that in our current framework, each type of Bob is assumed to have preferences
towards the acts that are open to him. However, even if certain types of actions are not
practically available to Bobi at a particular moment, it is still possible for us to ask him
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whether he would prefer one hypothetical act to another hypothetical act if he were to have
a choice. And since A is the set of all actions, any kind of hypothetical act is a member of A
as long as it is a function that maps states into consequences.
The definition is basically stating that there exists such acts that generate the same con-
sequence in all possible states. And, that it is from Bobis preferences from these “con-
stant act” which we derive his preferences towards sure consequences, and vice versa. We
know that, for each type of Bobi, Glorified Life Bobi Moderate Life Bobi Mortified Life
Bobi Death. So, if there are four acts, f , g, h, k such that f : W → {Glorified Life},
g : W → {Moderate Life}, h : W → {Mortified Life}, and f : W → {Death}, we know that
f Bobi gBobi hBobi k for all i.
[DEFINITION(D-4-4)] (Subjective Likelihood): For i = S,G,+ and all f , g ∈ A, e, d ∈ E
(e, d ⊆W ), e∗Bobi d (read as: “Bobi subjectively believes that event e is more
likelier to happen than event d”) ≡d f f Bobi g whenever xBobi y, f = x on e,
f = y on ec , g = x on d, g = y on dc.
The definition explains how we are able to extract one’s subjective beliefs concerning the
likelihoods of events from his or her preferences (which are revealed by his or her choice
behaviors.) The basic thought is something like this.
Suppose that there are two sports teams, X and Y, who will compete against each other
this following weekend. Suppose that you are trying to choose between the following two
actions: (a) “Bet on X”: you win $100 if X wins and lose $100 if X loses, and (b) “Bet on
Y”: you win $100 if Y wins and lose $100 if Y loses. Presumably, you would prefer to win
$100 rather to lose $100. Suppose that think about the two options for a moment and realize
that you strictly prefer act (a) (i.e. “Bet on X”) to act (b) (i.e.“Bet on Y”.)
What does your preference between the two acts tell us about your subjective beliefs
concerning which team has a higher chance of winning? Obviously, given that you want to
win $100 rather than to lose $100, the fact that you strictly prefer to bet on X rather than
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Y suggests that you subjectively believe that X has a higher chance of winning than Y. (Of
course, your beliefs about the likelihoods of X winning might be vastly inaccurate.) This
is the sense in which subjective probabilities are derived from one’s preferences in Savage’s
framework. And, this is basically what definition D-4-4 is saying.
We are done with the preliminary definitions. We now state Savage’s 7 axioms (which
are more commonly known as Savage’s 7 postulates):
For i =+,S,G, and f , f ′,g,g′ ∈ A, and x,x′,y,y′ ∈C, and e,d ⊆W (e,d ∈ E):
[AXIOM(A-4-1)]: Bobi on A is asymmetric and negatively transitive.
Again, Bobi is our old preference-relation; only, this time the relation is defined on the
set of acts, A. As we have seen from D-4-3 (the definition for constant acts), each type of
Bob’s preferences on A induces each type of Bob’s preferences on C. Once again, the other
relations, %Bobi (weak preference) and vBobi(indifference) are defined in a similar way as in
D-2-1 and D-2-2.
[AXIOM(A-4-2)]: Suppose f = f ′ and g = g′ on e ⊆W , f = g and f ′ = g′ on ec ⊆W .
Then, f Bobi g if and only if f ′ Bobi g′.
This reminds us with the “independence axiom” of Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s ex-
pected utility framework that we have seen in the previous section. What it is basically
saying is that given that two act generate exactly the same consequences (whatever they are)
outside a specific event, each type of Bob’s preferences between two acts are determined by
what sort of consequences these two acts generate when the specific event in question does
occur.
[AXIOM(A-4-3)]: Suppose event e ⊆W is not null, f = x on e and g = y on e. Then,
f Bobi g given e if and only if xBobi y.
This axiom, along with axiom A-4-2, extends the independence aspect of each type of Bob′is
preferences towards acts to each type of Bob′is preferences towards consequences.
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Here is a specific example. Suppose that there are two acts: (a) that generates Moderate
Life when event e happens and generates Glorified Life when event e does not happen, and
(b) that generates Mortified Life when event e happens and generates Glorified Life when
event e does not happen. All three types of Bobs strictly prefer a Moderate Life to a Mortified
Life. Therefore, the axiom says that all three types of Bobs strictly prefer act (a) to act (b)
given event e. (By the definition of conditional preferences (i.e. D-4-1), we can actually just
simply say that all three types of Bobs strictly prefer act (a) to act (b).)
Now, suppose that there are two other acts: (a’) that generates Moderate Life when event
e happens and generates Death when event e does not happen, and (b’) that generates Morti-
fied Life when event e happens and generates Death when event e does not happen. Both act
(a’) and (b’) differ with act (a) and act (b) only in respect to what happens outside of event e.
Then, the fact that all three types of Bobs strictly prefer a Moderate Life to a Mortified Life
along with axiom A-4-3 and axiom A-4-2 jointly imply that all three types of Bobs strictly
prefer act (a’) to act (b’) (given event e) just as they strictly prefer act (a) to act (b) (given
event e.)
[AXIOM(A-4-4)]: (xBobi y, f = x on e and f = y on ec, g = x on d and g = y on dc) and
(x′ Bobi y′, f ′ = x′ on e and f ′ = y′ on ec, g′ = x’ on d and g′ = y’ on dc) imply
( f Bobi g⇔ f ′ Bobi g′ )
The notation is slightly complicated. But, the thought behind it is simple. Let’s go back to
the two sports team example. If you bet on team X, then you win $100 if team X wins and
lose $100 if team X loses. If you bet on team Y, then you win $100 if team Y wins and lose
$100 if team Y loses. Obviously, you prefer winning $100 to losing $100. Again, suppose
that you prefer betting on team X rather than betting on team Y.
Now, suppose that somebody offers you the following two alternate bets. Again, you can
bet either on X or Y. However, this time, if you bet on team X, then you win $500 if team X
wins and lose $500 if team X loses, and if you bet on team Y, then you win $500 if team Y
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wins and lose $500 if team Y loses.
What axiom A-4-4 is basically saying is that if you prefer winning $500 to losing $500,
and if you previously preferred to bet on X rather than Y when the stakes were $100, then
your preference between the two bets should not change (that is, you should still prefer to
bet on X rather than to bet on Y) even when the stakes have changed to $500.
The intuition behind this is this. By definition D-4-4, the fact that you preferred to bet on
X rather than on Y indicates that you subjectively believe that it is likelier for team X (rather
than team Y) to win. If this is so, then axiom A-4-4 says that you should prefer any action
that generates a better consequence when team X wins (whatever that happens to be) to any
action that generates a better consequence when team Y wins (whatever that happens to be).
In other words, the axiom is basically saying that your subjective beliefs about the like-
lihoods of events should not be influenced by the particular consequences that are generated
on those events. I think that this is at least a plausible assumption normatively speaking. If
one subjectively thought that team X had a greater chance of beating team Y when the stakes
were $100, but, then changed his/her mind after the stakes when up to $500 and thought that,
now, team Y had a greater chance of beating team X, we would naturally think that he/she is
not thinking consistently about probabilities.
[AXIOM(A-4-5)]: xBobi y for some x,y ∈C
What the axiom is saying is that that each type of Bob is not completely indifferent to all of
the consequences in C. In our current framework, this axiom is already satisfied; since for
all i = S,G,+, Glorified Life Bobi Moderate Life Bobi Mortified Life Bobi Death.
The result of this axiom is that it prevents the whole set of states W from being a null
event, which would make the framework very uninteresting. Furthermore, the axiom pre-
vents the subjective likelihood relation (i.e. ∗Bobi) of each type of Bob from being reflexive.
For if it were the case that x∼Bobi y for every x,y∈C, then this would make the antecedent of
the definition of subjective likelihood (i.e. D-4-4) vacuously true, and thereby, render every
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event e ⊆W subjectively likelier than itself. This is not how we would want are subjective
likelihood relation to behave. We would want our subjective likelihood relation to be both
asymmetric and negatively transitive. And, the axiom prevents our subjective likelihood
relation to behave in any weird ways that contradict our general intuition of probabilities.
Again, the axiom is already satisfied in our current framework.
[AXIOM(A-4-6)]: Suppose f Bobi g and x is any consequence of C. Then, there exists
a finite partition of W such that, if e is any event in the partition, then ( f ′ = x
on e, f ′ = f on ec) implies f ′ Bobi g and (g′ = x on e, g′ = g on ec) implies
f Bobi g′.
This is where our assumption that the set of states W is infinite comes to play. The fact that
W is infinite means that we can arbitrarily partition W into any number of n-partitions. As n
becomes greater and greater, the partition of W will become finer and finer, and, as a result,
one’s subjective beliefs concerning the likelihoods of the realization of any single partition
of W (which is an event) will become smaller and smaller - that is, as n becomes arbitrarily
large, one will start to believe that it is quite unlikely for any single partition (i.e. an event)
to happen.
What the axiom is saying is that given that all three types of Bob strictly prefer (a) living
a Moderate Life for sure to (b) living Mortified Life for sure, there is, for each type of Bob,
a finite partition of W such that, between the two options, (a’) living a Moderate Life except
on one single partion of W where he would face Death and (b) living a Mortified Life for
sure, the given type of Bob would still strictly prefer (a’) to (b). Similarly, the axiom also
claims that there is, for each type of Bob, a finite partition of W such that, between the two
options, (a) living a Moderate Life for sure and (b’) living a Mortified Life except on one
single partion of W where he would live a Glorified Life, the given type of Bob would still
strictly prefer (a) to (b’).
For instance, suppose that (a’) is the option of living a Moderate Life except on the event
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that Angelina Jolie is a full-time professor of philosophy at Cornell University in the year
2013 and blinks her eyes exactly 13 times between 02/02/2013 2:36 PM and 02/02/2013
2:37 PM in which case one faces Death, and that (b) is the option of living a Mortified Life
for sure. I believe that it is reasonable to assume that each type of Bob would strictly prefer
(a’) to (b) if they are given the two options. (If you have any doubts on this, we can always
make the event that one faced death much less likelier than what it is right now.) The same
thing holds for each type of Bob’s preference between (a) and (b’).
We can see that this axiom closely resembles the Archimedean axiom (i.e. A-3-4) that we
have encountered in the Von-Neumann and Morgenstern framework in the previous section.
That is, what it is virtually saying is that no consequence can possibly be so bad (or so good)
such that having the most slightest chance of experiencing such consequence along with a
given option would completely change one’s preference towards such option to another.
These six axioms are actually all that we need for our current purpose. But, in Savage’s
original work, there is one more axiom that he presents:
[AXIOM(A-4-7)]: f Bobi g(w) given e, for all w ∈ e implies f %Bobi g given e. ( f ≺Bobi
g(w) given e, for all w ∈ e implies f -Bobi g given e.)
This axiom is needed for the more general case where one wants to derive an expected utility
representation theorem for probability distributions that assign positive probabilities on more
than finitely many consequences. However, we can see that such cases do not arise in our
current framework where the set of consequences C has only four elements; Death, Mortified
Life, Moderate Life, and Glorified Life. So, it is guaranteed that any probability distribution
on C is able to assign positive probabilities on only a finite number of consequences; which
is, at most, four. So, for us, we can safely ignore axiom A-4-7 in our current setting.
So, we have gone through all of the axioms that we need to derive an expected utility
representation theorem. Again, I will not go through the details of each step of the proof;
it is a very long and complicated process which requires a lot of patience. However, it is
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still worthwhile to understand how one would generally proceed to derive Savage’s expected
utility representation theorem.
Remember that each type of Bob in our current framework is not provided with prede-
termined objective probabilities; we simply infer each type of Bob’s subjective beliefs about
the likelihoods of particular events by observing each type of Bob’s preferences towards
available acts. As we have seen from definition D-4-4, each type of Bob’s subjective beliefs
concerning the likelihoods of particular events is represented by the binary relation ∗Bobi
which is defined in terms of each type of Bobi’s preferences towards acts. e ∗Bobi d would
imply that Bobi subjectively believes that event e is more likelier to happen than event d.
However, in order for us to derive an expected utility representation theorem, we would
need a probability measure (i.e. a probability distribution) that generates a concrete number
(i.e. a quantification) for each event in a way that correctly represents each type of Bobi’s
subjective likelihood relation for those events. That is, instead of just e ∗Bobi d, we would
need something more concrete like pBobi(e) = .73 and pBobi(d) = .16, where pBobi is a prob-
ability distribution on (W, E).
I have already mentioned this in passing in section 7.3.2, but, a probability distribution
pBobi on (W, E) is a function pBobi : E → [0,1] such that: (i) pBobi(W ) = 1 and (ii) for all
e,d ⊆W (i.e. e,d ∈ E), if e∩d = φ , then pBobi(e∪d) = pBobi(e)+ pBobi(d). We can easily
confirm that (i) and (ii) imply: (iii) pBobi(ec) = 1− pBobi(e).
So, what we want is for each type of Bobi’s subjective likelihood relation ∗Bobi defined
on E to be refined enough for there to be a probability distribution pBobi representing it. So,
what are the conditions that each type of Bobi’s subjective likelihood relation ∗Bobineed to
satisfy in order for there to exist a probability distribution pBobi representing it? Basically,
there are five conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient for there to exist a probabil-
ity distribution pBobi representing Bobi’s subjective likelihood relation ∗Bobi on E. And they
are:
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[Conditions for there to exist a probability distribution on (W, E)]
For all c,d,e⊆W (i.e. c,d,e ∈ E)
(A) ∗Bobi is asymmetric and negatively transitive.
(B) φ -∗Bobi e (where -
∗
Bobi≡d f∗Bobi)
(C) W ∗Bobi φ
(D) If d∩ c = e∩ c = φ , then [d ∗Bobi e⇔ (d∪ c)∗Bobi (e∪ c)]42
(E) Suppose d ∗Bobi e. Then, there is a finite partition {h1, ...,hn} of W such that d ∗Bobi
e∪hk for every k = 1, ...,n.
The five conditions from (A) to (E) are jointly necessary and sufficient for there to be a
probability distribution pBobi . The first important step in the proof of deriving the expected
utility representation theorem in Savage’s framework is to show that the seven axioms from
A-4-1 to A-4-7 (actually, just the six axioms from A-4-1 to A-4-6) logically imply the five
conditions (A) to (E) stated above. As it turns out, Savage’s seven axioms (actually, the first
six axioms) do imply these five conditions (From (A) to (E)) that are necessary and sufficient
for there to be a probability distribution pBobi on (W, E). From this, we are able to derive the
following lemma.
[LEMMA(A-4-1)] (Deriving Probabilities from Preferences): Suppose that each type of
Bobi’s preferences on A (i.e. the set of acts) satisfy the seven axioms from A-4-
1 to A-4-7. Then, for each type of Bobi, there exists a probability distribution
pBobi on (W,E) such that:
(a) For all d,e ∈ E, d ∗Bobi e if and only if pBobi(d)> pBobi(e).
(b) For all e ∈ E and 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, there exists a d ⊆ e such that pBobi(d) =
rpBobi(e).
42The four conditions from (A) to (D) are enough to make the binary relation ∗Bobi on E (what is known
as) a “qualitative probability.” We can see that the four conditions from (A) to (D) summarizes our general
intuition of what probability is. However, it has been proved that these four conditions are insufficient for there
to be a “quantitative probability” (i.e. a probability distribution) on E.
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(c) Moreover, for each type of Bobi, the probability distribution pBobi on (W,E)
is unique.
What we have just done is this. We started with each type of Bobi’s preferences on acts, and,
from this, we derived each type of Bobi’s subjective beliefs concerning the likelihoods of
various events. We, then, showed that given that each type of Bobi’s preferences on acts sat-
isfy axiom A-4-1 to A-4-7, each type of Bobis subjective beliefs concerning the likelihoods
of various events are refined enough for there to be a quantified notion of probability repre-
senting them. Moreover, the axioms A-4-1 to A-4-7 guarantee that the probability associated
with each event, which represents each type of Bobi’s subjective belief of the likelihood of
that event, is unique.
One should not confuse this as saying that the same probabilities will be uniformly as-
sociated with any given event for all three types of Bobi. Bob+ might act as if he were
assigning probability .73 to event e; while BobS might act as if he were assigning probabil-
ity .51 to event e; while BobG might act as if he were assigning probability .22 to event e.
That is, the three types of Bobs may be acting as if they were assigning completely different
probabilities for any given event. However, what the lemma is claiming is that, as long as
each type of Bobi’s preference towards acts satisfy axioms A-4-1 to A-4-7, there can be only
one probability associated with any given event for any given type of Bob.
Also, as I have already mentioned previously, lemma L-4-1 is not claiming that each
type of Bob is consciously assigning probabilities for each event when he acts in a particular
way. The probabilities are extrapolated from each type of Bobi’s choice behaviors. What the
lemma is claiming is that given that each type of Bobi’s choice behaviors (which reveal his
preference towards acts) satisfy axiom A-4-1 to A-4-7, it is possible for us to interpret each
type of Bobi’s behaviors as if he were assigning unique probabilities to events in set E.
The next major step in deriving the representation theorem is to associate each act with
a probability distribution on the set of consequences (i.e. C.) Since we have already derived
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each type of Bobi’s subjective probabilities for events in the previous step, this process can
be performed relatively easily. The strategy is to define the probability distribution on C
associated with act f ∈ A (i.e. pBobif ) as follows:
[DEFINITION(D-4-5)] (Probability Distribution Associated with Acts): For all x ∈C, f ∈
A, pBobif (x)≡d f pBobi({w : f (w) = x})
In other words, Bobi’s subjective probability of experiencing consequence x when he per-
forms act f is identified with his subjective probability for the event where consequence x
is realized when he performs act f to occur. Let’s, once again, go back to the sports team
betting example. Team X is going to complete against team Y, and suppose that there are no
draws. Suppose that you prefer to bet $100 on team X rather than to bet on team Y. Given
that your preference towards actions (in this case, your preference towards various bets on
sports teams) satisfy axioms A-4-1 to A-4-7, there is a unique probability associated with
each event that represents your subjective beliefs concerning the likelihoods of those events.
Suppose that probability p is represents your subjective beliefs concerning the likeli-
hood of the event of team X winning. Then, according to definition D-4-5, the act “Bet
$100 on team X” can be identified with the lottery (i.e. probability distribution), [p·(Win
$100)+(1− p)·(Lose $100)]; similarly, the act “Bet $100 on team Y” can be identified with
the lottery (i.e. probability distribution), [(1− p)·(Win $100)+p·(Lose $100)]. So, when you
preferred to bet $100 on team X rather than on team Y, we can say that you were, in effect,
preferring to play the lottery [p·(Win $100)+(1− p)·(Lose $100)] to the lottery [(1− p)·(Win
$100)+p·(Lose $100)].
What this means is that, with definition D-4-5, we can translate each type of Bobi’s pref-
erences towards actions in A into each type of Bobi’s preferences towards various lotteries
(i.e. probability distributions) defined on C; that is, we can think of the set of all acts (i.e.
A) as virtually the same thing as the set of all probability distributions on C, which in the
previous Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework was denoted by P. So, after deriv-
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ing subjective probabilities from each type of Bobi’s preferences towards actions, we have
in effect arrived back to our previous Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework. What
is left for us to show is that the seven axioms from A-4-1 to A-4-7 jointly imply the four
Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms (i.e. A-3-1 to A-3-4) that we have seen in section
7.3.2.
The next step is to show that, given that Bobi’s preferences towards acts meet the seven
axioms from A-4-1 to A-4-7, each type of Bobi will be indifferent towards any two acts that
are associated with the same probability distribution defined on C. I will simply state the
lemma without proving it.
[LEMMA(A-4-2)] (Indifferent Acts): Suppose that each type of Bobi’s preferences on A
(i.e. the set of acts) satisfy the seven axioms from A-4-1 to A-4-7 and that
pBobif (x) = p
Bobi
g (x) for all x ∈C where f .g ∈ A. Then, f ∼Bobi g.
What this lemma is saying is that, in the end, what each type of Bobi cares about are only the
particular consequences and their final probabilities of occurring; not the particular states
that the consequences are realized or the specific ways the consequences are randomized.
Suppose that, besides betting $100 on either team X or team Y, you are given a third option
which is: your friend tosses a fair coin and if the coin lands heads you win $100 with prob-
ability r and lose $100 with probability 1− r, and if the coin lands tails you win $100 with
probability 2p− r and lose $100 with probability 1− (2p− r) (where 1+ r > 2p > r > 0.)
If we calculate the probabilities of the third option, we can see that by choosing this
third option, you will win $100 with probability p and you will pay $100 with probability
(1− p). That is, the third option can basically be identified with the probability distribution
[(1− p)·(Win $100)+p·(Lose $100)] which is the same probability distribution associated
with the act “Bet $100 on team X.” What the lemma is claiming is that, in such cases, you
would be indifferent between the act “Bet $100 on team X” and choosing the third option.
Here, the consequence of winning $100 and losing $100 are realized in different possible
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states for the two acts in question; with the act “Bet $100 on team X” the consequence of
winning $100 is realized when the event of team X winning occurs, and with the third option,
the same consequence is realized when the fair coin that your friend tosses lands either
heads or tails and the events (whatever they happen to be) with the relevant probabilities
described above occur. However, the lemma claims that, as long as the consequences as well
as their respective final probabilities of occurring are the same, the specific ways that these
consequences are realized does not matter.
We can see that this lemma, although described differently, performs the same function
as the axiom of “Reduction of Compound Lotteries” (i.e. A-3-2) we encountered in Von-
Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework in section 7.3.2. The next step is to show that the
other three Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms (i.e. A-3-1, A-3-3, and A-3-4) are
implied by Savages seven axioms (i.e. from A-4-1 to A-4-7) as well.
Axiom A-4-1 is basically the same axiom as A-3-1; that each type of Bob′is preference-
relation is both asymmetric and negatively transitive. Furthermore, we have seen that ax-
ioms A-4-2 and A-4-3 resemble Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s “Independence Axiom”
(i.e. A-3-3) Lastly, we have seen that axiom A-4-6 closely resembles Von-Neumann and
Morgenstern’s “Archimedian Axiom” (i.e. A-3-4.) So, it should not be a surprise that all of
Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms are logically implied by Savage’s seven axioms.
Again, I will just simply state the lemma without proving it.
[LEMMA(A-4-3)] (Savage’s Axioms imply VnM Axioms): Suppose that each type of Bobi’s
preferences on A (i.e. the set of acts) satisfy the seven axioms from A-4-1 to A-
4-7. Then, for each type of Bobi, each act f ∈ A can be identified with the
probability distribution pBobif as in D-4-5, and each type of Bobi’s preferences
on pBobif for all f ∈A satisfy Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s four axioms from
A-3-1 to A-3-4.
We are now ready to state (finally!) Savage’s representation along with its uniqueness theo-
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rem.
[THEOREM(T-4-1)] (Savage’s Expected Utility Representation): The binary relationBobi
on A satisfies axioms A-4-1 to A-4-7 if and only if there exist a function uBobi :
C→ R such that: For all f ,g ∈ A, f Bobi g if and only if pBobif Bobi pBobig if
and only if ∑x∈C p
Bobi
f (x)uBobi(x)>∑x∈C p
Bobi
g (x)uBobi(x). Furthermore, uBobi is
unique up to positive affine transformation.
The proof can be performed by following the same general strategy that I have introduced
in section 7.3.2. I have already mentioned this before, but I believe that the meaning of
this will be more apparent now. The main gist of Savage’s expected utility theory, which
is summarized in theorem T-4-1, is this: Suppose that one did not even have the slightest
conception of what probabilities or utilities are. One simply thinks that certain actions are
more preferable than others. However, according to Savage, given that one’s preference
towards actions meet the seven axioms from A-4-1 to A-4-7, it is possible for outsiders
to interpret one’s behaviors as if one were assigning (subjective) probabilities on events,
utilities on consequences, and were aiming to maximize expected utility.
The significance of this is that given that we assume that each type of Bob is minimally
rational and acts consistently (which, in this context, means to act according to Savage’s
seven axioms), we can reliably predict how each type of Bob would react to a given situation,
once we have extrapolated each type of Bob’s subjective probabilities on events as well as his
utilities on consequences from observing his previous choices on actions. This will become
crucial when we try to model Hobbes’s state of nature in the next chapter.
Once again, each type of Bob′is utilities for the individual consequences in C can be
calibrated in the same way as we did in section 7.3.2. Again, the respective utilities for the
consequences in C for each type of Bob can be summarized as follows:
• uBob+(Glorified Life)= uBobS(Glorified Life) = uBobG(Glorified Life)= 1
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• uBob+(Moderate Life)= uBobS(Moderate Life)= p
+ = pS > 23 > p
G= uBobG(Moderate
Life)
• uBob+(Mortified Life)= uBobS(Mortified Life)= q
+ = qS > 13 > q
G= uBobG(Mortified
Life)
• uBob+(Death)= uBobS(Death) = uBobG(Death)= 0
Remember that each type of Bob′is utility functions, stated here, are expected utility functions,
where the utility of any probability distribution (i.e. lottery) is equal to the expected utility
of the sure consequences involved in that probability distribution (i.e. lottery.) The utilities,
here, represent what each type of Bobi as a matter fact prefers. But, we can derive what the
two actualized-Bobs (i.e.BobS and BobG) should prefer, normatively speaking, based on the
things that we have established in chapter 6. This is stated in the following theorem which
will be the main theorem for our current section.
[THEOREM (T5)] (Subjective Expected Utility Representation of Hobbes’s Theory of Real Good):
For all acts f , g ∈ A, performing act f is really better (or substantially better)
than performing act g for Bobi (i = S,G) if and only if f bob+ g if and only if
pBob+f Bob+ pBob+g if and only if∑x∈C pBob+f (x)uBob+(x)>∑x∈C pBob+g (x)uBob+(x).
That is, performing act f is really better (or substantially better) than performing
act g for Bobi (i = S,G) if and only if the expected utility of act f for Bob+is
greater than the expected utility of act g for Bob+.
Proof. Again, the proof can be performed in a very similar way as in the proof of T4, which
we saw in section 7.3.2. That is, theorem T5 follows from T2 (which states that what is really
good for a given individual is the satisfaction of the preferences formed by the individual’s
idealized-self on behalf of the individual’s actual-self), T-4-1 (which states that as long as
each type of Bobi satisfies axioms A-4-1 to A-4-7, there exists an expected utility function
uBobi such that Bobi strictly prefers to perform act x to act y if and only if the expected utility
of act x is greater than the expected utility of act y), our seven Savage’s axioms from A-4-1
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to A-4-7, and by our assumption that Bob+ is the idealized-self of Bobi (i = S,G). (Again, I
will omit the details.) 
The facts about the substantial rationality of each type of Bob’s preferences could be
summarized in the usual way as follows:
[PROPOSITION (P5)]: It is substantially rational for Bobi(i = S,G) to strictly prefer to
perform act f rather than to perform act g if and only if pBob+f Bob+ pBob+g if
and only if ∑x∈C p
Bob+
f (x)uBob+(x)> ∑x∈C p
Bob+
g (x)uBob+(x).
In the previous Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework, each type of Bob was pro-
vided with objective probability distributions to express his preference for; the probabilities
in each lottery for which each type of Bob expressed his preference were both objective and
predetermined. This means that, in the previous Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s frame-
work, none of the three types of Bob’s preferences were based on inaccurate estimations of
probability.
If we, for the current moment, assume that having accurate estimations of probability
suffice for somebody’s preference to be based on sufficient information about the world, we
can say that, in the previous Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework, all three types
of Bobs’ preferences were at least well-considered. So, if any type of Bob’s preferences
were substantially irrational in the Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework, it would
have been mainly because his preferences were unbalanced; that is, the irrationality of the
preference would have to have been due to the given type of Bob’s being influenced by the
wrong kind of basic passion when he formed such preference.
We have seen that this was the case for BobG. And, as we have seen, the substantial
irrationality of BobG’s preference, which was due to its being unbalanced, was reflected in
BobG’s utilities for the individual consequences (more specifically, his utilities for Moderate
Life and Mortified Life) in C; his utilities for Moderate Life (i.e. pG < 23 ) and Mortified
Life (i.e. qG < 13 ) were much lower than that of Bob+’s or BobS’s (i.e. p
+ = pS > 23 and
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q+ = qS > 13 ), which, in practical terms, suggests that BobG would gladly prefer to take risky
gambles that Bob+ and BobS would surely avoid. And, this is exactly what one would expect
a person who is infatuated by a passion for glory to be like.
The problem with the previous Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework is that there
is no way to explain how the preferences of BobS, who is another version of Bob’s actual-
self, could ever be irrational in the substantial Hobbesian sense. For if the preferences of
BobS were substantially irrational, it could not have been due to BobS’s being influenced
by the wrong kind of basic passion - BobS is already assumed to be influenced by the right
kind of basic passion, which is the basic passion for self-preservation. So, if the preferences
of BobS were substantially irrational, it is because BobS was insufficiently informed, espe-
cially, about the likelihoods of various consequences that would be generated by performing
a given course of action. In short, if the preferences of BobS were substantially irrational,
they are substantially irrational because they were unconsidered, and not because they were
unbalanced.
Unlike the previous Von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s framework, our current Savage’s
framework leaves room for BobS’s preferences to be substantially irrational in this way. For
instance, suppose that, in the state of nature, Bob made an agreement with Fred to come and
help each other when the other party is being attacked by another third party. Suppose that
Fred gets attacked by somebody and calls Bob for help. What should Bob do?
The two available actions that come to Bob’s mind are: (1) Help Fred (act h), and (2) Ig-
nore Fred’s Request (act i). Based on Hobbes’s assumption of rough equality among men43,
it is very likely that Bob and Fred would be able to successfully defeat the attacker by their
joint endeavor if they managed to cooperate.
Suppose that, once offered help, Fred will be very likely to provide help in return when
Bob is in trouble in the future, but will not provide any help for Bob in the future if his
43“Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that ... For as to the strength of body,
the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest...” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Paragraph 1]
186
request is ignored by Bob this time. Suppose that in the state of nature, one will, sooner or
later, encounter an attacker that one will not be able to defeat alone.
Considering all of these facts, suppose that, Bob’s idealized-self, Bob+ associates the
probability distribution [.99·Moderate Life + .01·Death] (i.e. pBob+h (Moderate Life)=.99,
pBob+h (Death)=.01) with act h, and associates the probability distribution [.5·Moderate Life +
.5·Death] (i.e. pBob+i (Moderate Life)=.5, pBob+i (Death)=.5) with act i. Obviously, hBob+ i,
since .99·uBob+(Moderate Life) + .01·uBob+(Death) = .99 · p+ > .5 · p+= .5·uBob+(Moderate
Life) + .05·uBob+(Death).
However, suppose the actual-Bob, BobS, decides to ignore Fred’s request with the fear
of getting involved in an unwanted fight along with some wishful thinking that he would
somehow manage to avoid facing such attacker himself in the future; so, h≺BobS i. According
to P5, this implies that BobS’s preference is substantially irrational. However, obviously, the
substantial irrationality of BobS’s preference was not due to his being influenced by the
wrong kind of basic passion; as a matter of fact, the primary reason why BobS preferred to
perform act i rather than to perform act h is because he thought that act i was the better way
to secure his self-preservation. So, the main reason why BobS’s preference was substantially
irrational is because his preference was based on inaccurate estimations of the likelihood of
relevant events. Specifically, BobS was overestimating the likely danger (i.e. facing Death)
of helping Fred out, and was underestimating the likelihood of him facing a random attacker
in the future.
Our current model captures the intuition behind this explanation very nicely. Remember
that, for both Bob+ and BobS, the utilities of each of the sure consequences in C were exactly
the same; this reflects the fact that both types of Bobs are primarily influenced by the basic
passion for self-preservation, which, according to Hobbes, is the right kind of basic passion
for people to be under the influence of. This means that in order for both h Bob+ i and
h ≺BobS i to be the case, it must be the case that pBobSh (Moderate Life) < pBobSi (Moderate
Life), which implies that pBobSh 6= pBob+h and pBobSi 6= pBob+i since pBob+h (Moderate Life) = .99
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> pBob+i (Moderate Life) = .01.
What all of this is saying is that, unlike what his own idealized-self, Bob+ believed, the
actual BobS believed that he actually had a better chance to achieve Moderate Life by ignor-
ing Fred’s help request. Such belief was false; and the resulting preference, was, thereby,
unconsidered, and, therefore, substantially irrational.
In short, within to our current reconstruction, whereas unbalancedness, which is one
form of substantial irrationality, is reflected in the discrepancies between the utilities of the
sure-consequences of one’s idealized-self and actual-self, unconsideredness, which is an-
other form of substantial irrationality, is reflected in the discrepancies between the probabil-
ity distribution that one’s idealized-self and actual-self associates with each course of action.
All of this discussion suggests that, with our framework, we can provide a formal definition
of what it means for one’s preferences to be fully-considered and fully-balanced:
[DEFINITION(D-4-6)] (Fully-Consideredness): For all f ,g ∈ A, Bobi (i=+,S,G)’s pref-
erence between act f and act g is fully-considered if and only if pBob+f = p
Bobi
f
and pBob+g = p
Bobi
g .
[DEFINITION(D-4-7)] (Fully-Balancedness): For all x ∈ C, Bobi (i = +,S,G)’s prefer-
ences are fully-balanced if and only if uBob+(x) = uBobi(x).
As I have already explained in chapter 1 (see section 1.3 “Rational Preferences”), one’s
preference need not be fully-considered or fully-balanced in order for it to be substantially
rational in the Hobbesian sense. According to P5, any actual-Bob’s preference between
any two acts is substantially rational if and only if it coincides with the idealized-Bob’s
preference between the two acts. This means that even if pBob+f 6= pBobif and pBob+g 6= pBobig
(which, by definition, would imply that the actual-Bob’s preferences are short of being fully-
considered), and even if uBob+(x) 6= uBobi(x) for some consequence x (which, by definition,
would imply that the actual-Bob’s preferences are short of fully-balanced), the actual-Bob’s
preference between act f and act g may still be substantially rational as long as the subjective
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probabilities as well as the utilities for individual consequences of the actual-Bob are close
enough to that of the idealized-Bob’s so that the actual-Bob would still manage to prefer
to perform the act that the idealized-Bob advises him to perform. When the actual-Bob’s
subjective probabilities and utilities are close enough in this way, the resulting preferences,
albeit being non-fully-considered and non-fully-balanced, would still be considered as well-
considered and well-balanced, and, would, thereby, qualify as being substantially rational.
Note that this means that it is possible for the actual-Bob’s preferences to be substantially
rational for some pair-wise comparisons between acts while, at the same time, be substan-
tially irrational for other pair-wise comparisons between acts. For example, suppose that
f Bob+ gBob+ h and f BobS hBobS g. Then, BobS’s preference between act f and act g
as well as his preference between act f and act h would be substantially rational, while his
preference between act g and act h would be substantially irrational.
5.4 An Additive Utility Representation of Hobbes’s Theory
of Real Good
We are almost there. One final touch that must be made to our reconstruction is to take
account of the aspects of time. It should be noted that considerations of time is a very
important factor within Hobbes’s theory of real good. For instance, as we have seen in
chapter 1 (section 1.4. “Irrational Preferences”), according to Hobbes, the major flaw in the
practical reasoning of the fool is that he/she did not properly take into account the long-term
effects of his/her behaviors when he/she decided to cheat; that is, he/she underestimated the
probability of his/her cheating behaviors being detected and did not properly consider what
would happen at a later time if others discovered that he/she cheated.
The importance of taking long-term effects that one’s action would bring into consid-
eration in determining the overall goodness of a given course of action is evident in the
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passage where Hobbes expresses his inchoate idea of aggregating the goodness of various
consequences that are spread throughout different time periods.
And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of
the good and evil consequences and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate,
the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of
consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for
so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the
evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or seeming good. And
contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent or seeming
evil [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 57 emphasis added]
The idea that Hobbes is expressing here is something like this. Suppose that there are
two acts (a1, a2), two type of consequences (good, evil), and a total of five time periods
(t1, t2, t3, t4, t5). Now, suppose that the chain of consequences associated with the two acts
can be summarized as follows.
Table 5.4: The Goodness of Chains of Consequences
acts \ time periods t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
a1 good evil good good evil
a2 evil good good evil evil
Remember that we have interpreted “apparent (or seeming) good” as the option (in this
case, the chain of consequences that is associated with each act) that one just happens to
prefer. As we already know, one’s preferences are represented by one’s utility function. This
means that what Hobbes is saying above is that the utility of a given course of action can be
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identified with the sum of the utilities of the individual consequences in the whole chain of
consequences this is associated with that action.
So, what Hobbes is saying above is: a1  a2 (act a1 is apparently better than (i.e.
strictly preferred to) act a2) if and only if U(a1) > U(a2) if and only if u1(good)+u2(evil)
+u3(good)+u4(good)+u5(evil) > u1(evil)+u2(good) +u3(good)+u4(evil)+u5(evil). Suppose
that ui(good)=1 and ui(evil)=−1 for i= 1,2,3,4,5. Then, U(a1) = u1(good)+u2(evil)+u3(good)
+u4(good)+u5(evil)= 1−1+1+1−1= 1 > U(a) = u1(evil)+u2(good) +u3(good)+u4(evil)
+u5(evil) =−1+1+1−1−1 =−1. Therefore, a1  a2.
Adding the utilities of the individual consequences to determine the utility of the whole
chain of consequences seems to be intuitively innocuous; at first glance, there seems to be
no big deal about it. However, we should never take it for granted that people’s preferences
concerning consequences that have multiple components can have an additive utility repre-
sentation that we have just encountered. This is because there are specific conditions that the
individual components of a given consequence must satisfy in order for there to be an addi-
tively separable utility representation for those consequences. The most important condition
is: independence (among the individual components.)
We have already encountered the independence condition in both the VnM and Savage’s
framework (i.e. Axioms A-3-3, A-4-2, A-4-3) in the previous section. The basic idea was
that one’s preferences concerning the consequences that are realized on a particular state (or
event) should not be influenced by what kind of consequence is realized on another state (or
event.) Or to put it in another way, there should be no interaction or interdependencies among
the consequences realized in different states (or events) that would, in any way, influence how
one feels about a given consequence realized in a particular state (or event.)
We can actually see that an expected utility representation is a certain form of an addi-
tively separable utility representation. Consider UBobi(p1x1, ..., pnxn) = p1uBobi(x1)+ ...+
pnuBobi(xn). Here, the utility of a given probability distribution is expressed by the sum of
the utilities of the individual consequences weighted by their respective probabilities. And
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the major reason why such additively separable utility representation was possible in the first
place was because we had assumed that each type of Bobi satisfied the independence axiom.
It would be easier to understand the necessity of independence for there to be an addi-
tively separable utility representation by looking at a specific example where independence
among the individual components that comprise a given option fail.
Suppose that Jennifer is at a restaurant that serves a “complete meal” that consists of an
appetizer and two main dishes. What will be served is already fixed but Jennifer is allowed
to choose the type of meat that she would like to include in each of the dishes. Her choices
of meat are from the set M={Shrimp, Beef, Pork, Chicken, Vegan}. Suppose that Jennifer is
not a vegetarian, and her preferences towards the various meat (and non-meat) are: Shrimp
 Beef Pork Chicken Vegan. Suppose that a vector (x1,x2,x3) ∈M×M×M denotes
the choice of three types of meat that is included in the three respective dishes.
We have assumed that Jennifer most prefers Shrimp among the various meat (and non-
meat) included in M. However, suppose that Jennifer, just like many people, also likes va-
riety. Therefore, even though Jennifer likes Shrimp the most she might actually prefer the
meal (Chicken, Shrimp, Beef) to (Shrimp, Shrimp, Shrimp).
Suppose that this is so. Then, it is very easy to see that there cannot be an additively sep-
arable utility representation of Jennifer’s preferences towards the various meal combination.
To see this, let u(Shrimp) = s, u(Bee f ) = b, u(Pork) = p, u(Chicken) = c, and u(Vegan) = v
where s > b > p > c > v for s,b, p,c,v ∈ R.Then, we can see that function u accurately
represents Jennifer’s preferences towards various types of meat in the sense that x y if and
only if u(x)> u(y).
Now, suppose that Jennifer’s preferences towards various composite meals had an addi-
tively separable representation. Then, u(Shrimp,Shrimp,Shrimp)= u(Shrimp)+u(Shrimp)+
u(Shrimp) = s+ s+ s = 3s, which, for every value of s that satisfies the inequality s > b >
p > c > v, is greater than u(Chicken,Shrimp,Bee f ) = u(Chicken)+u(Shrimp)+u(Bee f ) =
c+ s+b. This suggests that Jennifer prefers the meal (Shrimp, Shrimp, Shrimp) to the meal
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(Chicken, Shrimp, Beef). However, we have already assumed that she prefers (Chicken,
Shrimp, Beef) to (Shrimp, Shrimp, Shrimp) because she likes variety. So, here, we can see
that there cannot be an additively separable utility function that correctly represents Jen-
nifer’s preferences over composite meals.
I hope that nobody, at this point, is tempted to say that although Jennifer does prefer
(Chicken, Shrimp, Beef) to (Shrimp, Shrimp, Shrimp), she should prefer (Shrimp, Shrimp,
Shrimp) to (Chicken, Shrimp, Beef) since the additive utility of (Shrimp, Shrimp, Shrimp) is
greater than that of (Chicken, Shrimp, Beef). Again, such remark is based on reading aspects
of utilitarianism into the notion of utilities and utility functions, which I have already warned
the reader to be very cautious about.
A utility function is simply a thermometer of a person’s preference. So, it is the person’s
preferences that a utility function must adapt to, not the other way around. Saying that Jen-
nifer should prefer (Shrimp, Shrimp, Shrimp) to (Chicken, Shrimp, Beef) since the additive
utility of (Shrimp, Shrimp, Shrimp) is greater than that of of (Chicken, Shrimp, Beef) implies
that there is a normative reason for her to disregard variety in her meal. I doubt that there is
any such normative reason.
So, there is no additively separable utility representation of Jennifer’s preferences con-
cerning composite meals. And this is mainly because her preference for what kind of meat
she would like to have on one of the dishes is dependent upon what kind of meat she is going
to get on the other two dishes of the whole meal. In short, Jennifer’s preferences towards the
consequences that are realized in one component of the vector (x1,x2,x3) ∈ M×M×M is
not independent of the consequences that are realized in other components of the vector.
So, if we are aiming to find an additive utility representation of Hobbes’s theory of real
good for multiple periods of time as implied in the passage that we have seen in the beginning
of this section, we would first have to verify that each type of Bobi’s preferences towards the
consequences that are realized in each time period is independent of the consequences that
are realized in other time periods.
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There are many ways to define and test independence and show that it leads to an addi-
tively separable utility representation. In this section, I will introduce the method developed
in [Fishburn, 1965] and apply it to our current framework.
We start by describing the main components of our framework. Now, the set of conse-
quences is the product set, C1×...×Cn where Ci = {Deathi, Morti f ied Li f ei, ModerateLi f ei,
Glori f ied Li f ei}. The subscript i designates the specific time period. An element c in the set
of consequences is a vector (x1, ...,xn) that denotes a given chain-of -consequences where
the consequence xi is realized in the i-th period of time. For example, the vector (Moderate
Life1, Glorified Life2, Mortified Life3, ..., Deathn) denotes a chain of consequences where
one experiences Moderate Life at time period 1, Glorified Life at time period 2, Mortified
Life at time period 3, ..., and Death at time period n.
So, now, what each type of Bobi is considering is, not just simply individual conse-
quences, but rather, chains of consequences in the set C1× ...×Cn. Since each set Ci consists
in four elements, the product set C1× ...×Cn would normally consist in a total of 4n ele-
ments.
Of course, among the chains of consequences in C1× ...×Cn, there will be some chains
of consequences that are practically impossible; such as (Moderate Life1, Death2, Death3,
Glorified Life4, ...). (Moderate Life1, Death2, Death3, Glorified Life4, ...) is the chain of
consequence where Bobi experiences Moderate Life in the first period, gets killed in the
second period, stays dead in the third period, and suddenly revives and experiences Glorified
Life in the fourth period, and so on.
Needless to say, any rationally-minded person would not assign any positive probability
to such chain of consequences when he/she tries to figure out what kind of consequences
would unfold by performing a given course of action. More generally, any chains of conse-
quences where a non-Death consequence appears in any time period after the first occurrence
of Death would be practically impossible. Nevertheless, I believe that it is still not entirely
meaningless to think about how each type of Bobi would feel about such impractical chains
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of consequences if such chains of consequences were actually realized. Therefore, it still
makes sense to consider the whole product set C1× ...×Cn as our set of (chains of ) conse-
quences. Every chain of consequences in C1× ...×Cn would be assigned utilities; but, not
all of the chains of consequences will be assigned positive probabilities when each available
act gets associated with a given probability distribution.
Everything else is left as it were in the previous VnM and Savage framework; that is,
each type of Bobi has preferences over acts, from each type of Bobi’s preferences over acts
we derive a unique probability distribution on the set of events (i.e. the set of all subsets of
the set of states), each act is associated with a probability distribution on the set of (chains
of) consequences, and the utility of any act equals the expected utility of the probability
distribution that is associated with the given act in question. But, now, each consequence
in a given lottery (i.e. probability distribution) is, not a single consequence, but a chain of
consequence of the form (x1, ...,xn), and we would like to make the utility of this chain of
consequence, uBobi(x1, ...,xn), expressed in the additively separable form, uBobi(x1)+ ...+
uBobi(xn), just as Hobbes himself describes in the passage that we have seen in the beginning
of this section.
As I have explained, doing this requires each type of Bobi’s preferences concerning the
consequences that are realized in any single time period to be independent of the conse-
quences realized in other time periods. In what follows, I will introduce Fishburn’s defini-
tion of independence, argue that each type of Bobi’s preferences concerning various chains
of consequences meet such definition of independence, and show that meeting such defi-
nition of independence leads to an additively separable utility representation of chains of
consequences consisting of multiple components.
Let P be the set of all lotteries (i.e. probability distributions) on C1× ...×Cn. Consider a
pair of lotteries (l1, l2) l1, l2 ∈ P where:
l1 = (p1c1, p2c2, ..., p jc j), ∑ pa = 1, ca ∈C1× ...×Cn, for all a = 1, ..., j
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l2 = (q1d1, q2d2, ..., qkdk), ∑qb = 1, db ∈C1× ...×Cn , for all b = 1, ...,k
We now define the set G as follows:
• G ={(l1, l2) | l1 6= l2 and both l1 and l2 have the same total probability for any xi ∈Ci
(i = 1,2, ...,n) that appears in either}
It would be much easier to understand what sort of things belong in set G by looking at a
concrete example. Consider the following two lotteries, when the total number of time peri-
ods is 3 (n = 3):
l1 = [23 (Moderate Life1, Moderate Life2, Moderate Life3),
1
3 (Glorified Life1, Glorified
Life2, Glorified Life3) ]
l2 = [13 (Glorified Life1, Moderate Life2, Moderate Life3),
1
3 (Moderate Life1, Glorified
Life2, Moderate Life3), 13 (Moderate Life1, Moderate Life2, Glorified Life3)]
The two lotteries l1 and l2 are different; l1 gives the chains of consequences (Moder-
ate Life1, Moderate Life2, Moderate Life3) and (Glorified Life1, Glorified Life2, Glorified
Life3) each with probability 2/3 and 1/3, while l2 gives the chains of consequences (Glorified
Life1, Moderate Life2, Moderate Life3), (Moderate Life1, Glorified Life2, Moderate Life3),
(Moderate Life1, Moderate Life2, Glorified3) each with probability 1/3.
However, we can see that both lotteries give the same total probability for any time-
specific consequence that appears in the lottery. For instance, in both lotteries, the total prob-
ability of each of the time-specific consequences Glorified Life1, Glorified Life2, Glorified
Life3 is 1/3, while the total probability of each of the time-specific consequences Moderate
Life1, Moderate Life2, Moderate Life3 is 2/3.
This means that the pair of lotteries (l1, l2) meets the criteria for set G’s membership, and
is, therefore, a member of G. Given this, we now define our working notion of independence
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of preferences among time-periods.
[DEFINITION (D-5-1)] (Independence Among Time-Periods): Given C1×...×Cn each type
of Bobi(i = +,S,G)’s preferences on the consequences that are realized in any
given time period k = 1, ...,n (i.e. Bobi’s preferences on elements of Ck) are
independent of the consequences that are realized in any other time period j (
j 6= k and j = 1, ...,n) if and only if l1 ∼Bobi l2 for all (l1, l2) ∈ G.
In other words, the definition claims that if Bobi feels that any two lotteries that give the same
total probabilities for any time-specific consequence are equally preferable, then his prefer-
ence towards the consequences that are realized in one specific time period is independent of
the consequences (whatever they happen to be) realized in other time periods.
The intuition behind the definition is this. If you really are indifferent between any two
lotteries that are different, but, which, nonetheless, give the same total probability for each
time-specific consequence that occurs in them, this means that you do not care about the
specific way that each time-specific consequence is combined with other consequences that
occur in different time periods in a given chain of consequences. If this is the case, the,
this means that your preference towards a given time-specific consequence is independent of
consequences that occur in other time periods.
The next step in our current reconstruction is to see whether assuming that each type of
Bobi’s preferences towards each time-specific consequence is independent is consistent with
Hobbes’s own text. As we have already seen, Hobbes clearly has proposed an additive theory
of preference and the good. And, such additive theory of preference and the good requires
one’s preferences towards the individual components that constitute a composite object to
be independent of the other individual components in the composite object. So, whether
Hobbes himself was actually aware of it or not, his theory of preference and the good are
already committed to the notion of independence that we have just dealt. In other words,
Hobbes’s theory of preference and the good imply independence.
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However, it might be better for our purpose to give some positive textual evidence that
actually suggests that Hobbes had claimed something very similar to the notion of indepen-
dence that we are dealing with. For this purpose, let’s go back to the passage that I have
quoted in the beginning of this section.
And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of
the good and evil consequences and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate,
the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of
consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for
so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the
evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or seeming good. And
contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent or seeming
evil [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter VI, Paragraph 57 emphasis added]
According to Hobbes, one perceives that a given chain of consequences is apparently good
(i.e. something that one, as a matter of fact, prefers) when one perceives that the amount
of good individual consequences that are included in the chain of consequences is greater
than the amount of bad individual consequences included in the chain of consequences.
Here, Hobbes’s own wording suggests that he thought that the goodness (or the badness)
of a given time-specific individual consequence is determined separately from what sort of
consequences are located in other time periods.
Furthermore, Hobbes claims, here, that the good or evil effect depends on the forsight of
a long chain of consequences. Based on our current framework, I believe that the term “for-
sight”, here, can be translated into meaning one’s subjective probabilities. Combining this
with what we have established in the previous paragraph suggests that, according to Hobbes,
the overall preferability (i.e. apparent goodness) of a given chain of consequences is deter-
mined by the total sum of the apparent goodnesses included in the individual parts, which,
in turn, is determined by one’s subjective probabilities for those individual consequences.
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This implies that if the total (subjective) probabilities for each and every individual con-
sequences located in two different chains of consequences are exactly the same, the apparent
goodness of the two different chains of consequences would also be exactly the same as well.
If one remember that apparent goodness is interpreted as what one happens to prefer, we can
easily see that this means that the agent will be indifferent between the two chains of conse-
quences in question. And, this is exactly what definition D-5-1 is claiming. So, regardless of
whether or not independence (as defined in D-5-1) is a plausible normative assumption, we
can, at least, say that Hobbes was committed to it.
The only thing left for us to show is that such notion of independence leads to an ad-
ditively separable utility representation for different chains of consequences in our current
framework. First of all, definition D-5-1 implies the following lemma:
[LEMMA (L-5-1)] (Even Chance Notion of Independence): Given C1× ...×Cn each type
of Bobi(i = +,S,G)’s preferences on the consequences that are realized in any
given time period t = 1, ...,n (i.e. Bobi’s preferences on elements of Ct) are
independent of the consequences that are realized in any other time period j
( j 6= t and j = 1, ...,n) if and only if (12c1, 12c2) ∼Bobi (12c3, 12c4) whenever
c1,c2,c3,c4 ∈C1× ...×Cn and any xt ∈Ct (t = 1, ...,n ) that appears once (twice)
in (12c
1, 12c
2) also appears once (twice) in (12c
3, 12c
4).
It is easy to see that definition D-5-1 implies lemma L-5-1. Definition D-5-1 claims that
Bobi’s preferences towards consequences realized in any specific time period is independent
of the consequences realized in any other time periods if and only if Bobi feels indifferent
towards two different lotteries that give the same total probability towards any time-specific
consequence that occur in the lotteries. If this is the case, then it is obvious that Bobi would
feel indifferent towards any two lotteries that both gave a total probability of either 1/2 or
1 to every single time-specific consequence that occur in them. And this is basically what
lemma L-5-1 is claiming.
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From lemma L-5-1, we are able to derive the additively separable utility representation
that we were seeking to achieve.
[THEOREM (T-5-1)] (Additively Separable Utility Representation): Given C1×...×Cn each
type of Bobi(i =+,S,G)’s preferences on the consequences that are realized in
any given time period t = 1, ...,n (i.e. Bobi’s preferences on elements of Ct)
are independent of the consequences that are realized in any other time period
j ( j 6= t and j = 1, ...,n) if and only if there exist utility functions utBobi on Ct
t = 1, ...,n such that
UBobi(x1,x2, ...,xn) = u1Bobi(x1)+u2Bobi(x2)+ ...+unBobi(xn) (5.1)
for all (x1,x2, ...,xn) ∈ C1× ...×Cn with utBobi unique up to the simultaneous
transformations u∗tBobi (xt) = utBobi(xt)+bt for all xt ∈Ct , t = 1, ...,n, ∑bt = 0
when UBobi is fixed in origin and scale unit.
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Previously, in our expected utility framework, we have derived each type of Bob′is (car-
44Proof. (The proof follows the general strategy of [Fishburn, 1965, pp. 42-43]) First, pick an arbitrary chain
of consequences (x01,x
0
2, ...,x
0
n) ∈C1× ...×Cn and assign values to ukBobi(x0k) such that it satisfies the equation:
UBobi(x
0
1,x
0
2, ...,x
0
n) = u1Bobi(x
0
1)+u2Bobi(x
0
2)+ ...+unBobi(x
0
n)
To make this more concrete, let x0t = Deatht and utBobi(Deatht) = 0 for t = 1, ...,n. Then,
UBobi(Death1,Death2, ...,Deathn)
= u1Bobi(Death1)+u2Bobi(Death2)+ ...+unBobi(Deathn)
= 0+0+ ...+0 = 0
(5.2)
Now, define each utBobi as:
utBobi(xt) =UBobi(Death1, ...,Deatht−1,xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn)−∑
j 6=t
u jBobi(Death j) (5.3)
for all xk ∈ Ck k = 1, ...,n. We can see that the definition of utBobi is simply a rearrangement of
UBobi(Death1, ...,Deatht−1,xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn) =u1Bobi(Death1)+ ...+ut−1Bobi(Deathk−1)+utBobi(xt)+
ut+1Bobi(Deatht+1)+ ...+ unBobi(Deathn). However, we know that utBobi(Deatht) = 0 for t = 1, ...,n. There-
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dinal) utilities for the sure consequences in C. However, in the previous frameworks, we
did not have the notion of time included in our model, and, thereby, the four consequences
fore, the definition of utBobi can be restated as:
utBobi(xt) =UBobi(Death1, ...,Deatht−1,xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn) (5.4)
Now, add both sides of (7.4) over all t = 1, ...,n. Then, we get:
n
∑
t=1
utBobi(xt) =
n
∑
t=1
UBobi(Death1, ...,Deatht−1,xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn) (5.5)
When I was beginning to explain our current framework, I have explained everything, (except for the fact
that our set of consequences is, now, a multi-component product set C1× ...×Cn), is left intact as it were in
the previous VnM and Savage’s framework. This means that each type of Bobi’s preferences towards various
probability distributions on C1× ...×Cn satisfy the four VnM axioms (from A-3-1 to A-3-4), which guarantees
for there to exist an expected utility function representing each type of Bobi’s preferences where the utility of a
probability distribution equals the expected utility of its sure consequence.
Applying this fact to lemma L-5-1, with c1 = (x1, ...xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn), c2 =
(Death1, ...Deatht ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn), c3 = (x1,x2, ...xt ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn), c4 =
(Death1, ...,Deathn), we get:
1
2
UBobi(x1, ...xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn)+
1
2
UBobi(Death1, ...Deatht ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn)
=
1
2
UBobi(x1,x2, ...xt ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn)+
1
2
UBobi(Death1, ...,Deathn)
Multiplying 2 to each side of the equation we get:
UBobi(x1, ...xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn)+UBobi(Death1, ...Deatht ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn)
=UBobi(x1,x2, ...xt ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn)+UBobi(Death1, ...,Deathn) (5.6)
By summing both sides of this equation from k = 1, ...,n−1, we get:
n−1
∑
t=1
UBobi(x1, ...xt ,Deatht+1, ...,Deathn)+
n−1
∑
t=1
UBobi(Death1, ...Deatht ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn)
=
n−1
∑
t=1
UBobi(x1,x2, ...xt ,xt+1,Deatht+2...,Deathn)+
n−1
∑
t=1
UBobi(Death1, ...,Deathn) (5.7)
By cancelling the terms and rearranging, we get:
UBobi(x1,x2, ...xn)
=
n
∑
t=1
UBobi(Death1, ...Deatht−1,xt ,Deatht+1...,Deathn)− (n−1)UBobi(Death1, ...,Deathn)
Since, UBobi(Death1, ...,Deathn) = 0, we get:
UBobi(x1,x2, ...xn)
=
n
∑
t=1
UBobi(Death1, ...Deatht−1,xt ,Deatht+1...,Deathn) (5.8)
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in C were timeless. Now that the consequences in our model are not just simple timeless
consequences, but chains of consequences the individual components of which are dispersed
throughout time, we would need to find a way to assign utilities for the individual conse-
quences that occur in each time period. After doing this, we would be able to derive the
utility for the entire chain of consequences by summing up the utilities that are assigned to
the individual consequences realized in each time period. The legitimacy of such process is
validated by theorem T-5-1.
In section 7.3, I have normalized each type of Bobi’s utility scale by assigning 0 to the
worst outcome (i.e. Death) and assigning 1 to the best outcome (i.e. Glorified Life.) From
this, we were able to approximate the utilities for the other two outcomes (i.e. Moderate
Life and Mortified Life) by finding the lottery that involves the two prizes Glorified Life
and Death to which each type of Bobi would feel indifferent to getting either Moderate
Life or Mortified Life for sure. Again, each type of Bobi’s utilities for these four timeless
consequences can be summarized as follows:
• uBob+(Glorified Life)= uBobS(Glorified Life) = uBobG(Glorified Life)= 1
• uBob+(Moderate Life)= uBobS(Moderate Life)= p
+ = pS > 23 > p
G= uBobG(Moderate
Life)
• uBob+(Mortified Life)= uBobS(Mortified Life)= q
+ = qS > 13 > q
G= uBobG(Mortified
Life)
Combining the results of (7.5) and (7.8), we finally get:
UBobi(x1,x2, ...xn) = u1Bobi(x1)+u2Bobi(x2)+ ...+unBobi(xn) (5.9)
which is the additive utility representation that we were seeking to achieve. What the representation is saying
is that, for each type of Bobi, the utility of any chain of consequence in C1× ...×Cn equals the total sum of the
utilities of each individual consequence that is realized in each time period.
Adding bt to each utBobi(xt) such that ∑
n
t=1 bt = 0 will keep the equation (7.9) intact. Therefore, if utBobi(xt)
represents Bobi’s preferences towards the consequences that are realized in time period t, then u ∗tBobi (xt) =
utBobi(xt)+ bt (∑
n
t=1 bt = 0) also represents Bobi’s preferences towards the consequences that are realized in
time period k. This proves the uniques part of the theorem and, thereby, completes the proof. 
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• uBob+(Death)= uBobS(Death) = uBobG(Death)= 0
Now, each of these four consequences can, now, be realized in each time period from t = 1 to
t = n. Given independence of each type of Bob′is preferences towards the four consequences
realized in different time periods, we are able to think of each time period separately in
determining the relative distances among the four time-specific consequences in each type
of Bobi’s preference-ordering.
We normalize each time-specific utility function by assigning utBobi(Deatht) = 0 and
utBobi(Glori f ied Li f et) = 1 for all t = 1, ...,n. (Recall that during the proof of theorem T-
5-1, I have assigned ukBobi(Deathk) = 0 for all k = 1, ...,n.) We, then, find the probabilities
p+,S,Gt to which Bob+,S,G would feel indifferent between the sure consequence of Moderate
Lifet and the lottery [p
+,S,G
t Glorified Lifet , (1− p+,S,Gt )Deatht] and assign utBob+,S,G(ModerateLi f et)=
p+,S,Gt . Similarly, we find the probabilities q
+,S,G
t to which Bob+,S,G would feel indiffer-
ent between the sure consequence of Mortified Lifet and the lottery [p
+,S,G
t Glorified Lifet ,
(1− p+,S,Gt ) Deatht] and assign utBob+,S,G(Morti f ied Li f et) = p+,S,Gt .
Now, it might be the case that a given type of Bobi does not value the same type of conse-
quence realized in different time periods in the same way. For instance, it is very likely that
BobG value a Glorified Lifet realized in an earlier time period much more highly than a Glo-
rified Lifet realized in a much later time period. This means that unBobG(Glori f ied Li f en)>
utBobG(Glori f ied Li f et) when n > t. We would need to incorporate this fact into our addi-
tively separable representation of each type of Bobi’s preferences.
A convenient way to do this is to express the additively separable utility representation
in weighted form as follows:
UBobi(x1,x2, ...xn) = α
i
1u1Bobi(x1)+α
i
2u2Bobi(x2)+ ...+α
i
nunBobi(xn) (5.10)
Here, α it (t = 1, ...,n) denotes the relative weights for each time-specific utility function
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of Bobi. To determine the relative weights for any two time periods, say t = 1,2, we sim-
ply let Bobi compare one option, which gives the best consequence in t = 1 and the worst
consequence in t = 2 (i.e. (Glorified Life1, Death2)) with another option which gives the
worst consequence in t = 1 and the best consequence in t = 2 (i.e. (Death1, Glorified Life2).)
(Remember that (Death1, Glorified Life2) denotes the purely hypothetical farfetched chain
of consequences where Bobi dies at time period 1 and suddenly revives and experiences
Glorified Life at time period 2.)
If Bobi’s preference is: (Glorified Life1, Death2)Bobi(Death1, Glorified Life2), then this
implies that α i1u1Bobi(Glori f ied Li f e1)+α
i
2u2Bobi(Death2)
> α i1u1Bobi(Death1)+α
i
2u2Bobi(Glori f ied Li f e2). Rearranging the terms, we get
α i1{u1Bobi(Glori f ied Li f e1)−u1Bobi(Death1)}
> α i2{u2Bobi(Glori f ied Li f e2)−u2Bobi(Death2)}, which implies that α i1 > α i2
since utBobi(Glori f ied Li f et) = 1 and utBobi(Deatht) = 0 for all t = 1, ...,n.
This means that Bobi values experiencing Glorified Life at time period 1 more than he
values experiencing Glorified Life at time period 2. If the inequality was the other way
around, then this would imply that Bobi values experiencing Glorified Life at time period 2
more than he values experiencing Glorified Life at time period 1. If it is an equality, then
this means that Bobi values experiencing Glorified Life at time period 1 and experiencing
Glorified Life at time period 2 equally.
By performing every pair-wise comparisons for all time periods t = 1, ...,n in this way,
we will be able to determine the relative weights for all α it (t = 1, ...,n.) The relative weight
α it (t = 1, ...,n) signifies the relative importance that Bobi puts to a given time period t. So,
when α i1 > α
i
2 > ... > α
i
n, this means that the given type of Bobi cares more about short-term
consequences than long-term consequences, and how much he cares about the consequences
realized in a given time period diminishes by each increment time.
According to Hobbes, putting too much emphasis on short-term gains while neglecting
long-term effects of one’s actions is one of the major causes that makes an agent form ir-
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rational preferences. According to Hobbes, this generally happens when the agent is being
influenced by the wrong kind of basic passion - such as the basic passion for glory - that later
becomes what Hobbes calls “perturbations” in the agent’s deliberation process.
Emotions or perturbations of the mind are species of appetite and aversion (. . . )
They are called perturbations because they frequently obstruct right reasoning.
(. . . ) Therefore, although the real good must be sought in the long term, which
is the job of reason, appetite seizeth upon a present good without foreseeing
the greater evils that necessarily attach to it. Therefore appetite perturbs and
impedes the operation of reason; whence it is rightly called a perturbation.
[Hobbes 1991: De Homine, Chapter XII, Section 1 emphasis added]
This would almost certainly be the case for BobG when he deliberates. That is, one of the
major reasons why BobG would gladly take very risky gambles between Glorified Life and
Death, which both Bob+ and BobS would quite obviously want to avoid, is because, the
basic passion for glory, which BobG is infatuated with, would make BobG concentrate only
on the immediate gains while making him overlook the long-term harms that such action
would very likely bring. The result would be preferences that are irrational because they are
unbalanced.
By utilizing the notion of relative weights in the additive representation of (7.10), we are
able to characterize this type of temporal unbalancedness. That is, when BobG, by being
influenced by a basic passion for glory, overvalues the importance of short-term gains while
neglecting the importance of long-term losses, this would mean that αGt is much greater
than αS,Gt in earlier time periods while αGt is much smaller than α
S,G
t in later time periods.
This means that, for i = S,G, Bobi’s preferences concerning the consequences realized in a
specific time period t is temporally non-fully-balanced if and only if αS,Gt 6= α+t .
However, in the previous section, I have defined the notion of “fully-balancedness” in
terms of utilities, and, it would, therefore, be nicer to find a way to characterize this type
205
of temporal unbalancedness in terms of utilities (and not relative weights) for the sake of a
more unified approach.
Doing this is actually not very hard. In the weighted additive utility representation of
(7.10), we can just simply incorporate the relative weights into each time-specific utility
function itself. This would render each Bobi’s time-specific utilities for each time-specific
consequence as:
• utBob+,S,G(Glorified Lifet) = α
+,S,G
t
• utBob+,S,G(Moderate Lifet)= α
+,S,G
t p
+,S,G
t
• utBob+,S,G(Mortified Lifet)= α
+,S,G
t q
+,S,G
t
• utBob+,S,G(Deatht) = 0
From this, we are able to express the utility for a given chain of consequences (x1,x2, ...xn) in
the additively separable form of (7.8) without using separate terms to denote relative weights
as in (7.10).
From this, we extend the definition of fully-balancedness (i.e. D-4-7) to incorporate the
notion of temporal non-fully-balancedness of Bobi’s preferences that we have just discussed
as follows.
[DEFINITION(D-5-2)] (Extension of Fully-Balancedness): For all chains of consequences
(x1,x2, ...xn) ∈C1× ...×Cn, Bobi (i =+,S,G)’s preferences are fully-balanced
if and only if UBob+(x1,x2, ...xn) =UBobi(x1,x2, ...xn) if and only if u1Bob+(x1)+
u2Bob+(x2)+ ...+unBob+(xn) = u1Bobi(x1)+u2Bobi(x2)+ ...+unBobi(xn).
Moreover, for all time periods t = 1, ...,n, Bobi (i =+,S,G)’s preferences con-
cerning consequences that are realized in any given time period are temporally
fully-balanced if and only if utBob+(xt) = utBobi(xt).
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With all of this in mind, we can now state our main theorem concerning Hobbes’s theory of
real good, as well as our main proposition concerning the notion of substantial rationality in
our additively separable framework as follows.
[THEOREM (T6)] (Additive Utility Representation of Hobbes’s Theory of Real Good): For
all chains of consequences (x1,x2, ...xn), (y1,y2, ...,yn) ∈C1× ...×Cn, the chain
of consequences (x1,x2, ...xn) is really better (or substantially better) than the
chain of consequences (y1,y2, ...,yn) for Bobi (i= S,G) if and only if (x1,x2, ...xn)
bob+ (y1,y2, ...,yn) if and only if UBob+(x1,x2, ...xn) > UBob+(y1,y2, ...,yn) if
and only if u1Bob+(x1)+u2Bob+(x2)+...+unBob+(xn)> u1Bob+(y1)+u2Bob+(y2)+
...+unBob+(yn).
That is, the chain of consequences (x1,x2, ...xn) is really better (or substantially
better) than the chain of consequences (y1,y2, ...yn) for Bobi (i = S,G) if and
only if, for Bob+, the total sum of the utilities for the individual consequences
realized in each time period of the chain of consequences (x1,x2, ...xn) is greater
than that of the chain of consequences (y1,y2, ...yn).
[PROPOSITION (P6)]: It is substantially rational for Bobi(i = S,G) to strictly prefer the
chain of consequences (x1,x2, ...xn) to the chain of consequences (y1,y2, ...yn)
if and only if if and only if (x1,x2, ...xn) bob+ (y1,y2, ...,yn) if and only if
UBob+(x1,x2, ...xn)>UBob+(y1,y2, ...,yn) if and only if u1Bobi(x1)+u2Bobi(x2)+
...+unBobi(xn)> u1Bobi(y1)+u2Bobi(y2)+ ...+unBobi(yn).
I will omit the proof. The proof for both T6 and P6 can be performed in exactly the same
way as it was performed in the previous sections.
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5.5 The Role of Laws of Nature: Solving the Epistemic
Problem
In our reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of real good, we have developed our theory on the
basis of our interpretation that what is really good for a given individual (e.g. Bob) is to
satisfy his/her rational preferences which can be identified with the type of preferences that
the individual’s idealized-self would form on behalf of the individual.
However, we have seen that, due to many practical constraints, the actual preferences of
a given individual would, in many cases, be quite different from the type of preferences that
the individual’s idealized-self, who is fully-knowledgeable and who is, more than anything
else, concerned about the individual’s long-term self-preservation, would form on behalf of
the actual individual. The individual might be insufficiently informed about the relevant facts
about the world, which would make him/her associate the wrong probability distribution with
a given course of action; the result will be preferences that are irrational because they are
unconsidered. Or the individual might be primarily under the influence of the wrong kind of
basic passion, which would make him/her assign wrong utilities for individual consequences
as well as whole chains of consequences; the result will be preferences that are irrational
because they are unbalanced.
So, the problem seems to be this. If what is really good for a given individual is the
satisfaction of the type of preferences that his/her idealize-self would form on behalf of
him/her, but, if, in very many cases, the preferences formed by actual individuals are, due
to many practical constraints, not the type of preferences that Hobbes’s theory of the good
would urge them to form, then how can anyone manage to know what his/her idealized-
self would advise him/her to do in any given situation, and, thereby, adjust his/her actual
preferences accordingly? In short, given our reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of real good,
we first encounter an epistemic problem of knowing what one’s idealized-self would actually
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advise one to do in any given situation.
I believe that what Hobbes calls the “laws of nature” are specifically designed to solve
this very epistemic problem. According to Hobbes,
A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis) is a precept or general rule, found out by
reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life
or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which
he thinketh it may be best preserved. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIV,
Paragraph 3]
Again, the fact that the laws of nature, which are discovered by reason, are specifically
designed to secure one’s self-preservation indicates that self-preservation is the major aim of
one’s reason and rationality, as it is stated in (P1). The fact that the laws of nature provide
prescriptive guidelines that help one secure one’s self-preservation indicates that the laws of
nature are specifically designed to help one form substantially rational preferences.
In Leviathan, Hobbes introduces roughly twenty laws of nature. Here is a list of some of
the laws of nature that Hobbes introduces:
• The First Law: “that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he has hope of
obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and
advantages of war.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIV, Paragraph 4]
• The Second Law: “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for
peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all
things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow
other men against himself.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIV, Paragraph 5]
• The Third Law: “that men perform their covenants made, without which covenants
are in vain, and but empty words, and the right of all men to all things remaining, we
are still in the condition of war.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XV, Paragraph 1]
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(...)
• The Ninth Law: “that every man acknowledge other for his equal by nature. The
breach of this precept is pride.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XV, Paragraph 21]
• The Tenth Law: “that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to re-
serve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the
rest. ... the observers of this law are those we call modest, and the breakers arrogant
men.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XV, Paragraph 22]
(and so on...)
The first law of nature urges one to choose peace when this is reliably expected and prepare
for war when this is not. This means that in situations where the achievement of peace
is reliably expected, acting peacefully best approximates what one’s idealized-self, who is,
more than anything else, concerned about one’s long-term self-preservation, would advise
one to do.
The second and the third laws of nature urge one to generally keep the agreements or
covenants that one had made with others. This means that, in most cases, the act of keeping
one’s agreements or covenants is associated with a probability distribution over chains of
consequences that maximizes the expected utility of one’s idealized-self.
The ninth and tenth laws of nature are specifically designed to direct people’s attention
away from any obsessions for glory and unnecessary power over other people. And, we can
see how much important Hobbes thinks that it is to refrain from being obsessed with glory
and power over others in order to secure one’s long-term self-preservation by observing his
consistent emphasis on the importance of recognizing the natural equality of men in the other
laws of nature.
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My aim is not to go any deeper in analyzing Hobbes’s laws of nature. My aim is simply
to show how the laws of nature relate to our current reconstruction of Hobbes’s theory of
real goodness. As I have mentioned in the previous chapters, the laws of nature of nature
constitute the contents of what Hobbes calls “moral science” or “moral philosophy.”
And the science of them [the laws of nature] is the true and only moral phi-
losophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good
and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan,
Chapter XV, Paragraph 40]
As we have seen in chapter 1, scientific knowledge is the culmination of the operation of
one’s combined rational faculties, and is something which Hobbes strongly advises one to
incorporate into one’s practical deliberation process. I believe that one of the main reasons
why Hobbes did not just recommend people to incorporate their rational faculties into their
deliberation process, but actually went a whole step further and presented a list of very
concrete guidelines in the name of “laws of nature” for people to follow in their practical
deliberations indicates that Hobbes was pretty much aware of the epistemic gap between
what people should prefer in the substantially rational sense (i.e. the preferences that one’s
idealized-self would advise one to form) and what people actually do prefer in real life, and
wanted to find a solution to this problem.
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Chapter 6
A Bayesian Game-Theoretic
Reconstruction of Hobbes’s State of
Nature
We now move on to one of the most important cornerstones of Hobbes’s entire political
philosophy; namely, his description of what would eventually happen in the state of nature;
a state in which there is no centralized government power.
6.1 Hobbes’s State of Nature: State of War
Hobbes’s justification for the existence of government entirely relies on the purported fact
that, without a government, people’s lives would be, not simply much worse, but utterly un-
bearable. This is because without a government that has sufficient power to enforce criminal
laws and effectively regulate people’s behaviors, the state of nature (which refers to a state
where there is no government) will, according to Hobbes, inevitably dissolve into a state of
universal war of all against all.
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to
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keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a
war as is of every man against every man. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter
XIII, Section 8]
Here, we must first get clear on what sort of state of affairs Hobbes intends to denote by the
term “war.” For one thing, for Hobbes, the application of the term “war” is not restricted to
the state of affairs where people are actually engaged in physical warfare with one another.
For WAR consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time
wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. ... so the nature of
war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during
all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.
[Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Section 8]
In other words, for Hobbes, the state of war simply denotes a state of affairs where there is
no sufficient guarantee of peace; that is, a state of affairs where expectations for a physical
battle to break out at any given moment are quite high.
One of the major disadvantages of such precarious times is that it is impossible for social
progress and prosperity to be stably achieved.
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is un-
certain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious buildings, no instru-
ments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge
of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and
which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death... [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Section 9]
Hobbes has famously summarized the life in the state of nature as:
... the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan,
Chapter XIII, Section 9]
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6.2 The Five Axioms of The State of Nature (which leads to
a state of universal war)
What are the specific conditions of the state of nature that makes Hobbes conclude that it will
inevitably result in a state of universal war? Based on textual evidence, the characteristic
conditions which, Hobbes thinks, would inevitably lead to a state of universal war can be
summarized into the following five axioms (which I will refer to as “the axioms of the state
of nature.”)
[AXIOM(A-6-1)] (Equality): People’s physical and mental capabilities are roughly equal.
The most important implication of this axiom is that, in the state of nature, even the weakest
human being has enough power (either physical or mental) to kill the most powerful human
being.1 This means that everybody else in the state of nature can be a (potential) threat to
one’s own self-preservation.
[AXIOM(A-6-2)] (Competition Due To Scarce Resources): In the state of nature, resources
are scarce in such a way that there will inevitably arise situations in which two
people would want to obtain the same object.
Coupled with the axiom of equality (i.e. A-6-1), this axiom implies that, in the state of
nature, one would inevitably face situations in which one is in direct competition for a given
resource with another person who has the potential to kill one. This is what Hobbes predicts
in the following passage:
But the most frequent cause why men want to hurt each other arises when many
want the same thing at the same time, without being able to enjoy it in common
or to divide it. The consequence is that it must go to the stronger. But who is
1“For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, ... , As as to the
faculties of the mind ... I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength.” [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Sections 1,2]
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the stronger? Fighting must decide. [Hobbes 1997: On the Citizen, Chapter 1,
Section 6]
And therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which
is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, en-
deavour to destroy or subdue one another.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter
XIII, Section 3]
Now, one might question whether the axiom of competition (i.e. A-6-2) is really a reasonable
assumption for the life in the state of nature. That is, is it really reasonable to assume that
competition caused by scarcity of resources will inevitably arise in a situation where there is
no government power?
The objection makes more sense if one remembers that the sole purpose of considering
the state of nature in Hobbes’s political philosophy is to justify the existence of governments.
If we absolutely need governments because, without governments, our lives in the state of
nature would be unbearably miserable, and if one of the primary reasons why our lives in
the state of nature would be unbearably miserable relies on the fact that competition will
inevitably arise in the state of nature due to scarcity of resources, then it seems that our justi-
fication for the existence of governments would be significantly weakened in contemporary
settings in which technological advances has, in many areas, overcome problems associated
with scarcity of resources.
To this, it might be helpful to remember that, within Hobbes’s entire moral and political
system, there is a resource that is guaranteed to be scarce: power.2 One of the most signifi-
2Within Hobbes’s moral system, power is defined as a person’s “present means to obtain some future ap-
parent good.” [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter X, Paragraph 1] As we have seen previously, for Hobbes, a
person’s apparent good is simply the satisfaction of the person’s current preferences. So, power, for Hobbes,
generally means any present means that could be used to satisfy the preferences that a person has at a given
moment. So, there could be many things that could count as power within Hobbes’s system. However, among
the several things that could count as power, there is something that Hobbes regards as the greatest:
The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united
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cant characteristics of power3 is that it is zero-sum; that is, one person’s gain is necessarily
coupled with another person’s loss. This makes power a scarce resource that not everybody
can fully enjoy. And, as we have seen, according to Hobbes, not only do people need power
to secure their own self-preservation, but there is a certain portion of the human population
that value power extremely highly, and, thereby, pursue power (not simply as a means for
one’s self-preservation, but) for its own sake. And, this leads us to the next two important
axioms of the state of nature.
[AXIOM(A-6-3)] (The Existence Of Two Types of Men): In the state of nature, there ex-
ists two types of people: the modest type and the vain-glorious type. Further-
more, it is common knowledge that the state of nature is inhabited by these
two types of people; that is, the modest type knows, and the vain-glorious type
knows that the modest type knows that there is a certain portion of the entire hu-
man population who are vain-glorious, people who enjoy having superior power
over others and pursue power, not as a means to secure one’s self-preservation,
but for its own sake.
[AXIOM(A-6-4)] (Human Psychology): Not everybody’s psychology is strictly egoistic. The
modest type, who compose the majority of the entire population, would strictly
prefer to cooperate with other people given that these other people cooperate in
return. This is not to say that the modest types are perfect altruists or masochists;
they are not the type of people who would enjoy having their cooperative behav-
iors being taken advantage of by other people. By contrast, the vain-glorious
types are the type of people who have a strictly egoistic psychology; they would
by consent in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his
will, such as is the power of a commonwealth...[Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter X, Paragraph
3]
In other words, according to Hobbes, the greatest power that a person can possibly acquire is the power to use
the powers of many other people according to one’s will. This is power over other people. And, it is not hard
to expect that the scarcity of such power cannot be alleviated by technological advancement.
3Here, I am denoting what Hobbes calls “the greatest of human powers” – namely, power over other people.
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gladly enjoy taking advantage of other people’s good intentions whenever it is
to their advantage and increases their power.
The textual ground for theses two axioms comes from the following passages:
Also, because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security
requires, if others (that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within mod-
est bounds) should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be
able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Section 4]
In the state of nature there is in all men a will to do harm, but not for the same
reason or with equal culpability. One man practices the equality of nature (. . . )
this is the mark of modest man (. . . ) Another, supposing himself superior to
other, wants to be allowed everything (. . . ) that is the sign of an aggressive
character. In his case, the will to do harm derives from vainglory. [Hobbes
1997: On the Citizen, Chapter 1, Section 4 emphasis added]
We can clearly see that Hobbes is not assuming that everybody in the state of nature is
obsessed with power in a vain-glorious way; many people - those who Hobbes calls “modest”
- would be quite content with having just enough power to subsist and secure their self-
preservation. However, according to Hobbes, there are people who want more than enough
power; not because they believe that having more power would help them better secure their
self-preservation, but rather because they simply enjoy having conquered and having power
over others.
It has been argued by many contemporary scholars that, not only does Hobbes assume
psychological egoism in his description of the state of nature, but something very similar to
psychological egoism is needed for Hobbes to properly explain the universal conflict, which,
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he thinks, will inevitably emerge in the state of nature.4 Psychological egoism is a doc-
trine that roughly claims that human beings universally have a strictly egoistic psychology
- that is, according to psychological egoism, everybody is more or less what Gauthier calls
“straight forward maximizers”5 who always try to maximize his/her own self-interest. This
is a contestable doctrine, and the more Hobbes’s political philosophy relies on psychological
egoism, the less firm is its very foundation.
We can see from the above passages that at least Hobbes did not assume psychological
egoism in his description of the state of nature. He concedes that there exist people who have
a strictly egoistic psychology and “[takes] pleasure in contemplating their own power in the
acts of conquest”; namely, people of the vain-glorious type. But he makes it clear that only
“some” - and not all - human beings fit into this category.
If there are any substantial theories of human psychology to which Hobbes should be seen
to be committed at this point, it is merely the denial of what may be called “psychological
altruism” - a doctrine that claims that human beings are universally altruistic. This is a
much plausible thing to assume than psychological egoism. As I have mentioned, it is quite
contestable to think that people are universally selfish and care only about themselves; it
is not hard to discover in our daily lives people displaying acts of benevolence and self-
sacrifice. However, it seems quite evident from our everyday experiences that, at least, not
everybody is a saint.
Some people might think that this is insufficient to generate the level and extent of uni-
versal conflict in Hobbes’s state of nature on which Hobbes’s justification for the existence of
4See [Butler, 1983, Hume, 1975, Broad, 1950]. Kavka [1986] thinks that some textual evidence does
suggests that Hobbes was a psychological egoist, but thinks that only a weakened version of psychological
egoism, which he calls “Predominant Egoism” is needed for Hobbes’s political philosophy to work. McNeilly
[1966] thinks that Hobbes was at least committed to psychological egoism in his earlier works. Hampton [1986,
pp. 20-24] interprets Hobbes as a psychological egoist who maintains that all of our desires are caused by a
“self-interested” bodily mechanism, and opposes the idea of interpreting Hobbes as a psychological egoist who
claims that all of our desires have self-regarding content. In other words, according to Hampton, Hobbes does
allow people to have certain kinds of other-regarding desires. However, according to Hampton, these other-
regarding desires play absolutely no role in Hobbes’s political argument that it is not entirely unreasonable to
regard Hobbes as a psychological egoist when one is trying to understand his political philosophy.
5See [Gauthier, 1984, p. 167]
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government ultimately relies. In what follows, I will argue that, concerning any substantial
assumptions about human psychology and motivation, the denial of psychological altruism
is all that we need to adequately explain how universal conflict in Hobbes’s state of nature
inevitably occurs.
Let’s return back to our discussion of the axioms of the state of nature. If only modest
people were in the state of nature, it might not have been so hard to achieve mutual coop-
eration without external enforcement. In such situations, people might be able to live in a
peaceful anarchy and establishing a government might not be necessary. However, this is
not the case for Hobbes’s state of nature. As we have seen, in Hobbes’s state of nature, it is
a known fact that there are vain-glorious men who desire to conquer and seek power for its
own sake. The major problem is that, in the state of nature, there is no reliable way to detect
these vain-glorious men in advance. This leads us to our final axiom of the state of nature.
[AXIOM(A-6-5)] (Uncertainty): In the state of nature, people cannot reliably know other
people’s types or beliefs.
Let’s think of this from the modest type’s perspective. In the state of nature, a modest type
will face at least one of the following two forms of uncertainties: (1) (Since the specific type
of each person is not ingrained visibly on each person’s forehead) in most cases, a modest
type will be uncertain about his/her counterpart’s type - that is, whether he/she is dealing with
another modest type like him/her or whether he/she is dealing with a vain-glorious type. (2)
Even when modest type A somehow gets to know that he/she is dealing with another modest
type B, modest type A will still be uncertain about whether modest type B believes that
he/she is dealing with another modest type like him/her or whether modest type B believes
that modest type A believes that he/she is dealing with another modest type like him/her and
so on - in other words, it is possible for modest type A to falsely believe that modest type B
believes that modest type A is a vain-glorious type, or modest type A might falsely believe
that modest type B believes that modest type A believes that modest type B is a vain-glorious
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type (and so on), and thereby, adapt his/her actions accordingly.
According to Hobbes, these two kinds of uncertainties that permeate through out the state
of nature causes fear and diffidence.
In men’s mutual fear ... I mean by that word any anticipation of future evil. ...
Even the strongest armies fully ready for battle, open negotiations from time to
time about peace, because they fear each other’s forces and the risk of being
beaten. Men take precautions because they are afraid... [Hobbes 1997: On the
Citizen, Chapter 1, p. 25]
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure
himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the
persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to
endanger him. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Section 4]
And, as it is indicated by this last passage, it emerges from all of these facts that initiating a
preemptive attack becomes the optimum strategy for everybody living in the state of nature.
This leads us to the main theorem of Hobbes’s state of nature which can be stated as follows:
[THEOREM(T-6-1)] (War of Every Man against Every Man): The state of nature results
in a state of war of every man against every man.
It is one thing to informally say that the state of nature will dissolve into a state of war by the
five axioms of the state of nature; it is another thing to rigorously show that this is indeed the
case. Our job in this chapter is to provide a game-theoretic model that is intended to show
that theorem T-6-1, indeed, follows from the five axioms of the state of nature in a slightly
more systematic and rigorous way.
Based on axiom A-6-5, we can see that uncertainty is one of the most important factors
that causes unwanted conflict in Hobbes’s state of nature. If there were no uncertainties in the
state of nature, it would have been quite possible for the modest type of people to exclude the
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vain-glorious type of people and cooperate with one another peacefully. The primary reason
why this is not possible is because of uncertainty.
Unfortunately, uncertainty has mostly been neglected in contemporary scholarship that
has tried to explain the universal conflict in the state of nature in the lights of contemporary
game-theory. This deficiency is what I intend to supplement in this current chapter.
6.3 Hobbes’s State of Nature as a “Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)”
Game
6.3.1 The Four Desiderata of Hobbes’s State of Nature
Any game-theoretic model that attempts to represent Hobbes’s state of nature correctly must
try to meet the following desiderata:
1. It must show that universal warfare is the equilibrium of the state of nature:
2. It must show that universal war is sub-optimal (i.e. Pareto-inferior): that is, it must
show that there is a social state (i.e. universal peace) which everybody would strictly
prefer to the state of universal war
The game-theretic model would also have to incorporate the following factors into
the model:
3. In the state of nature, there are two different types of people - the modest type and the
vain-glorious type - who respectively have different motivations which are manifested
in their respective preferences. (Axioms A-6-3 and A-6-4)
4. Each person in the state of nature is uncertain about his/her opponent’s type as well as
his/her opponent’s beliefs. (Axiom A-6-5)
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6.3.2 The PD (Prisoner’s Dilemma) Game
Many people have tried to model Hobbes’s state of nature as a PD (Prisoner’s Dilemma)
Game.6 The PD game is a very attractive model to represent Hobbes’s state of nature, and it
might be useful at this point to briefly explain the main structure of the PD game.
A PD game represents a strategic situation consisting of two players each with an option
to either cooperate or defect. Suppose that (x,y) denotes a state of the world where player 1
plays action x and player 2 plays action y. A strategic situation is a PD game if and only if
player 1 and player 2 each have the following preference-orderings:
• Player 1’s preference-ordering:
(Defect, Cooperate)  (Cooperate, Cooperate) (Defect, Defect) (Cooperate, De-
fect)
• Player 2’s preference-ordering:
(Cooperate, Defect)  (Cooperate, Cooperate) (Defect, Defect) (Defect, Cooper-
ate)
We can see that the preferences of player 1 and player 2 are symmetric. Both players most
prefer to defect while the other player cooperates, and least prefer to cooperate while the
other player defects. Both players also prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection. The
situation can be conveniently represented by the following game-matrix.
6See [Rawls, 1971, 1999, p. 269], [Taylor, 1976, Chapter 6], [Barry, 1965, pp. 253-254], [Gauthier, 1969,
pp. 76-89].
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Table 6.1: The PD Game
7
Player 1\ Player 2 Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2,2 4,1
Defect 1,4 3,3
The number written on the left side of the comma signifies player 1’s order of preference
while the number written on the right side of the comma signifies player 2’s order of
7Usually, there is a story that goes with the PD game. As a matter of fact the story is how the PD game got
its name: “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” The story goes something like this:
Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police believe that the two suspects have jointly committed an
egregious crime. However, the police lack sufficient evidence to charge the two suspects with the egregious
crime that they quite confidently believe that the two suspect have committed; the police only have enough
evidence to charge the two suspects with a minor offense. So, in order to charge the two suspects with the
egregious crime, it is necessary for the police to receive confession from the two suspects. In order to induce
confession, the police put the two suspects into two separate interrogation rooms rendering communication
between the two suspects impossible. The police propose the following deal to each of the suspects: “If both
of you remain silent, then both of you are going to each serve 1 year in prison for the minor offense that we are
able to charge with our available evidence. However, if one of you confesses while the other remains silent,
the one who confesses will get parole and will be immediately released for cooperating with the investigation,
while the other who remained silent will be fully charged with the egregious crime and serve 10 years in
prison. If both of you confess, then both of you will each serve 5 years in prison, which is a slightly reduced
sentence for the egregious crime that you both have jointly committed. So, what are you going to do; confess?
Or remain silent?”
The situation can be summarized by the following game-matrix.
Suspect 1\ Suspect 2 Remain Silent Confess
Remain Silent 1 year, 1 year 10 years, 0 years
Confess 0 years, 10 years 5 years, 5 years
Table 6.2: The Story of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma
Given that the two suspects care only about the
number of years that each serves in prison, we can
see that each suspect achieves a better outcome (i.e.
serves lesser years in prison) by confessing regard-
less of what the other suspect decides to do. The re-
sult is that both suspects confess and achieve what each considers the second worst outcome.
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preference. Note that, here, the numbers are not meant to be utilities, but simply the ranking
in each player’s preference-ordering.
In a game of prisoner’s dilemma, each player has a strictly dominant strategy; namely,
to defect. As we can verify from the above game-matrix as well as each player’s preference-
orderings summarized above, each player obtains a more preferable outcome by defecting
regardless of what the other player chooses to do.
The logic behind this reasoning is this: “The other player can either cooperate or defect.
If the other player cooperates, I get a more preferred outcome by defecting. If the other player
defects, I get a more preferred outcome by defecting. So, either way, I get a more preferred
outcome by defecting.” In this case, we say that the act of defecting strictly dominates the
act of cooperating, which means that defecting generates a strictly preferable outcome for
every action that the other player can take.
Knowing that defection strictly dominates cooperation, both players in the PD game will
choose to defect and, thereby, (defect, defect) becomes the unique (Nash) equilibrium of the
PD game. (I have indicated the equilibrium in the game-matrix by putting the numbers inside
the cell bold.) An equilibrium of a game is a situation where every player is best-responding
to every other player’s actions, and everybody’s actions are consistent with one another in the
sense that nobody has any incentives to deviate from his/her current action given the actions
of others. This makes the (Nash) equilibrium a stable point.
The interesting thing about the PD game is that the unique equilibrium of the game is sub-
optimal. That is, as we can verify from the game-matrix and the preference-orderings of each
player summarized above, we can see that both players prefer the social state (cooperate,
cooperate) rather than the social state (defect, defect) which is the unique equilibrium of the
game. This means that it is possible to enhance the situation of somebody (actually, in this
case, both players) without worsening the situation of anybody else. In economics jargon,
such enhancement is called a Pareto-improvement. A situation is sub-optimal whenever a
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Pareto-improvement is possible.
And, this is exactly what makes the prisoner’s dilemma a well-known paradox; the para-
dox of the PG game consists in the fact that the social equilibrium state does not coincide
with the social optimum state.8 Historically, the PD game has been used as a counter ar-
gument against Adam Smith’s dictum that claims that society can always achieve social
optimum (by the guidance of “the invisible hand”) by simply letting individuals pursue their
own preferences. We can see that this is not the case for the PD game; each player pursuing
his/her own preferences results in an equilibrium that is sub-optimal. This is true for any
situation that reflects the structure of the PD game.
6.3.3 Some Common Misunderstandings of the PD Game
Before we move on, I think that it would be helpful to correct some misunderstandings that
are commonly associated with game theory (or “rational choice theory” in general, of which
game theory is conceived to be a part) and, more specifically, the PD game. The misun-
derstandings generally stems from (mistakenly) thinking that game theory is committed to
some highly contestable substantial theory of human nature and human motivation; that hu-
man beings either are or should be strictly egoistic and self-interest-maximizing beings.
Based on such general assumption about game theory, critics tend to make either of the
following two objections.
• Objection 1. Game theory is defective as a normative theory of action; it urges one
to care only about one’s own self-interest when one ought to care about other things -
such as morality, good citizenship, the common public good - as well.
8Let me elaborate this a little bit more. It is not simply the fact that both players end up in a sub-optimal
situation that makes a PD game a paradox. It is no paradox in itself that people can end up in suboptimal
situations. The paradox of the PD game consists in the fact that both players end up in a sub-optimal social
state even when both players are perfectly rational in the sense that both are best-responding to each other’s
strategy given each of their preferences (note that this is exactly what is meant by saying that the social state
is an equilibrium.) In short, the paradox consists in the social equilibrium state not coinciding with the social
optimum state.
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• Objection 2. Game theory is defective as a descriptive theory of action; it assumes
that people, as a matter of fact, care only about their own self-interests even when they
apparently do not.
Let me comment on each of these objections in turn.
Game Theory is Defective as a Normative Theory of Action
When one is first introduced to game theory and the PD game, it is very easy for one to
understand game theory as recommending a certain prescription in the PD situation; that is,
game theory might seem to say, in a PD game, defection is rational, and this might seem to
imply that game theory recommends defection in the PD game.
Understood in this way, it seems that game theory is recommending people to be selfish;
that is, it seems that it is urging people only to care about their narrow self-interest rather
than to cooperate with other people even when such cooperation is possible. For instance, in
his article, “The Rational Choice Approach to Politics: A Challenge to Democratic Theory”,
Mark Petracca claims,
In the main, proponents of rational choice theory “assume that it is egoistically,
individualistically, irrational not to maximize one’s satisfactions and seek one’s
own greatest good.” [Petracca 1991, p. 296]
Many people find such conclusion rather distasteful. To them, even if it is true that defecting
in the PD game would maximize one’s self-interest, there could be other considerations, such
as a moral reason, that dictates one to cooperate rather than to defect in the PD game. (For
instance, maybe, the two suspects in the original prisoner’s dilemma story made a promise
not to confess if they happen to get interrogated by the police.) Some people might think
that such moral reason should override any reason that stems from purely egoistic consid-
erations. To them, game theory ignores such moral reasons or any other considerations that
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are not directly relevant to maximizing one’s own self-interest by relying on a very narrow
conception of rationality. According to Petracca,
The influence of values, ethics, and ideas on individual motivation are alien
to rational choice theories of human nature. By this account, public-spirited
behavior or behavior motivated by other-regarding motives is not only irrational,
but highly unlikely. [Petracca 1991, p. 297]
However, according to these people, urging people to become somebody who only cares
about his/her own narrow self-interest is not a proper way to cultivate democratic citizenship
to people who should rightfully care about things such as democratic deliberation and the
common public good. And, hence, they think game theory is defective as a normative theory
of action on which any political philosophy should be based.
Such objection against game theory and the PD game is misplaced. First of all, it is
a mistake to think of game theory as a normative theory of action that tells people how
they should act when they are in Prisoner’s-Dilemma-like situations. Rather, the primary
purpose of game theory is to learn what social state will emerge as a a stable equilibrium
point as a result of strategic interactions among two (or more) people who each have the
respective preferences that the specific game assumes them to have, and to see what kind of
properties that this stable equilibrium point has. If a strategic situation has a PD structure,
then game theory shows that universal defection will be the stable equilibrium point, and
that this stable equilibrium point will be sub-optimal. This is simply a conceptual (or a
mathematical) truth: in a PD game, it is true, by definition (of Nash Equilibrium, Pareto-
Optimality, and each player’s preference-orderings), that both players defect and that this is
the unique sub-optimal equilibrium of the game. Whether a real-life social situation truly has
a PD game structure is something that we would have to determine outside of game-theory,
empirically.
Second, although it is true that game theory assumes that it is rational for one to defect in
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the PD game, we should be very careful not to interpret this as claiming that one should de-
fect whenever one encounters a PD-game-like real-life situation. When game theory deems
it rational for each player to defect, this is so given that the two players described in the PD
game already have the preference structures that they are assumed to have. That is, what
game theory is claiming is this: given that each player prefers the outcome that each player
would obtain by defecting regardless of what the other player does, it is rational for each
player to defect. This is similar to saying that it is rational to choose an apple over an orange
given that one prefers having an apple to having an orange. However, one should be clear
that this is not to say that one should prefer an apple over an orange in the first place. Simi-
larly, game theory does not claim that it is rational for people to have a preference-ordering
that renders defecting a strictly dominant strategy, and makes their interaction an instance
of a PD game in the first place. Concerning the question of what sort of preferences people
should have, game theory does not take any stance.
In short, game theory is not a normative theory of action that tells people what sort of
preferences they should have. Rather, it is simply a mathematical model that represents a
given strategic interaction between two or more people who are assumed to have particu-
lar preference-orderings. Other than requiring a minimum set of consistency requirements,
game theory does not suggest what type of preference people should have; it only tells us
what would happen if people do have those type of preferences that are already assumed in
the model.
If there are any normative conclusions that we might be able to draw from the PD game,
it would be that there can be certain social situations where the social structure itself could
cause a sub-optimal social equilibrium to emerge, and that whenever we confront a social
situation that resembles the structure of the PD game it might be recommendable to alter
the incentive structure of the situation in order to restore the social optimum and achieve a
Pareto-improvement.9
9Such things are usually done in the field that is now known as “mechanism design.”
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Game Theory is Defective as a Descriptive Theory of Action
To this, the objector might raise another objection of the following line: regardless of whether
or not game theory is intended to be a normative theory of action, it is even defective as a
descriptive theory of action. This is because, according to these critics, empirical evidence
has shown that considerations of self-interests play a very marginal role in actual human
beings’ real-life actions and motivations.
... a growing body of empirical research in a variety of social science disciplines
shows the explanatory limits of the rational choice approach to human nature.
... Tom Tyler’s recently published study of why people obey the law shows that
normative values about distributive and procedural justice matter in the motiva-
tion of individual behavior. In a study of randomly selected citizens in Chicago,
Tyler made this important discovery:
“People obey the law because they believe that it is proper to do so, they react
to their experiences by evaluating their justice or injustice, and in evaluating the
justice of their experiences they consider factors unrelated to outcome, such as
whether they have had a chance to state their case and been treated with dignity
and respect. On all these levels people’s normative attitudes matter, influencing
what they think and do. (Tyler 2006, Why People Obey the Law, p. 178)”
[Petracca 1991, PP. 300-301]
Similar empirical findings have been found in the study of PD games in real-life situations: it
has been confirmed by many experiments that people participating in a game that mimics the
structure of the PD game tend to cooperate far more often than what game theory predicts.
10
10See [Dawes and Thaler, 1988, Cooper et al., 1996, Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evi-
dence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games]
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However, what the results of these empirical experiments really show is not that there is
any fault in game theory’s predictive or descriptive power, but merely that many people do
not have the preferences that would make their interaction in the experiments instances of a
PD game.
For example, suppose that an experimenter randomly picks two people from a group
and makes them play the following game: Each player can choose either to “cooperate” or
“defect.” When one player cooperates while the other defects, the person who cooperated
pays $1 while the person who defected receives $2. If both players cooperate, then both
players receive $1. If both players defect, then both players receive nothing. Moves are
made simutaneously.
Given that the two players care only about the amount of money they receive, we can see
that the experiment has exactly the same structure as the PD game. However, suppose that,
after many trials of the experiment, it turned out there were very many cases where the two
players chose to cooperate rather than to defect.
It is very easy to think that such experiment falsifies a major assumption as well as a
general prediction of game theory; that people care only about promoting their own self-
interest which would render the unique (Nash) equilibrium of the situation to be universal
defection. On the contrary, what the experiment really shows is merely that money is not the
only thing that people in general care about. And, the claim that people do care or should
care only about money is not a part of game theory.
People participating in the experiments might care about their reputation, etiquette to-
wards strangers, etc., and they might have thought that winning an extra dollar is not worth
compromising any of these things. If this explanation is correct, then this means that the
preference-orderings of the people who were participating in the experiments were very
likely to be not:
• (Defect, Cooperate)  (Cooperate, Cooperate) (Defect, Defect) (Cooperate, De-
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fect)11
but, something like:
• (Cooperate, Cooperate)  (Defect, Cooperate) (Defect, Defect) (Cooperate, De-
fect)
If this is so, then what the people participating in the experiment were playing was not a PD
game, but something like the game of Stag Hunt.
As I have explained, game theory is simply a mathematical model, most of the central
assertions of which are merely truths by definition. What game theory assumes is that peo-
ple generally choose according to their preferences and that these preferences conform to a
minimum set of consistency requirements (e.g. transitivity.) However, game theory is silent
on the issue of what specific preferences people do have or should have.
Different set of preferences (among the players) results in a different game. If people’s
real-life preferences happen to roughly conform to the preferences of the players in a spe-
cific game-theoretic model, then the equilibrium of that specific game is a good predictor
of what type of social situation will eventually emerge as a result of those people’s interac-
tions. However, (unsurprisingly) if people’s preferences are misrepresented, then the result-
ing game-theoretic model will very likely give false predictions. This does not show that
there is any intrinsic fault in game theory; it merely shows that we have chosen the wrong
game to represent the situation.
In short, game theory is not committed to any substantial theory of human psychology;
specifically, game theory does not claim that people are or that they should be selfish (e.g.
that they (should) care only about money, reducing their years in prison, and so on.) Game
theory does not deny that people’s preferences can be based on other things - such as their
11Where (X, Y) denotes a situation where Player 1 plays action X while the other Player 2 plays action Y
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moral or religious convictions, their sense of right and wrong, and certain types of other-
regarding desires. Therefore, it is a mistake to object to game theory by claiming that it is
defective either as a normative or a descriptive theory of human action on these grounds.
6.4 Why Hobbes’s State of Nature is Not a PD Game
It is understandable why so many people have been attracted to the idea of modeling Hobbes’s
state of nature as a PD game.
First of all, in a PD game, the act of defection strictly dominates the act of cooperation
and, thereby, universal defection is the unique equilibrium of the game. If the state of nature
is seen as a PD game, then this explains very well why the state of nature, according to
Hobbes, inevitably results in a state of universal war. So, modeling Hobbes’s state of nature
as a PD game meets the first desideratum that we have seen in the beginning of the previous
section.
Secondly, the unique equilibrium of a PD game, (namely, the state (defect, defect)) is
sub-optimal; that is, there is a state (namely, the state (cooperate, cooperate)) which both
players in the game would strictly prefer over the equilibrium. This corresponds very well
with the misery and the insecurity that Hobbes associates with the life in the state of nature,
and supports Hobbes’s own justification for establishing a government that has the power to
enforce peace. This shows that modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as a PD game meets the
second desideratum as well.
What all this shows is that the PD game is a very attractive game to model Hobbes’s state
of nature. However, modeling Hobbes’s state of nature by a PD game has the problem of
misrepresenting what Hobbes deems to be the major cause of conflict in the state of nature.
It is true that Hobbes thinks that everybody in the state of nature has a tendency to initiate
a preemptive attack and start a war of all against all. However, as we have already seen in
section 8.2, Hobbes explicitly states that not everybody is inclined to initiate a preemptive
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attack for the same reason.
Let’s go back (despite pain of repetition) to some of the passages that come from Hobbes’s
major texts:
In the state of nature there is in all men a will to do harm, but not for the same
reason or with equal culpability. One man practices the equality of nature (. . . )
this is the mark of modest man (. . . ) Another, supposing himself superior to
other, wants to be allowed everything (. . . ) that is the sign of an aggressive
character. In his case, the will to do harm derives from vainglory. [Hobbes
1997: On the Citizen, Chapter 1, Section 4 emphasis added]
Also, because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security
requires, if others (that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within mod-
est bounds) should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be
able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. [Hobbes 1994:
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, section 4 emphasis added]
We can see here that, according to Hobbes, the state of nature involves two different types of
people: (a) the modest person and (b) the vain-glorious person.
The vain-glorious person is inclined to initiate a preemptive attack regardless of whether
or not his/her opponent wishes to cooperate simply because he/she enjoys conquest and hav-
ing power over others. The modest person would be very glad to cooperate with his/her op-
ponent given that there is guarantee that his/her opponent will also cooperate in return. How-
ever, the modest person is also inclined to initiate a preemptive attack because he/she lacks
assurance that his/her opponent will not initiate a preemptive attack against him/herself:
either because his/her opponent is a vain-glorious person him/herself or because his/her op-
ponent is a modest person who mistakenly believes that he/she is dealing with a vain-glorious
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person.
And from this diffidence12 of one another, there is no way for any man to se-
cure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master
the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough
to endanger him. [Hobbes 1994: Leviathan, Chapter XIII, section 4 emphasis
added]
However, this is not the situation that is described in the PD game. In the PD game, both
players have exactly the same preference-orderings; both players strictly prefer to defect
even when there is a guarantee that the other player is going to cooperate. If we translate
this to Hobbes’s the state of nature, this would imply that everybody in Hobbes’s state of
nature would prefer to initiate a preemptive attack even when there is a guarantee that the
other party will cooperate and seek mutual peace. In other words, modeling Hobbes’s state
of nature as a PD game implies that everybody in the state of nature is vain-glorious.
This directly conflicts with what Hobbes says in the passages that we have just seen
above, which explicitly distinguishes between two types (i.e. the modest type and the vain-
glorious type) of people. This means that modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as a PD game
fails to meet the third desideratum that we have seen in section 8.3.
Furthermore, the primary reason why people dwelling in Hobbes’s state of nature lack
assurance that the other party will not initiate a preemptive attack is, as we have seen, that
people are uncertain both about the other party’s type (i.e. whether the other party is modest
or vain-glorious) as well as about the other party’s beliefs (i.e. whether the other party
believes that I am modest or vain-glorious.) This means that the game theoretic model that
aims to represent Hobbes’s state of nature should include aspects of uncertainty into the
entire picture.
12Here, it is worth mentioning that Hobbes is using the word “diffidence” in the archaic sense in which it
means suspicion or distrust.
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However, one should note that there are no aspects of uncertainty involved in the PD
game. The PD game (using the terminology of game theorists) is a complete information
game; that is, each player is completely aware of the other player’s preferences, pay-offs,
what type of strategies are available to each player, how many times the game will be played
in what sequence and so on. As we have seen, this is not how Hobbes describes the situation
in the state of nature where uncertainty is one of its most characteristic features as well as
the main cause of conflict. In short, the PD game fails to meet the fourth desideratum that
we have seen in section 8.3.
What all this shows is that the PD game, despite having some notable features that could
be used to explain the universal conflict in Hobbes’s state of nature, does not fit very well
with what Hobbes describes in his own text; it under-represents some of the key features
(i.e. different types of people and uncertainty) which Hobbes deems to be the main source of
conflict in the state of nature. In other words, although modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as
a PD game meets the first two desiderata, it fails to meet the third and fourth desiderata we
have seen in the previous section.
However, independently of whether the PD game fits with Hobbes’s original text well or
not, it should be noted that modeling the state of nature as a PD game has an additional prob-
lem of significantly weakening the major purpose of Hobbes’s political philosophy; which
is to justify the existence of governments. As I have already mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, many experiments that have been led by behavioral economists show that people tend
to cooperate much more often in games that were designed to mimic the structure of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. This suggests that people might not actually play a PD game were they
situated in Hobbes’s-state-of-nature-like situations where there is no government power to
enforce laws.
This suggests that the argument that people will engage in universal warfare in the state of
nature because they will be playing the PD game is quite likely to be at odds with empirical
human psychology. The more one’s justification for the existence of governments is based
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on a premise that is at odds with empirical human psychology, the more it loses practical
force and plausibility.
This last point suggests that even if Hobbes’s own text really did suggest that the state
of nature is a PD game, it might have been advisable for contemporary scholars to find
alternate models simply to boost the plausibility of Hobbes’s justification for the existence
of governments by modeling Hobbes’s state of nature in an alternate way. However, as we
have seen, one does not even need to go that far, since there is more than enough textual
evidence that shows that Hobbes did not think that the primary cause of universal warfare in
the state of nature was due to everybody being dominated by a basic passion for vain-glory,
which is required for the state of nature to be a PD game.
6.5 Other Alternative Models: The Stag Hunt and The It-
erated PD Game
Before I present my own model, I would first like to point out that I am not the first person
to express dissatisfaction of modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as a PD game. Some people
have suggested that Hobbes’s state of nature is really not a one-shot-PD game; but, instead
either a game of Stag Hunt13 or a game of iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma14. In this section, I
will briefly explain why I think these two models are inadequate representations of Hobbes’s
state of nature.
13See [Skyrms, 2004, chapter 1], [Gauthier, 1969, p. 85]. Gauthier thinks that Hobbes’s state of nature can
be modeled as a PD game in the short-term, and a Stag Hunt game in the long-term.
14See [Kavka, 1986, Chapter 4], [Hampton, 1986, Chapter 3]
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6.5.1 Problems with Modeling Hobbes’s State of Nature as a Game of
Stag Hunt
The game of Stag Hunt can be summarized by the following game-matrix:
Table 6.3: The Stag Hunt
Player 1\ Player 2 Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 1,1 4,2
Defect 2,4 3,3
15
Again, the numbers signify each player’s order of preference (not utilities.) The game of
Stag Hunt has two pure-strategy (Nash) equilibria (which are indicated in bold font); namely,
(Cooperate, Cooperate) and (Defect, Defect)), and one mixed-strategy (Nash) equilibrium
which I will omit.
Just like the PD game, the Stag Hunt meets the first two desiderata of Hobbes’s state
of nature; that is, (1) mutual defection is an equilibrium, and (2) mutual defection is sub-
optimal.
However, what distinguishes the game of Stag Hunt from the PD game is that, unlike
the PD game, mutual cooperation, along with mutual defection, is also an equilibrium. This
means that if Hobbes’s state of nature is truly a game of Stag Hunt, it is quite unclear why
the state of nature should inevitably dissolve into a state of universal war as Hobbes himself
claims, rather than it turning out to be a state of mutual peace and harmony.
In his book, The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling has argued that when there are
more than one equilibrium in a game, the actual equilibrium will turn out to be the one that
15Hampton follows Sen and calls the game an “Assurance Game.” See[Hampton, 1986, p. 67]
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is prominent based on cultural, historical, conventional factors. Schelling has called such
equilibrium a focal point of a game.16 This means that if Hobbes’s state of nature is a game
of Stag Hunt, then individuals will be able to achieve peaceful harmony without government
enforcement in some state of natures where there has historically been an ethos of mutual
cooperation. As a result, in such situations, there would be no need for a government. This
completely defies one of the main purposes of Hobbes’s political philosophy; which is to
justify the existence of governments for any population in any circumstances.
Furthermore, just like the PD game, the game of Stag Hunt does not incorporate one of
Hobbes’s major assumptions that in the state of nature there are two types of people (i.e. the
modest type and the vain-glorious type) who respectively have distinct preference-orderings;
we can see above that, in the game of Stag Hunt, there is only one type of player and the
preferences of the two players are symmetric.
Also, just like the PD game, the game of Stag Hunt is a complete information game
which incorporates no aspects of uncertainty. In short, not only does modeling Hobbes’s
state of nature as a game of Stag Hunt completely defies one of the major aims of Hobbes’s
political philosophy, it fails to meet the third and fourth desiderata that we have discussed
previously.
6.5.2 Problems with Modeling Hobbes’s State of Nature as an Iterated
PD Game
What about modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as an iterated PD game? An iterated PD game
is a game where the two players play the PD game multiple times. When the PD game is
played multiple time, it is possible for each player to either reward (by cooperating in the
next round) or punish (by defecting in the next round) his/her opponent’s behavior in the
previous round. This changes the dynamics of the game significantly.
16See [Schelling, 1981]
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If the game is played only finitely many times, then the game has only one equilibrium;
namely, both players defecting in every period of the game.17
However, if the game is played infinitely many times, there are other equilibria besides
the one where both players defect in every period of the game. One such equilibrium is
where both players play a strategy known as tit-for-tat. The rule of tit-for-tat is simple;
cooperate in your first move, and then copy what your opponent had done in the previous
round. Tit-for-tat can be characterized as a strategy of both punishment and forgiveness: it
punishes one’s opponent by defecting in the current round if one’s opponent defects in the
previous round; but, it forgives and rewards one’s opponent by cooperating in the next round
if one’s opponent cooperates in the current round.
There are a number of other equilibrium-strategy-pairs (besides tit-for-tat and consistent
defection) in the infinitely repeated PD-game which I will not go through in detail.18What’s
important is that, unlike the case of an one-shot PD game, in an infinitely repeated PD game,
it is possible for both players to reap the benefits of mutual cooperation for infinite number
of periods by mutually employing the right kind of strategy.
Just like the one-shot PD game and the Stag Hunt, the iterated PD game meets the first
two desiderata of Hobbes’s state of nature.
However, besides meeting the first two desiderata, modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as
an iterated PD game has its own merits. The most significant merit is that it seems to explain
the universal warfare that is characteristic of the state of nature, while, at the same time,
show how people can escape the state of nature and successfully establish a government by
themselves. As I have just briefly explained, although it is true that both players defecting in
17This can be proved by backward induction.
18These other equilibrium-strategy-pairs can be distinguished by the severity of the punishment that each
strategy prescribes when one first encounters defection by the other player. The grim-trigger strategy (i.e. the
strategy of no forgiveness) prescribes one to cooperate until one first encounters defection by the other player,
in which case it prescribes to consistently defect afterwards. The strategy of limited-punishment prescribes one
to initially cooperate, and, when one first encounters defection by the other player, it prescribes one to punish
the other player by defecting for a given number (n) of periods. With an adequate discount rate, it can be
shown that both players playing either the grim-trigger strategy or the strategy of limited-punishment can both
be equilibria in an infinitely repeated PD game.
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every period of the game is an equilibrium, there are other equilibria where both players are
able to mutually cooperate throughout the game. These latter equilibria open possibilities
for people to escape the predicament they face in the state of nature.19
However, the problem is not that simple. One problem is whether it is really plausible
to think of the interaction among the people living in the state of nature as a repeated PD
game. The iterated PD game requires each player to play the PD with the same opponent
repeatedly.
I doubt that this would be the case for people living in the state of nature. In the state
of nature, it would be far more likely for each person to randomly encounter a different
opponent everytime they happen to interact with somebody. If this is so, then it might be
more plausible to model Hobbes’s state of nature as a one-shot game, rather than some
repeated game.
Even if one happens to interact with the same person more than once, such interaction
cannot be repeated infinite number of times in the state of nature. This is because, in the
state of nature, interaction with other people can, in many case, result in the death of one of
the parties. This means that Hobbes’s state of nature can, at best, be modeled as a finitely
repeated PD game.
However, we have seen that in a finitely repeated PD game, mutual defection for all peri-
ods of the game is the only equilibrium of the game.20 This takes away a major attraction of
modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as an iterated PD game; namely, the fact that it shows how
people can escape the state of nature and successfully establish a government by themselves.
Even if we concede that interaction in the state of nature can be repeated with the same
19Of course, the same thing can be claimed for the Stag Hunt as well. That is, in the game of Stag Hunt,
the two players can achieve mutual cooperation if there happens to be widespread convention of cooperation
which would make mutual cooperation the focal point of the game. However, the dynamic interaction of
the iterated PD game seems to better explain how universal cooperation can emerge naturally by constant
interaction between the players themselves.
20Things get a little more complicated in which the two players know that they are playing a finitely repeated
PD game, but do not know the number of periods. If we assume that the probability that the game will end at
the next period increases as the game moves on, we can again show, by backward induction, that the unique
Nash equilibrium of the game is mutual defection for all periods of the game.
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person infinite number of times, modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as an infinitely repeated
PD game has exactly the same problems that caused problems for the Stag Hunt game.
That is, since there exist multiple equilibria where both parties can naturally achieve mutual
cooperation in an infinitely repeated PD game, modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as an
infinitely repeated PD game significantly weakens Hobbes’s major argument for justifying
the necessity of government. Furthermore, modeling Hobbes’s state of nature as an infinitely
repeated PD game fails to meet the third and fourth desiderata by not incorporating the
distinction between the two types of people (i.e. the modest type and the vain-glorious type)
as well as aspects of uncertainty, which Hobbes clearly assumes to exist in the state of nature,
into the model.
In short, although many people have been attracted to the idea of modeling Hobbes’s state
of nature as an infinitely repeated PD game, it fails to be an ideal game theoretic-model that
is both faithful to Hobbes’s original text and that could serve Hobbes’s original intentions
well.
6.6 Modeling Hobbes’s State of Nature with Bayesian Game
Theory
We have just seen that most game theoretic models that have been hitherto presented to
represent Hobbes’s state of nature failed to provide an adequate representation by failing to
meet the third and fourth desiderata that I have stated in section 8.3.1. If one is faithful to
Hobbes’s original text, it is not hard to realize that it was not, strictly speaking, people’s
egoistic psychology that Hobbes thought to be the primary cause of universal conflict in the
state of nature.
Rather, the universal conflict in the state of nature, according to Hobbes, is primarily due
to uncertainty. Therefore, any game theoretic model that does not model uncertainty is, I
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claim, an incorrect model of Hobbes’s state of nature. And, in order to model uncertainty,
one would have to utilize, what is known as, Bayesian game theory.
When one encounters strategic situations with other people, one is not always perfectly
or completely informed about the nature of the strategic interaction that one is facing. That
is, one can be uncertain in many ways. Among the many ways that one can be uncertain
about a given strategic interaction, game theorist generally distinguish between imperfect
information and incomplete information.
In game theory, a player is said to face imperfect information when he/she does not know
the past moves that were played by one’s strategic opponents. However, in an imperfect in-
formation game, each player is still assumed to know every aspect that relates to the structure
of the game itself; such as how many players there are, what kind of preferences the players
have, what kind of strategies are open to the players, and so on. Simply put, in an imperfect
information game, the players know what kind of game that they are playing; what they do
not know is how the other players played out their moves in the previous stages of the game.
In an incomplete information game, the nature of the uncertainty is deeper. This happens
when any one or more players are uncertain about any aspect that directly relates to the
structure of the game itself: such as the preferences of the other players, the kind of strategies
that the other players can play, what kind of beliefs that the other players have, and so on.
Simply put, in an incomplete information game, the players might not even know what kind
of game that they are playing.
Game theorists knew how to analyze imperfect information games. However, it took
some time for game theorists to figure out how to analyze incomplete information games.
The solution came from John Harsanyi in his three sequence papers, titled, “Games with
Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I-III” published in 1967 and 196821,
and is now introduced in most standard introductory textbooks in game theory.22
21[Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b]
22See [Osborne, 2003, Dutta, 1999, Dixit and Skeath, 2004]
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The basic idea is to include an additional player called “nature” that makes the first move
related to the specific aspect that the players in the game are uncertain about. The move is
usually characterized as a probability distribution on the various options that the uncertain
parameter can possibly take. By doing so, the incomplete information game has, in effect,
been reduced into an imperfect information game, where the players do not exactly know
nature’s past moves.
After reducing an incomplete information game into an imperfect information game, we
can now utilize the same tools that we have used to analyze imperfect information games to
analyze the incomplete information game that we are interested in. This is what I plan to do
in this section.
6.6.1 First Bayesian Model of Hobbes’s State of Nature: Uncertain
About the Other Person’s Type
Let’s start with two individuals living in Hobbes’s state of nature: Bob and Jill. There are two
versions of Bob and Jill; the modest versions (denoted by BobS, JillS) and the vain-glorious
versions (denoted by BobG, JillG)23All types of Bob and Jill have two available actions: they
can either seek peace or initiate a preemptive attack.
Different types of Bob and Jill have different preferences. The different preferences
depend on both what type one is and what type one happens to be interacting with. The pref-
erences of the four types of players are summarized in the following four game-matrices:
23Again, this is a continuation of our previous chapter. BobS is the type of Bob who is primarily influenced
by a basic passion for self-preservation, and BobG is the type of Bob who is primarily influenced by a basic
passion from glory. The same thing applies to Jill as well.
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Table 6.4: Different Types of Bob and Jill’s Preferences in the State of Nature
BobS\ JillS Peace Attack
Peace 1,1 4,2
Attack 2,4 3,3
BobS\ JillG Peace Attack
Peace 2,2 4,1
Attack 1,4 3,3
BobG\ JillS Peace Attack
Peace 2,2 4,1
Attack 1,4 3,3
BobG\ JillG Peace Attack
Peace 2,2 4,1
Attack 1,4 3,3
Again, the numbers in each cell signify each player’s order of preference. Here is a short
explanation for the situation. The vain-glorious types (i.e. BobG and JillG), being obsessed
with glory, prefers to initiate a preemptive attack regardless of his/her opponent’s type as well
as his/her opponent’s actions. The modest types most prefers to seek peace and cooperate
with other modest types provided that the other modest types reciprocate one’s cooperation.
However, the modest types would rather initiate a preemptive attack if the other modest type
is going to attack, and would prefer to initiate a preemptive attack against other vain-glorious
types for preventive purposes. We can see that the game played by BobS and JillS is a game
of Stag Hunt, while the other three games played by other type-combinations of Bob and Jill
are PD games.
It will be convenient to assign a pair of utilities for each cell in each of the game-matrices
above. In order to use the results that we have established in the previous chapter, we would
need to assign consequences for each of the cells in the game-matrices above that respects
each types of Bob and Jill’s preference-ordering. Remember that for all types of Bob and
Jill: Glorified Life Moderate Life Mortified Life  Death.24 The result of putting these
24Here is a very brief explanation of what each type of lives signifies; Death literally means death; Mortified
Life means a life with insufficient power (i.e. being under the power and influence of other people); Moderate
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consequences in the game-matrices becomes:
Table 6.5: The Consequences that Each Type of Bob and Jill will Face by Performing Their
Respective Actions
BobS\ JillS Peace Attack
Peace Glorified Life, Glorified Life Death, Moderate Life
Attack Moderate Life, Death Mortified Life, Mortified Life
25
BobS\ JillG Peace Attack
Peace Moderate Life, Moderate Life Death, Glorified Life
Attack Glorified Life, Death Mortified Life, Mortified Life
26
Life means a life with just enough power to sustain one’s self-preservation; Glorified Life means a life with
more than enough power (i.e. having power over others) to sustain one’s long-term self-preservation.
25The interpretation for this might be something like this. When two modest type of people cooperate, both
will be able to reap the benefits of mutual cooperation and will be able to enjoy mutual prosperity. This, for
them, would mean a glorified life. If one of the modest type initiates a preemptive attack, while the other
modest type seeks peace, the modest type that attacks will be able to catch the other modest type that sought
peace off-guard, and will be able to kill him/her. The fact that any human being has enough physical + mental
power to kill another human being comes from the axiom of equality that we have seen in section 8.2. When
both modest types decides to attack, then both would be able to avoid being killed by the other party since both
parties would be prepared for such assault. However, after the fight both parties would be battered and would be
worse-off than they would otherwise be if they had both sought mutual peace. This is simply an interpretation;
it is pointless to argue about the minute details of it. What’s important is that the two modest type of players
are playing the game of Stag Hunt, and regards mutual peace as the most preferable outcome.
26The interpretation for this might be something like this. When a modest type knows that he/she is inter-
acting with a vain-glorious type, he/she knows that the vain-glorious type would prefer to initiate a preemptive
attack regardless how he/she acts. Knowing this, the modest type would prefer to initiate a preemptive attack,
and, hopefully, catch the vain-glorious type off-guard. If the modest type succeeds in doing this, he/she will be
able to kill the vain-glorious type as the axiom of equality suggests. Successfully killing a vain-glorious type
will earn the modest type a reputation that he/she is a hard-liner against vain-glorious types, which would deter
other vain-glorious types from attacking him/her. This added security (or power) would mean that the modest
type would obtain a Glorified Life by killing a vain-glorious type in the state of nature. Of course, the modest
type’s preference for a Glorified Life over a Moderate Life would not be as strong as that of a vain-glorious
type. Mutual peace between the modest type and the vain-glorious type would give both parties Moderate Life.
Mutual attack between the two parties would give them Mortified Life, since both would be wounded despite
not being killed. It’s not hard to imagine that being attacked by a vain-glorious type while the modest type
seeks peace will result in the modest type’s death. Again, what’s important is not the specific interpretation,
but the fact that when a modest type and a vain-glorious type interact, they are playing a PD game.
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BobG\ JillS Peace Attack
Peace Moderate Life, Moderate Life Death, Glorified Life
Attack Glorified Life, Death Mortified Life, Mortified Life
BobG\ JillG Peace Attack
Peace Moderate Life, Moderate Life Death, Glorified Life
Attack Glorified Life, Death Mortified Life, Mortified Life
We would now need to assign, not just simply ordinal utilities, but, what is known as VnM
(short for “Von-Neumann and Morgenstern”) or expected utilities. Unlike ordinal utilities,
which represents a person’s preferences in the sense that the person strictly prefers x to y if
and only if the utility of x is greater than the utility of y (i.e. x y iff U(x)>U(y)), VnM or
expected utilities represent a person’s preferences in the sense that the person strictly prefers
x to y if and only if the expected utility of x is greater than the expected utility of y (i.e. x y
iff EU(x)> EU(y)).
There is a set of specific conditions (known as the VnM Axioms27) that one’s preferences
must meet in order for there to be an expected utility function that could represent them. I
will not go through the VnM Axioms in this paper. I will simply assume that all types of
Bob and Jill meet the VnM Axioms.
Assuming that all types of Bob and Jill meet the VnM axioms, there exist expected
utility functions that represent each type of Bob and Jill’s preferences over various gambles
that include the four type of lives (i.e. Glorified Life, Moderate Life, Mortified Life, Death)
as their prizes. For our current model, I assign the following expected utilities for each of
27Some of the major VnM Axioms include independence, Archimedean, continuity (in some systems), asym-
metry, negative transitivity, and so on. For those who are interested in expected utility theory in general and
would like to know what these VnM Axioms signify, please refer to the following books. [Fishburn, 1970,
Kreps, 1988, Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Resnik, 1987, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944] or any standard
graduate-level textbook in decision theory.
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the four type of lives in the state of nature.28
• UBobS,BobG,JillS,JillG(Death) = 0
28The values that I assign here are not completely arbitrary. I will briefly explain the process by which I have
determined these values.
Given that each type of Bob and Jill’s meet the VnM axioms, we can find an expected utility function that
represents each type of Bob and Jill’s preferences over any gambles consisting of the four type of lives we have
listed above. Furthermore, if we find any one expected utility function that represets a given type of Bob or
Jill, we can find another expected utility function that represents the given type of Bob or Jill’s preferences by
performing a positive affine transformation of the original expected utility function.
Let’s start assigning utilities for the four type of lives for each type of Bob (i.e. BobS and BobG) and Jill
(i.e. JillS and JillG.) I will start with the two types of Bob; exactly the same process can be applied to the two
types of Jill afterwards.
First, start out by normalizing each type of Bob’s utility scale by assigning UBobS,BobG (Glorified Life)=1
and UBobS,BobG (Death)=0 for both BobS and BobG. We then find the two values m
S
1 and m
S
2 (0 ≤ mS1,mS2 ≤
1) that would make BobS indifferent to achieving a Moderate Life and playing the gamble [mS1· Glorified
Life; (1−mS1)·Death], and would also make BobS indifferent to achieving a Mortified Life and playing the
gamble [mS2· Glorified Life; (1−mS2)·Death]. We then assign the utilities UBobS (Moderate Life) = mS1 and
UBobS (Mortified Life) = m
S
2.
We can see that the function UBobS has the expected utility property - that is, the utility of a gamble is
its expected utility (for instance, UBobS ([m
S
1· Glorified Life; (1−mS1)·Death]) = mS1· UBobS (Glorified Life) +
(1−mS1)·UBobS (Death) = mS1) - and represents BobS’s preferences in the sense that BobS strictly prefers gamble
x to gamble y if and only if the expected utility of the gamble x is greater than the expected utility of gamble
y (for example, we know that BobS is indifferent between Moderate Life and the gamble, [mS1· Glorified Life;
(1−mS1)·Death] and we can see that the expected utilities of Moderate Life and the gamble [mS1· Glorified Life;
(1−mS1)·Death] are both mS1.) We can assign UBobG (Moderate Life) = mG1 and UBobG (Mortified Life) = mG2 .
We, now, determine the the respective ranges that each value mS1, m
S
2, m
G
1 , m
G
2 can take. First, remem-
ber that BobS is the modest type of Bob who is being influenced by a basic passion for self-preservation.
This implies that, within BobS’s preference-ordering, moving up from Death to Mortified Life would worth
more than moving up from Mortified Life to Moderate Life or moving up from Moderate Life to Glorified
Life. This implies that |UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e)−UBobS(Death) |= mS2− 0 = mS2 >|UBobS(ModerateLi f e)−
UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e) |= mS1−mS2 and
|UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e)−UBobS(Death) |=mS2−0=mS2 >|UBobS(Glori f ied Li f e)−UBobS(ModerateLi f e) |=
1−mS2.
Furthermore, BobS (unlike BobG) would not attach much value to glory (i.e. power) per se; BobS’s concern
for power would be limited to his interests in securing his self-preservation. Therefore, for BobS, moving up
from Moderate Life to Glorified Life would not be worth more than moving up from Mortified Life to Moderate
Life (which means moving up from an abject life to a decent life.) This implies that |UBobS(ModerateLi f e)−
UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e) |= mS1−mS2 >|UBob+(Glori f ied Li f e)−UBob+(ModerateLi f e) |= 1−mS1.
Summarizing all of this we get:
(a) mS1 > m
S
2 (i.e. a Moderate Life is strictly preferred to a Mortified Life)
(b) 2mS2 > m
S
1
(c) mS1 +m
S
2 > 1
(d) 2mS1 > 1+m
S
2
Of course, there will be more than one set of values for mS1 and m
S
2 that satisfy the inequalities (a), (b), (c),
(d). However, as one can easily confirm by simple algebra, there are lower bounds for both mS1 and m
S
2, which
are:
• mS2 >
1
3
(Multiplying 2 to each side of (b) and connecting it with (d), we get: 4mS2 > 2m
S
1 > 1+m
S
2. From this,
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• UBobG,JillG(Mortified Life) = 1/4
we get: mS2 >
1
3 . )
• mS1 >
2
3
(From the fact that mS2 >
1
3 and (d), we get: 2m
S
1 > 1+m
S
2 > 1+
1
3 =
4
3 . From this, we get: m
S
1 >
2
3 .)
Summarizing this, we get:
• UBobS(Glori f ied Li f e) = 1,
• UBobS(ModerateLi f e) = m
S
1 >
2
3
• UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e) = m
S
2 >
1
3
• UBobS(Death) = 0
We now go over the same process for BobG. Obviously, BobG, who is primarily influenced by the basic passion
for glory, will have different preferences towards the various gambles that include Glorified Life and Death as
their prizes.
It is not hard to expect that such type of Bob would value a glorified life extremely highly. So, for BobG,
moving up from Moderate Life to Glorified Life would definitely worth more than moving up from Mortified
Life to Moderate Life or moving up from Death to Mortified Life in BobG’s.
Furthermore, the fact that BobG strongly desires glory and honor implies that he would have a strong
aversion against dishonor and mortification. Of course, BobG’s aversion against dishonor would not be so
strong to the extent that he would rather prefer Death to a Mortified Life: but his preference for a Mortified Life
would not be that strong. This implies that, for BobG, moving up from Death to Mortified Life would worth
less than moving up from Mortified Life to Moderate Life.
Let mG1 and m
G
2 respectively be the values of p in the lottery [p·Glorified Life + (1− p)·Death] to which
BobG would be indifferent to securing a Moderate Life and a Mortified Life. By summarizing all of the facts
above, we get the following four inequalities:
(a) mG1 > m
G
2 (i.e. a Moderate Life is strictly preferred to a Mortified Life)
(b) 1−mG1 > mG1 −mG2
(c) 1−mG1 > mG2
(d) mG1 −mG2 > mG2
Again, there will be more than one set of values of mG1 and m
G
2 that would satisfy these four inequalities.
However, we are able to derive the lower bounds of mG1 and m
G
2 from these inequalities, which can be summa-
rized below:
• mG2 <
1
3
(Multiplying 2 to each side of (d) and connecting it with (b), we get: 1+mG2 > 2m
G
1 > 4m
G
2 . From this,
we get: mG2 <
1
3 . )
• mG1 <
2
3
(From the fact that mG2 <
1
3 and (b), we get: 2m
G
1 < 1+m
G
2 <
4
3 . From this, we get: m
G
1 <
2
3 .)
From this, we are able to summarize BobG’s utilities for the sure consequences as follows:
• UBobS(Glori f ied Li f e) = 1,
• UBobS(ModerateLi f e) = m
G
1 <
2
3
• UBobS(Morti f ied Li f e) = m
G
2 <
1
3
• UBobS(Death) = 0
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• UBobG,JillG(Moderate Life) = UBobS,JillS(Mortified Life) = 1/2
• UBobS,JillS(Moderate Life) = 3/4
• UBobS,BobG,JillS,JillG(Glorified Life) = 1
The four game-matrices that we have just seen above can now be summarized as follows:
Table 6.6: Summary of the Four Games Played by Each Type of Bob and Jill
BobS\ JillS Peace Attack
Peace 1, 1 0, 3/4
Attack 3/4, 0 1/2, 1/2
BobS\ JillG Peace Attack
Peace 4/3, 1/2 0, 1
Attack 1, 0 1/2, 1/4
BobG\ JillS Peace Attack
Peace 1/2, 3/4 0, 1
Attack 1, 0 1/4, 1/2
BobG\ JillG Peace Attack
Peace 1/2, 1/2 0, 1
Attack 1, 0 1/4, 1/4
Remember that the numbers in the matrices are, now, expected utilities; this means that each
type of Bob and Jill prefers option x to option y if and only if the expected utility of option
x is greater than the expected utility of option y for each type of Bob and Jill in question. I
now present the first Bayesian game-theoretic model for Hobbes’s state of nature as follows:
In sum, the ranges that the utilities of Moderate Life and Mortified Life could possibly take for BobS and BobG
would be: 1/3 < UBobS(Mortified Life) < 2/3 < UBobS(Moderate Life) < 1 and 0 < UBobG(Mortified Life) < 1/3
< UBobG(Moderate Life) < 2/3. The same utility ranges will apply to both types of Jill as well.
For convenience, let us pick some numbers that fit within these ranges and assign them as the expected
(VnM) utilities of Mortified Life and Moderate Life for both types of Bob and Jill. (What follows in the main
text of this paper are the values that I have assigned.) Note that this is not entirely arbitrary since the expected
utilities that were assigned would have to fit within the range that we have just seen which we have established
here.
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Figure 6.1: The First Bayesian Game-Theoretic Model of Hobbes’s State of Nature
Let me briefly explain what the model is saying. At first, nature makes the first move and
determines the proportion g of the entire population that is vain-glorious. g is a probability
that is known to all types of players. One may think that people living in the state of nature
know the value of g by their past experiences; that is, if one had encountered m vain-glorious
persons among n people that one had interacted in the past, then one believes that g = m/n.
Let’s assume that the proportion g of the entire population that is vain-glorious is common
knowledge.
The four branches that ramify from nature each correspond to the four possible states.
The left-most branch corresponds to the state where both Jill and Bob are vain-glorious; the
second branch corresponds to the state where Jill is modest and Bob is vain-glorious; the
third branch corresponds to the state where both Jill and Bob are modest; and the fourth
250
branch corresponds to the state where Jill is vain-glorious and Bob is modest.
The nodes that are connected with a dotted-line denote a given information set; in which
the player, given the information he/she has received, knows that he/she is located at one
of the nodes in the information set, but does not completely know which particular node
that he/she is located at. So, for example, the first information at the very top signifies that
Jill knows that she is a vain-glorious type, but does not know whether she is dealing with a
modest Bob or a vain-glorious Bob. In the bottom-left information set, Bob knows that he
is a vain-glorious type, but does not know whether he is interacting with a modest Jill or a
vain-glorious Jill, and also does not know what action Jill would decide to perform if she
were a modest type.29
For each information set, we use the Bayes’s law to determine the conditional probability
that the player is located at a particular node given that he/she is in the information set. (This
is why it is called Bayesian game-theory.) So, the probability that Jill is located at the
upper leftest node (i.e. she is interacting with a vain-glorious Bob) given that she herself
is vain-glorious (i.e. she is in the very first information set) would be: Pr(BobG | JillG)
= Pr(BobG∩JillG)Pr(BobG) =
g2
g2+g(1−g)= g.
The pay-offs written at the bottom denote the VnM (expected) utilities of Jill (at the top)
and Bill (at the bottom) for each “player-type + action” combinations. One can verify that
the pay-offs correspond to the pay-offs written in the four game-matrices above.
Now, let’s get into the interpretation of the model. We already know how the two vain-
glorious types (i.e. BobG and JillG) would act in the state of nature; they would initiate a
preemptive attack regardless of the type and actions of their opponent. What we are curious
about is how the modest types (i.e. BobS and JillS) in the state of nature would act when they
are uncertain about what type of person with whom they are interacting.
Remember that the modest types most prefer to mutually cooperate with another modest
29Note that Bob knows what action Jill would decide to perform if she were a vain-glorious type, (namely,
initiate a preemptive attack), since initiating a preemptive attack strictly dominates seeking peace for a vain-
glorious Jill.
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type given that the other modest type cooperates as well. However, the modest types prefer to
initiate a preemptive attack if either he/she is interacting with a vain-glorious type or he/she
is interacting with a modest type who decides to attack.
Since the pay-offs denote each player’s VnM (expected) utilities, each player prefers to
perform a given act to another act if and only if the expected utility of the former act is
greater than that of the latter act.
Suppose that one is the modest type of Jill (i.e. JillS.) For JillS, the expected utility of
seeking peace (i.e. playing P) would be: (the probability that Bob, who Jill is interacting
with, is vain-glorious) × (the utility of the outcome that is generated when BobG plays A
while JillS plays P) + (the probability that Bob, who Jill is interacting with, is modest) ×
{(the probability that BobS plays P)×(the utility of the outcome that is generated when BobS
and JillS play P) + (the probability that BobS plays A)×(the utility of the outcome that is
generated when BobS plays A and JillS plays P)}. Suppose that the probability of BobS
playing P is peB. Calculating all of this, we get:
• EUJillS(P)= (1−g) · peB · · · (8.1)
Similarly, we can calculate JillS’s expected utility of initiating a preemptive attack (i.e. play-
ing A), which is:
• EUJillS(A)=
1
2 ·g+(1−g)(34 · peB+ 12 · (1− peB)) = 12 + 14 · (1−g) · peB · · · (8.2)
The modest type of Jill, JillS, will initiate a preemptive attack if and only if the value of (8.2)
greater than that of (8.1). With simple algebra, one can verify that this is so when:
• peB · (1−g)< 23 (where 0 < g < 1 and 0≤ peB ≤ 1) · · · (8.3)
Whenever the values of g and peB satisfy this inequality, the modest Jill will initiate a pre-
emptive attack. Then, what does this inequality tell us? It tells us that it is not that hard for
even a modest type of person, (such as JillS), who would most prefer to cooperate and seek
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peace with another modest type, to initiate a preemptive attack on the other party in the state
of nature.
More specifically, the general intuition that is implied by the inequality is this: (a) The
more JillS believes Bob to be vain-glorious (i.e. the larger the value of g), the more is it
likely for JillS to initiate a preemptive attack. (b) The less JillS believes Bob will choose to
seek peace when he is modest (i.e. the lesser the value of pe), the more likely it id for JillS
to initiate a preemptive attack.
We can see that whether or not JillS (who is herself a modest type) would initiate a
preemptive attack is determined by two parameters; the values of g and peB. However, we
can see that when g is greater than 1/3 - that is, when the vain-glorious types constitute more
than one third of the entire population, the modest Jill (i.e. JillS) is guaranteed to initiate a
preemptive attack; even when she initially believes that Bob will seek peace for sure given
that he is modest. The same reasoning applies to the modest type of Bob (i.e. BobS) as well.
Even when there are far fewer vain-glorious people in the entire population, the modest
Jill will decide to initiate a preemptive attack if she believes that the probability that a modest
Bob would seek peace is not that high; again, this is so, whenever the two values of g and
peB satisfy the inequality (8.3) Again, exactly the same reasoning applies to the modest type
of Bob (i.e. BobS) as well.
What our first game-theoretic model shows is this. One does not need to assume that
everybody in the state of nature is vain-glorious or egoistic (which is an assumption that
is tacitly made by people who model Hobbes’s state of nature as a PD game) in order to
explain the universal conflict in Hobbes’s state of nature. Even the modest type of people
could very well initiate a preemptive attack in the state of nature, not because they do not
prefer peace (in fact, they prefer peace more than anything else), but rather, because they are
uncertain about whether they are interacting with another modest type like themselves or a
vain-glorious type. The conclusion is that, (in very many cases), everybody (including both
the modest types and the vain-glorious types) would decide to initiate a preemptive attack in
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Hobbes’s state of nature.
6.6.2 Second Bayesian Model of Hobbes’s State of Nature: Is it Possible
for One to Credibly Signal One’s Type?
In our first Bayesian game-theoretic model, we have seen that modest people living in
Hobbes’s state of nature can very well initiate a preemptive attack because they are uncertain
about whether they are interacting with another modest person or a vain-glorious person. In
other words, people in Hobbes’s state of nature can initiate a preemptive attack because they
are uncertain about the other person’s type.
If this is so, then it would be quite handy if it is possible for the modest people to credi-
bly signal their type to the other modest types so that they could coordinate their actions and
seek peace with one another. The following variant of Bayesian games (usually known as
signaling-games) models this type of situation.
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Figure 6.2: The Second Bayesian Game-Theoretic Model of Hobbes’s State of Nature
The model represents a situation where each type of Jill knows her own type and also knows
that she is interacting with a modest Bob. However, the modest Bob does not know what
type of Jill he is interacting with. Again, in such situations, the modest Jill would want to
distinguish herself from the vain-glorious Jill and would want to signal that she is a modest
type to the modest Bob; she might do so, by shouting, “I am modest!”, to the modest Bob.
However, in order for the modest Bob to properly use this information to successfully
coordinate his behaviors with the modest Jill, such signal must be credible. And such signal
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is credible only when it is actually in vain-glorious Jill’s own interest not to mimic modest
Jill’s signal and shout out, “I am also modest!”, herself. When the vain-glorious Jill thinks
that she would be better-off by copying the modest Jill’s signal, she will do so, and, this
would render the modest Jill’s signal, namely, shouting out, “I am modest!”, mere empty
words that convey no information.
When the two different types of Jill can be properly distinguished by their different sig-
nals, the resulting equilibrium will be, what game theorists call, a “separating equilibrium.”
However, if the two different types of Jill cannot be properly distinguished by a credible sig-
nal because one of the types has an incentive to mimic the other type’s signal, the resulting
equilibrium will be, what game theorists call, a “pooling equilibrium.”
I claim that there is no separating equilibrium in Hobbes’s state of nature. Here is a very
simple and informal way to think about it. Suppose, on the contrary, the modest Jill and the
vain-glorious Jill can be properly distinguished by their different signals; that is, only the
modest Jill sends the signal, “I am modest.”, to the modest Bob. If so, then the modest Bob
will know that he is interacting with a modest Jill whenever he receives the signal, “I am
modest.” from Jill, and will know that he is interacting with a vain-glorious Jill whenever he
receive any other signal. So, after receiving the signal, “I am modest.”, modest Bob will very
likely seek peace, and after receiving any other signal, modest Bob will initiate a preemptive
attack.
The catch to this is that the vain-glorious Jill will also know this quite too well. That
is, the vain-glorious Jill will know that if she copies modest Jill’s signal and shouts, “I am
modest.”, then she is very likely to face BobS’s peace-seeking gesture, while if she doesn’t,
she will be facing BobS’s preemptive attack for sure. In other words, by copying the modest
Jill’s signal, the vain-glorious Jill has a high chance to achieve Glorified Life, while she will
achieve Mortified Life for sure if she doesn’t. We can see that the vain-glorious Jill has every
incentive to copy the modest Jill’s signal. So, the vain-glorious Jill will also signal, “I am
modest.”
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However, the modest Bob will know this very well also. So, after receiving the signal,
“I am modest.” from Jill, the modest Bob will realize that such signal conveys no useful
information. This means that the modest Bob’s beliefs about the probability that he will be
facing a vain-glorious Jill will not be updated, and will, thereby, remain unchanged (i.e. it
will remain as g) after receiving the signal.
This, in effect, reduces our current signaling game into the right-half part of the first
Bayesian game-theoretic model that we have seen in the previous subsection. The analysis
is exactly the same as before; only this time, we will be reasoning in the shoes of the modest
Bob instead of the modest Jill. The result is that the modest Bob will initiate a preemptive
attack if and only if the values of g and peJ (i.e. the probability that the modest Jill will seek
peace) meet the following inequality:
• peJ · (1−g)< 23 (where 0 < g < 1 and 0≤ peJ ≤ 1) · · · (8.4)
Again, if the value of g is greater than 1/3 - that is, if the vain-glorious types constitute
more than one third of the entire population in Hobbes’s state of nature - the modest Bob is
guaranteed to initiate a preemptive attack. Even if the vain-glorious types constitute less than
one third of the entire population, the modest Bob is still very likely to initiate a preemptive
attack given that his beliefs about the probability that the modest Jill will seek peace is not
too high. And given that the modest Bob initiates a preemptive attack, the modest Jill best-
responds by initiating a preemptive attack also.
In short, our second Bayesian game-theoretic model shows another important reason why
Hobbes’s state of nature is very likely to dissolve into a state of universal war even when the
majority of the people prefer to seek mutual peace and cooperation. Not only are people in
Hobbes’s state of nature uncertain about what type of person they are interacting with, but,
in Hobbes’s state of nature, it is impossible for the modest types to successfully coordinate
with other modest types by sending signals that would distinguish themselves from the vain-
glorious types, because the vain-glorious types have a strong incentive to mimic the signals
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of the modest types which would render any signal sent by the modest types mere empty
words.
6.6.3 Third Bayesian Model of Hobbes’s State of Nature: Uncertain
About the Other Person’s Beliefs
Until now, we have seen that, in Hobbes’s state of nature, even the modest types, who would
most prefer to seek peace with other modest types, are quite likely to initiate a preemptive
attack because they are uncertain about what type of person they are interacting with. That
is, in Hobbes’s state of nature, the modest types do not know whether they are interacting
with another modest type like themselves or a vain-glorious type. Furthermore, we have seen
that it is practically impossible for the modest types to credibly signal their identities to other
modest types because the vain-glorious types have an incentive to mimic their signals and do
exactly the same.
However, now, suppose that two modest types who encounter each other in the state of
nature, somehow, got to know that each is interacting with another modest type. Would this
guarantee that the two people will now succeed in coordinating their actions and achieve
mutual peace? Not quite.
This is because although both modest people may know that he/she is interacting with an-
other modest person, the person may still not know whether the other person believes that
he/she is interacting with a modest person. In other words, conflict in the state of nature
can still emerge because people are uncertain about the other party’s beliefs even when they
know the other party’s type. The following Bayesian model demonstrates how people in the
state of nature can fail to achieve mutual peace by being uncertain, not about the other per-
son’s type, but about the other person’s beliefs.
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Figure 6.3: The Third Bayesian Game-Theoretic Model of Hobbes’s State of Nature
In this model, there are three possible states of the world; α, β and γ . Again, the dotted-
lines indicate the information set in which each given player is located. In all three states, α,
β and γ , Jill knows that she is interacting with a modest Bob, BobS. In state γ , the modest
Bob, BobS, also knows that he is interacting with a modest Jill. However, in states α and
β , the modest Bob, BobS, does not know whether he is interacting with a modest Jill or a
vain-glorious Jill.
A very interesting thing happens when the actual state is γ . Suppose that the actual
state is γ . Then, both Bob and Jill know that they are interacting with another modest type.
Furthermore, Bob also knows that Jill knows that she is interacting with another modest
type. However, what BobS does not know is whether JillS knows that BobS knows that he is
interacting with a modest Jill, JillS. This is because when the actual state is γ , BobS knows
that JillS knows that the true state is either β or γ . This means that there is a chance that
JillS would think that the true state is β than γ . But, if the true state is β , then JillS knows
that BobS knows that the true state is either α or β . In other words, if the true state is β ,
then JillS knows that there is a chance that BobS would believe that he is interacting with a
vain-glorious Jill rather than a modest Jill.
We can see, here, that Bob and Jill each has uncertainty in some part of his/her higher-
order beliefs. And this is precisely how BobS and JillS may both decide to initiate a preemp-
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tive attack even when they both know perfectly well that they are interacting with another
modest person. That is, if the actual state is γ , BobS might think that JillS thinks that BobS
thinks that he is interacting with a vain-glorious Jill, which would make JillS think that BobS
would initiate a preemptive attack, which, in turn, would make JillS initiate a preemptive
attack, and, by knowing this, BobS would have no choice but to initiate a preemptive attack
himself. This, again, results in universal conflict in Hobbes’s state of nature.30
Our third Bayesian game-theoretic model shows us another very important reason why
modest people that constitute the majority of the entire population can fail to coordinate their
30Here is the specific algebraic calculations. Suppose that one is BobS and is in the information set αβ -
BobS knows that the true state is either α or β , but he does not know whether the true state is α or whether the
true state is β (i.e. BobS does not know whether he is interacting with a vain-glorious Jill (α) or a modest Jill
(β ).) BobS knows that if the true state is α , JillG will initiate a preemptive attack for sure. Let the probability
for the true state being α given that BobS is in the information set αβ be a, and the probability that JillS would
seek peace given that the true state is β be peJ . Then, the expected utilities for each action, Peace and Attack,
for BobS in state αβ becomes:
• EUBobS(Peace)= (1−a) · peJ · · · (a)
• EUBobS(Attack)=
1
2 ·a+(1−a)( 34 · peJ + 12 · (1− peJ)) = 12 + 14 · (1−a) · peJ · · · (b)
BobS initiates a preemptive attack if and only if (a) < (b). This is so, when,
• peJ · (1−a)< 23 (where 0 < a < 1 and 0≤ peJ ≤ 1) · · · (c)
Again, for all values of 0≤ peJ ≤ 1, inequality (c) is satisfied when 13 < a < 1. Suppose that this is so. That is,
suppose that whenever BobS is in state αβ and is unsure about what type of Jill he will be facing, he believes
that there is more than one third chance of meeting a vain-glorious Jill rather than a modest Jill. Let this fact
be known to JillS.
Now, suppose that one is JillS who is in the information set, βγ . Exactly the same reasoning as before
applies here as well. Let the probability that the true state is β given that JillS is in the information set βγ be b,
and the probability that BobS would seek peace given that the true state is γ be peB. Note that if the true state is
β , then BobS is guaranteed to attack by the assumption that we made in the previous paragraph. The expected
utilities for each action, Peace and Attack, for JillS in state βγ becomes:
• EUJillS(Peace)= (1−b) · peB · · · (d)
• EUJillS(Attack)=
1
2 ·b+(1−b)( 34 · peB+ 12 · (1− peB)) = 12 + 14 · (1−b) · peB · · · (e)
JillS initiates a preemptive attack if and only if (d) < (e). This is so, when,
• peB · (1−b)< 23 (where 0 < b < 1 and 0≤ peB ≤ 1) · · · (f)
Again, for all values of 0≤ peB ≤ 1, inequality (f) is satisfied when 13 < b < 1.
Suppose, the common prior probabilities for each state, α,β , and γ , are Pr(α) = 1170 , Pr(β ) =
20
70 ,
Pr(γ) = 3970 . Then, both inequalities (c), (f) are satisfied, and, in state γ , which is the true state, the two modest
types of Bob and Jill will initiate a preemptive attack even when both perfectly know that each is interacting
with another modest type. This is because, in state γ , Bob does not know whether Jill knows that Bob knows
that Jill is modest; and Jill does not know whether Bob knows that Jill is modest.
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behaviors to achieve universal peace in Hobbes’s state of nature. Even when two modest
people correctly identify that their counterpart is modest, they may still be uncertain about
whether their counterpart knows that he/she is modest or whether his/her counterpart knows
that he/she knows that his/her counterpart is modest, and so on. As our third Bayesian game-
theoretic model shows, being uncertain about one’s counterpart’s beliefs (or one’s higher-
order beliefs) can very well cause each party to initiate a preemptive attack even when both
parties perfectly know that his/her counter part is modest.
6.7 Concluding Remarks
In the previous secion, we have seen three Bayesian game-theoretic models that jointly il-
lustrate how Hobbes’s state of nature could dissolve into a state of war of all against all as
Hobbes himself claims. We can see that the Bayesian game-theoretic models that I have
provided nicely meet all of the four desiderata that I have introduced in section 8.3.
First, the models show that universal warfare is the equilibrium of the state of nature;
of course, whether or not the modest types decide to initiate a preemptive attack depends
on the proportion of vain-glorious people in the entire population as well as the probability
that a given modest type would seek peace. However, we have seen that if the proportion
of vain-glorious people exceeds a certain number (in our model, 1/3), the modest types are
guaranteed to initiate a preemptive attack, which would lead to universal warfare.
Second, such universal warfare is sub-optimal. We can easily verify from our three
Bayesian game-theoretic models that universal peace is a social state in which everybody
(including the vain-glorious types) would prefer to rather be. This means that if there hap-
pens to be a powerful authority, such as a government, that has the power to enforce universal
peace among the people living in the state of nature, then such a social institution would en-
hance the situation of everybody without worsening the situation of anybody.
However, many of the game-theoretic models that we have seen in the previous sec-
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tions (including the PD game) all meet the first two desiderata. The real merit of our three
Bayesian game-theoretic models comes from the fact that, unlike the other game-theoretic
models that have tried to model Hobbes’s state of nature, they meet the third and fourth
desiderata as well.
As we can see, all three Bayesian game-theoretic models incorporate the existence of
two distinct types of people (i.e. the modest type and the vain-glorious type) that Hobbes
clearly assumes to dwell in the state of nature. This makes the three Bayesian game-theoretic
models meet the third desideratum. Furthermore, all three Bayesian game-theoretic models
directly model the relevant aspects of uncertainty into the model and show how uncertainty
can be the primary cause of the universal conflict that emerge in Hobbes’s state of nature.
This makes the three Bayesian game-theoretic models meet the fourth desideratum.
The fact that our three Bayesian game-theoretic models meet all four desiderata of Hobbes’s
state of nature makes them have several advantages that the previous game-theoretic models
that tried to model Hobbes’s state of nature did not have.
First of all, the three Bayesian game-theoretic models better accord with what Hobbes
actually states in his text. As we have already seen, Hobbes clearly did not think that the uni-
versal conflict which he thought the state of nature will inevitably dissolve into is primarily
caused by everybody being strictly egoistic and having the preference structure of the players
in the PD game. It is true that Hobbes thought that there are such egoistic and power-seeking
people in the state of nature. However, the main reason why Hobbes thought that universal
conflict would inevitably emerge in the state of nature is not because he thought that every-
body is egoistic and glory-hungry in this way, but rather, because he thought that the modest
people cannot properly distinguish themselves from the glory-hungry ones, and are unsure
about the beliefs of other modest people. Our three Bayesian game-theoretic models, unlike
previous game-theoretic models, accommodate Hobbes’s original intentions very nicely.
Second, the fact that universal conflict in the state of nature is due to uncertainty rather
than people having a strictly egoistic psychology has the advantage of freeing Hobbes from
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psychological egoism. As I have argued in one of the previous chapters, psychological ego-
ism (which roughly claims that all human actions are ultimately motivated by strictly egoistic
concerns) is a very contestable doctrine of human psychology which many people think to
be false. Remember that the primary role that the state of nature plays in Hobbes’s political
philosophy is to justify the existence of governments by illustrating the misery that people
would face when they did not have one. However, if the universal conflict as well as the mis-
ery that accrues it can only be explained by assuming a theory of human psychology which
many people think to be implausible, Hobbes’s justification for the existence of governments
would, to that very extent, be weakened.
Our three Bayesian game-theoretic models have the advantage of explaining the universal
conflict of the state of nature without assuming that everybody has a strictly egoistic psychol-
ogy. It shows that even when the majority of the people favor mutual peace and cooperation,
universal conflict can still emerge primarily because of uncertainty. Such explanation is free
of any contestable psychological assumptions, and is, thereby, more plausible and widely ap-
plicable to many actual human situations. This means that our three Bayesian game-theoretic
models provide a much firmer foundation that Hobbes’s political philosophy can stably rest
on, and, thereby, provide a more plausible justification for the existence of governments.
I would like to say one more thing before I conclude this chapter. In section 6.5, I have
explained that one of the reasons why many people are attracted to the idea of modeling
Hobbes’s state of nature as an infinitely repeated PD game comes from the fact that such
model seems to explain how people can escape the state of nature. The reason why I did
not include such attraction as one of the desiderata is because it was never part of Hobbes’s
intentions to provide an accurate historical account of how all of our particular governments
have originated. We can see, in the following passage, Hobbes’s rather apologetic attempt to
provide real-life examples that roughly fit into his description of the state of nature as a way
of responding to people who question the state of nature’s historical authenticity:
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It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time nor condition of
war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world. But there
are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of
America ... have no government at all. ... Howsoever, it may be perceived what
manner of life there would be where there were no common power to fear, by the
manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government
use to degenerate into, in a civil war. But though there had never been any
time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another ...
[Hobbes [1997, Leviathan, Chapter XIII, Section 10, 11]]
Hobbes explains that at least some parts of the world, such as America, are currently in a state
of nature, and that even if it is true that not all governments have originated from an actual
state of nature, we can, at least, speculate how miserable life would be in a situation where
there were no governments by observing what generally happens during civil wars. We can
see that what Hobbes is emphasizing here is the misery of the state of nature rather than its
historical authenticity. In other words, what Hobbes is virtually saying here is, “Even if my
description of the state of nature is, in many cases, historically false, the fact that our lives
will be miserable without a government is absolutely true!” And, as a matter of fact, this is
all that is needed for Hobbes’s purpose.
We should remember that the sole purpose of Hobbes’s state of nature is to justify the ex-
istence of governments. And between the misery and the historical authenticity of Hobbes’s
state of nature, it can be easily shown that the latter really plays no major role. That is, for
Hobbes, the fact that a particular government did not go through a phase of state of nature,
and was, thereby, not established by the mutual agreements made by its people, does not
undermine its legitimacy.
In Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes between two different ways that a commonwealth can
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be established: (1) by institution, and (2) by acquisition.31 A commonwealth is established
by institution when people spontaneously form a government and transfer their rights to the
sovereign by mutual agreement. A commonwealth is established by acquisition when people
become part of an already existing commonwealth either by succession (which Hobbes calls
“Paternal”32) or by physical force (which Hobbes calls “Despotical.”33) Between the two
cases, only governments established in the first way (i.e. by institution) go through a phase
of state of nature; that is, a phase of state of nature is absent in governments that were
established in the second way (i.e. acquisition.) Nonetheless, Hobbes claims that the rights
of the sovereign in both cases - that is, in cases of commonwealths by institution and in cases
of commonwealths by acquisition - are the same.34
Of course, Hobbes makes it clear that, in both types of commonwealths, the right of the
sovereign derives from the covenants made by its subjects.35 However, it is quite clear that
Hobbes is not confining the term “covenant” to mean only actual expressed consent. As it
can be affirmed by the fact that Hobbes likens the rights of a sovereign over its subjects in a
commonwealth established by natural succession (which is one form of commonwealth by
acquisition) to the rights that parents have over their children36, the term “covenant”, within
Hobbes’s moral an political philosophy, is used broadly to encompass the type of acts that
may be called “tacit consent” or “hypothetical consent.”
This means that, for Hobbes, whether or not a given commonwealth has actually gone
through a phase of state of nature and was established by the actual expressed consent of its
people is immaterial for its justification. What is sufficient is that, counterfactually speak-
ing, people’s lives would have been much worse if the commonwealth did not exist. And,
I repeat, this is all that is needed for Hobbes’s general purpose. In this sense, it might be
31See Hobbes [1994, Leviathan, Chapter XVII, Section 15]
32Hobbes [1994, Leviathan, Chapter XX, Section 4]
33Hobbes [1994, Leviathan, Chapter XX, Section 10]
34Hobbes [1994, Leviathan, Chapter XX, Section 14]
35Hobbes [1994, Leviathan, Chapter XVIII, Section 1 and Chapter XX, Section 11 ]
36Hobbes [1994, Leviathan, Chapter XX, Section 4]
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plausible to think of Hobbes’s state of nature as a hypothetical theoretical device that occu-
pies a similar place in Hobbes’s political philosophy as what the original position occupies
in Rawls’ political philosophy. 37
Or course, I am not denying that thinking of how people can actually escape the state
of nature (if there were such a phase), and how they can successfully establish a govern-
ment by mutual agreement, is, in itself, an interesting question to ask. However, it is not a
question that Hobbes himself directly pursues, nor does an answer to this question required
for Hobbes’s general purpose of justifying the existence of governments. This means that
there is really no theoretical need for a game-theoretical model that is designed to repre-
sent Hobbes’s state of nature to show how people in the state of nature can escape it and
successfully establish a government by mutual agreement. For the purpose of justifying the
existence of governments, it suffices for the game-theoretic model to show that the state of
nature results in a sub-optimal equilibrium.
However, for those who still think that showing how the people in the state of nature
could possibly escape the state of nature is a major attraction of any game-theoretic model
that represents it, it is not hard to see that our three Bayesian game-theoretic models can
satisfy these people as well. As we have seen, whether or not a given modest type decides
to initiate a preemptive attack in the stat of nature depends on two factors; (a) the proportion
of vain-glorious people in the entire population, and (b) the probability that a given modest
type is believed to seek peace.
When the proportion of vain-glorious people in the entire population is significantly low
or when the modest types start to believe that there is a high chance that other modest type
will seek peace, a given modest type will decide to seek peace as well. So, there are two
basic ways to escape Hobbes’s state of nature: reduce the number of vain-glorious people in
the entire population, or encourage modest people to seek peace more often. How this may
be achieved is left for the reader’s own speculation.
37See Rawls [1971, 1999, A Theory of Justice].
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I would like to end this paper by briefly saying something about the particular form of
government that Hobbes thinks that his argument from the state of nature justifies. Hobbes
thought that his argument supported a government with nearly absolute power - a government
in which the liberty of everybody except the sovereign are severely restricted.38 I believe
that this is a major logical slip into Hobbes’s, otherwise quite cogent, argument had fallen; I
believe that such logical slip can be attributed to many external factors (such as the general
political atmosphere) that Hobbes was experiencing in his own time. If we agree that giving
governments excessive power is nothing that is desirable in itself, and that the sole purpose
of governments is to prevent unwanted conflict and restore optimality, we must agree that
the basic form of government that Hobbes’s argument logically justify is a government that
has much more limited powers than what Hobbes himself had suggested.
38See Hobbes [1994, Leviathan, Chapter XVIII]
267
Bibliography
F. J. Anscombe and R. J. Aumann. A definition of subjective probability. The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, 34(1), 1963.
Kenneth Arrow. Social Choice & Individual Values. Yale University Press, 1951.
Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, 1980.
Kurt Baier. The Rationality and the Moral Order. Open Court, 1995.
S. Barberà, P. Hammond, and C. Seidl, editors. Handbook of Utility Theory-Volume I Prin-
ciples. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
S. Barberà, P. Hammond, and C. Seidl, editors. Handbook of Utility Theory-Volume II Ex-
tensions. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
Brian Barry. Political Argument. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.
D. Baucher and P Kelly, editors. The Social Contract From Hobbes to Rawls. Routledge,
1994.
Daniel Bernoulli. Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. Econometrica, 22
(1), 1954.
Cristina Bicchieri. 10. rationality and game theory. In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality.
Oxford University Press, 2004.
268
Ken Binmore. The Foundations of Analysis: A Straightforward Introduction-Book 1 Logic,
Sets and Numbers. Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Ken Binmore. The Foundations of Analysis: A Straightforward Introduction-Book II Topo-
logical Ideas. Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Ken Binmore. Mathematical Analysis: A Straightforward Introduction (second edition).
Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Ken Binmore. Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume 1: Playing Fair. MIT Press,
1994.
Ken Binmore. Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume II: Just Playing. MIT Press,
1998.
Ken Binmore. Rational Decisions. Princeton University Press, 2009.
L. Blume. Lecture notes on "ordinal representations".
L. Blume, A. Brandenburger, and E. Dekel. An overview of lexicographic choice under
uncertainty. Annals of Operations Research, 19, 1989.
Richard Brandt. The definition of an ’ideal observer’ theory in ethics. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 15(3), 1955.
Richard Brandt. A Theory of the Good and the Right (Revised Edition). Prometheus Books,
1998.
Michael E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press,
1987.
C. D. Broad. Egoism as a theory of human motives. Hibbert Journal, LXXXIV(8), 1950.
John Broome. Weighing Goods. Blackwell Publishing, 1991.
269
John Broome. Ethics out of Economics. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
John Broome. Weighing Lives. Oxford University Press, 2004.
Joseph Butler. Five Sermons (edited by Stephen Darwall). Hackett, 1983.
John M. Cooper, editor. Plato - Complete Works. Hackett, 1997.
Russell Cooper, Dounglas Dejong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross. Cooperation
without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner’s dilemma games. Games and
Economic Behavior, 12(13), 1996.
Peter A. Danielson, editor. Modeling Raionality, Morality, and Evolution. Oxford University
Press, 1998.
Stephen Darwall. Normativity and projection in hobbess leviathan. Philosophical Review,
109(3), 2000.
Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, editors. Moral Discourse and Practice:
Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford University Press, 1996.
Robyn M. Dawes and Richard H. Thaler. Anomalies: Cooperation. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 2(3), 1988.
A. Dixit and S. Skeath. Games of Strategy (second edition). W. W. Norton & Company,
2004.
Prajit Dutta. Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice. The MIT Press, 1999.
Daniel Ellsberg. Classic and current notions of ’measurable utility’. The Economic Journal,
64(255), 1954.
J. Elster and J. Roemer, editors. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
270
Jon Elster. Sour Grapes - Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge University
Press, 1983.
Jon Elster. Ulysses and the Sirens - Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge
University Press, 1984.
Roderick Firth. Absolutism and the ideal observer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search, 12(3), 1952.
Roderick Firth. Reply to professor brandt. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15
(3), 1955.
Peter C. Fishburn. Independence in utility theory with whole product sets. Operations
Research, 13(1), 1965.
Peter C. Fishburn. Utility theory. Management Science, 14(5), 1968.
Peter C Fishburn. A general theory of subjective probabilities and expected utilities. Man-
agement Science, 14(5), 1969.
Peter C Fishburn. Utility Theory for Decision Making. Wiley, 1970.
Peter C. Fishburn. A study of lexicographic expected utility. Management Science, 17(11),
1971a.
Peter C. Fishburn. Lexicographic orders, utilities and decision rules: A survey. Management
Science, 20(11), 1971b.
Peter C. Fishburn. The axioms of subjective probability. Statistical Science, 1(3), 1986.
M. Fleurbaey, M. Salles, and J. Weymark, editors. Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utili-
tarianism - themes for Harsanyi and Rawls. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Wulf Gaertner. A Primer in Social Choice Theory. Oxford University Press, 2006.
271
David Gauthier. The Logic of Leviathan. Oxford University Press, 1969.
David Gauthier. Rational cooperation. Noûs, 8(1), 1974.
David Gauthier. Thomas hobbes: Moral theorist. The Journal of Philosophy, 76(10), 1979a.
David Gauthier. David hume, contractarian. Philosophical Review, 88(1), 1979b.
David Gauthier. Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press, 1984.
David Gauthier. Review: Taming leviathan. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16(3), 1987.
Bernard Gert. Hobbes and psychological egoism. Journal of the History of Ideas, 28(4),
1967.
Bernard Gert. Hobbess account of reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 76(10), 1979.
Bernard Gert. Introduction. In Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive) (edited by Bernard
Gert). Hackett, 1991.
Allan Gibbard. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Harvard University Press, 1990.
Alvin I. Goldman. A Theory of Human Action. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.
Ian Hacking. The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge University Press, 1975, 2006.
F. Hahn and Martin Hollis, editors. Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford University
Press, 1979.
Ishtiyaque Haji. Hampton on hobbes on state of nature cooperation. Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, 51(3), 1991.
Jean Hampton. Hobbes and The Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge University Press,
1986.
272
Jean Hampton. Cooperating and contracting a reply to i. haji. Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research, 51(3), 1991.
Jean Hampton. Hobbes and ethical naturalism. Philosophical Perspectives, 6. Ethics, 1992.
Russell Hardin. Collective Action. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.
John C. Harsanyi. Ethics in terms of hypothetical imperatives. Mind, New Series, 67(267),
1958.
John C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players, i-iii.
part i. the basic model. Management Science, 14(3):159–182, Novermber 1967.
John C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players, i-iii.
part iii. the basic probability distribution of the game. Management Science, 14(7):486–
502, March 1968a.
John C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players, i-iii.
part ii. bayesian equilibrium points. Management Science, 14(5):320–334, January 1968b.
John C. Harsanyi. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social
Situations. Cambridge University Press, 1977.
John C. Harsanyi. Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics. Economics and Ethics
(American Economic Association), 68(2), 1978.
John C. Harsanyi. Does reason tell us what moral code to follow and, indeed, to follow any
moral code at all? Ethics, 96(1), 1985.
D. Hausman and M. McPherson. Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy
(second edition). Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Thomas Hobbes. Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive). Hackett, 1991.
273
Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan (with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668). Hackett,
1994.
Thomas Hobbes. On The Citizen. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Thomas Hobbes. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. Dodo Press, 2009.
David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1975.
David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Penguin, 1984.
Richard C. Jeffrey. On interpersonal utility theory. The Journal of Philosophy, LXVIII(20),
1971.
Richard. C. Jeffrey. The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press, 1983.
G. Jehle and P Reny. Advanced Microeconomic Theory (second edition). Addison Wesley,
2000.
Niels Erik Jensen. An introduction to bernoulliam utility theory: 1 utility functions. The
Swedish Journal of Economics, 69(3), 1967a.
Niels Erik Jensen. An introduction to bernoulliam utility theory ii - interpretations, evalua-
tion and application; a critical survey. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 69(4), 1967b.
James Joyce. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press,
1999.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47(2), 1979.
Gregory Kavka. Hobbess war of all against all. Ethics, 93(2), 1983.
Gregory Kavka. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton University Press, 1986.
274
Gregory Kavka. The rationality of rule-following: Hobbess dispute with the foole. Law and
Philosophy, 14(1), 1995.
Isaac Kramnick. Writing politics. In Jonathan Monroe, editor, Writing and Revising the
Dicsiplines. Cornell University Press, 2002.
David H. Krantz, R. Duncan Luce, Patrick Suppes, and Amos Tversky. Foundations of
Measurement. Dover, 1971.
Jody S. Kraus. The Limits of Hobbesian Contractarianism. Cambridge University Press,
1993.
David M. Kreps. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Westview Press, 1988.
David Lewis. Convention. Blackwell Publishing, 2002.
R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. Games and Decisions Introduction and Critical Survey.
Dover, 1957.
Alfred F. MacKay. Extended sympathy and interpersonal utility comparisons. The Journal
of Philosophy, 83(6), 1986.
John Mackie. Ethics - inventing right and wrong. Penguin, 1977.
A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University
Press, 1995.
F. S. McNeilly. Egoism in hobbes. The Philosophical Quarterly, 16(64), 1966.
F. S. McNeilly. The Anatomy Of Leviathan. Macmillan, 1968.
A. Mele and P Rawling, editors. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University
Press, 2004.
John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarianism and Other Essays. Penguin, 1987.
275
C. Morris and A. Ripstein, editors. Practical Rationality and Preference. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001.
Paul Moser, editor. Rationality in Action - Contemporary Approaches. Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
Roger Myerson. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1997.
Patrick Neal. Hobbes and rational choice theory. The Western Political Quarterly, 41(4),
1988.
Robert Nozick. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books, 1974.
Martin Osborne. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press, 2003.
Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, 1984.
Mark P. Petracca. The rational choice approach to politics: A challenge to democratic theory.
The Review of Politics, 53(2), 1991.
Philip Pettit. Rules, Reasons, and Norms. Oxford, 2002.
Peter Railton. Moral realism. The Philosophical Review, XCV(2), 1986a.
Peter Railton. Facts and value. Philosophical Topics, XIV(2), 1986b.
Peter Railton. Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003.
John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999.
John Rawls. Political Liberalism (second edition). Columbia University Press, 1993, 2005.
Tom Regan. The case for animal rights. In David Boonin and Graham Oddie, editors, What’s
Wrong? – Applied Ethicists and Their Critics (Second Edition). Oxford University Press,
2010.
276
Michael Resnik. Choices - An Introduction to Decision Theory. University of Minnesota
Press, 1987.
Fred S. Roberts. Measurement Theory. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.
John Roemer. Theories of Distributive Justice. Harvard University Press, 1998.
Leonard Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. Dover, 1972.
T. M. Scanlon. What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1998.
Thomas M. Scanlon. Preference and urgency. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72(19), 1975.
Thomas Schelling. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W.W. Norton & Company, 1978.
Thomas Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1981.
A. Sen and B. Williams, editors. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press,
1982.
Amartya Sen. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. North-Holland Publishing Company,
1970.
Amartya Sen. Plural utility. Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, 1981.
Amartya Sen. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Harvard University Press, 1982.
Brian Skyrms. Evolution of The Social Contract. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Brian Skyrms. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University
Press, 2004.
Michael Slote. An empirical basis for psychological egoism. The Journal of Philosophy, 61
(18):530–537, 1964.
277
J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism For & Against. Cambridge University
Press, 1973.
Michael Smith, David Lewis, and Mark Johnston. Dispositional theories of value. Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 63, 1989.
Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau, editors. Leviathan After 350 Years. Oxford University Press,
2004.
Leo Strauss. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis. University of
Chicago Press, 1996.
Nicholas Sturgeon. Hume on reason and passion.
Robert Sugden. Rational choice: A survey of contributions from economics and philosophy.
The Economic Journal, 101(407), 1991.
A. E. Taylor. The ethical doctrine of hob. Philosophy, 13(52), 1938.
Michael Taylor. Anarchy and Cooperation. London: Wiley, 1976.
Tom R. Tyler. Why People Obey the Law. Princeton University Press, 2006.
Peter Vallentyne. Contractarianism and Rational Choice. Cambridge University Press,
1991.
Hal Varian. Microeconomic Analysis (Third edition). W. W. Norton & Company, 1992.
Hal Varian. Intermediate Microeconomics (seventh edition). W. W. Norton & Company,
2006.
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
Princeton University Press, 1944.
278
Howard Warrender. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation. Oxford
University Press, 2000.
John A. Weymark. Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism. Social Choice
and Welfare, Vol. 25, 2005.
Bernard Williams. Internal and external resons. In Moral Discourse & Practice (edited by
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton) (1997). Oxford University Press, 1981.
279
